PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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PROGRESS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE USSR

Biology • *David Joravsky*

Geography • *John E. Chappell, Jr.*

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PROGRESS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE USSR

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Progress and Ideology in the USSR

No political system is immune to the forces of social change, and the Soviet system is no exception. Ever since the death of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, his heirs, nudged by their instinct for self-preservation, realizing that their political survival required adjustment to the new needs of the developing society they wanted to govern, have been engaged in a cautious, frequently checkered, but nonetheless significant process of economic, social, and political transformation. The use of mass terror as a principal means of political rule has been abandoned; and economic improvement, based on higher standards of efficiency induced by material incentives, has become the substance of the new "march to communism."

The new deference to social reality brought in its wake the need for further and wider intellectual renovation. The subjective obscurantism of Stalin's day had to give way to objective judgments if rational policy decisions supporting rational ends were to be made and executed. Thus a revival of science, including the social sciences, became a real practical necessity, and the only way to promote this end was to grant at least limited autonomy to scientific endeavor.

Yet, while implicitly acknowledging that its ideology—Marxism-Leninism—does not represent the ultimate achievement as a scientific method, and often explicitly admitting that its past leadership has been deficient in its judgments of reality and even as the determinant of policy, the party continues to insist on its absolute political supremacy in the Soviet state and society. And to continue promoting its political monopoly, it must continue to defend its ideology as the morally superior creed and the ultimate prescription for social progress.

The resulting inexorable conflict is unfolding already. Having been forced by "life itself" to grant varying degrees of autonomy to the scientists, social scientists, writers and artists, the party has opened its political authority and especially its ideology to continuous challenges. The questions posed by these challenges are as numerous as they are intriguing. What has in fact been the extent and quality of change in Soviet science since Stalin's death? What have been the developments in the social sciences, and within what scope are these sciences allowed to function? What of new directions in philosophy? How much have the arts and letters benefited from the new climate? What threats does science present to official doctrine? Will the party be able to confine scientific inquiry within a prescribed conceptual framework? How far will the party go in confining its doctrine? Will protracted and serious ideological adjustment lead to an erosion of ideology in the USSR?

These are some of the issues to which the following articles are addressed. It is hoped that the survey will open up fresh perspectives on the present course of Soviet society. It may also lead to some fascinating conjecture about the dialectical relationship between progress and the world's "most progressive" ideology.

—The Editors

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The Debacle of Lysenkoism

By David Joravsky

Three myths must be set aside before Lysenkoism can be examined realistically. Two are completely fanciful, yet they constantly reappear in Western comments on Lysenko, as if his mythopoeic mentality were a contagion affecting his foreign critics as well as his domestic followers.[1] The first myth derives Lysenkoism from the writings of Marx and Engels, the second from a Communist desire to remold human heredity.

There is a connection between Marxist ideology and Lysenkoism, but it is as remote, indirect, and subtle as the connection between Protestant ideology and American racism. Lysenko's claim that Marx and Engels are the authors of his biological theories can no more be taken at face value than the Southern Baptist habit of justifying white supremacy by citing Biblical texts. Marx and Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin wrote very little about biology, and what little they wrote consciously avoids such technical issues as the mechanism of heredity. Soviet Marxist commentators on biology did get involved in technical issues, but Lysenkoism did not originate among them. Their original center, the Timiriazev Institute, was closed down in 1935, just when Lysenkoism emerged in full force. Lysenkoism was born in agronomy and plant physiology at the end of the 1920's—without benefit of Marxist texts. It is a fact

[1] For recent examples, see C. L. Sulzberger in the *New York Times,* June 4, 1965; also E. W. Caspari and R. E. Marshak, "The Rise and Fall of Lysenko," *Science* (published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science), July 16, 1965, pp. 275-78.

Currently an Associate at the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, Mr. Joravsky is the author of Soviet Marxism and Natural Science *(Columbia University Press, 1961) and is now working on a full-length history of the Lysenko affair. He has twice visited the Soviet Union for research purposes, most recently in the spring of 1965 under the sponsorship of the National Science and Guggenheim Foundations.*

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that in the mid-1930's the philosopher L. I. Prezent helped Lysenko to extend his empire to plant breeding, genetics, and evolutionary theory, but is also a fact that in the early 1930's Prezent, like the other Marxist philosophers, had been a partisan of standard genetics. In the late 1930's, on order from the Central Committee, the other Marxist philosophers embraced Lysenkoism, just as they are now deserting it. Such behavior can hardly be interpreted as an intellectual effort to keep faith with Marxist texts. Both the intellect and the texts are conspicuous by their absence.

The myth about Lysenkoite commitment to the improvement of human heredity also credits anti-intellectuals with a seriousness of thought that they steadfastly avoid. Some Bolsheviks once concerned themselves with the improvement of human heredity, as K. A. Timiriazev did before the Revolution.[2] N. A. Semashko, the first Commissar of Health, sponsored research not only in medical genetics but also in eugenics, in an effort to discover and control the heredity factors in social development. Indeed, Semashko pictured applied eugenics as the long-run goal of his commissariat, a goal attainable only in a Communist society. By the mid-1920's, however, he and other leading Bolsheviks were already backing away from this radical position. Eugenics came to be denounced as a pseudo-science. Whether Mendelian or Lamarckist in its understanding of the heredity mechanism—at that time some eugenicists were still Lamarckist—the subject itself was declared inherently reactionary and repulsive. Reactionary, because it cast doubt on the biological quality of humanity, thus undermining confidence in mankind's ability to improve itself by social revolution. Repulsive, because it compared our reproductive patterns with those of mice and fruit flies and suggested that human mating should be regulated by the state as the mating of cattle is regulated by stockbreeders. Bolshevik ideologists were no more impressed than nice people in the West by the argument that people share certain patterns of reproduction with mice and fruit flies, and that efforts to discover these patterns may suggest ways to improve the regulation of human mating, which has always been a function of state power anyway. Indeed, Soviet officials are sometimes more finical on this subject than many Western politicians. Their law, for instance, does not require people getting married to submit to a test for venereal disease. (In the 1920's Semashko urged that such a requirement be postponed until there were enough physicians in the countryside. The number of doctors in the Soviet Union today suggests that this condition has been met, but Soviet law still requires simply a declaration that the partners have informed each other of the state of their health.)

Bolshevik revulsion against eugenics antedated the rise and survives the fall of Lysenkoism. It has not rested on the assertion that the improved environment created by the revolution would transform human heredity. It has rested on the assertion that changes in heredity do not matter, that they ceased—or at least ceased to play an important part in social development—once society emerged from the subhuman level. The final crushing argument was, and is, the observation that the improvement of human heridity was a Nazi preoccupation. The Lysenkoites simply carried this anti-intellectual attitude to its ultimate absurdity. They denied the importance of heredity not only in social but even in individual development. In 1936, after S. G. Levit was arrested and his Institute of Medical Genetics closed, research in the subject ceased altogether. Medical genetics has been revived in the last few years, but efforts to find the social significance of changes in human heredity remain taboo.

Kremlinology and Lysenkoism

The third popular myth, or series of myths, concerns the politics of Lysenkoism. The rise and long-delayed fall of this odd school are attributed to powerful men intriguing in the Kremlin. This line of thought is certainly reasonable, but with inadequate evidence it usually produces myth instead of reliable political history. Lenin is pictured as the original patron of Lysenkoism—because his administrative secretary sent a telegram to the Tambov Soviet demanding a report on the work of Michurin, the plant breeder who was posthumously canonized by the Lysenkoite church. Or Lunacharsky is assigned an important role—because he sponsored a movie that glorified the Austrian

[2] See his article on eugenics in *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar Granat,* Vol. XIX, pp. 391-95.

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Lamarckist, Kammerer. Such myths can be sustained only by systematically ignoring a mountain of contrary evidence showing that the Soviet government enthusiastically supported standard biology throughout the 1920's and into the early 1930's, when Michurinism was a small movement confined to horticulture. As Lysenkoism absorbed and transformed this movement in the mid-1930's, winning monopolistic control of research and education in agronomy and biology, party chiefs were guiding the process. Who can doubt that? But, without access to the archives, who can establish which chiefs played what roles, and for what reasons, then or since?

The major public sponsors of Lysenkoism when it first emerged were the scourge of the Ukraine, P. P. Postyshev; Commissars of Agriculture Ya. A. Yakovlev and M. A. Chernov; and the head of the Central Committee's Division of Science, K. Ya. Bauman. They all perished as enemies of the people in the late 1930's, yet the movement they had sponsored in agronomy and biology rolled on with increasing force. Stalin came to support Lysenkoism—the nature of Soviet affairs and a few bits of direct evidence make that clear. But deductions from the nature of things cannot tell us exactly when or why Stalin extended his mighty hand to Lysenko. Neither can the fragmentary public evidence of Kremlin politics tell us why Lysenko remained Stalin's favorite. Stalin often changed his mind. Witness the administrators of agronomy and biology who were given strong support in the 1920's and early 1930's only to be cast aside—frequently into prison—when Lysenko came along. Witness also the case of N. V. Tsitsin, a plant breeder whom Stalin personally and publicly endorsed in the 1930's more strongly then he did Lysenko. When the two favorites quarreled in the 1940's, Stalin allowed Tsitsin to fall into disgrace.

If we may legitimately imagine that Lysenko became for Stalin what Lindemann was for Churchill—the scientific adviser in whom the "Chief" placed irrevocable trust—imagination is no safe guide in reconstructing the intricate court politics that must have attended the spasmodic decline of Lysenkoism since Stalin died. For example, what are we to imagine about Khrushchev's role? In the first five years after Stalin's death, he seems to have been on the side of the resurgent anti-Lysenkoites. And then he seems to have changed his mind, or his position, or both. Mr. Sidney Ploss, who made a painstaking study of Kremlin politics relating to agriculture, chose to ignore the change, apparently feeling that it was nothing more than a tactical maneuver. He pictured Khrushchev as really and truly an opponent of Lysenkoism—and sent his book to press a month before Khrushchev's fall brought the public disgrace of Lysenko.[3] Thus does Kremlinology, which might be defined as the effort to do archival research in Soviet politics without access to the archives, reward great labor with meager and unreliable conclusions.

The Impermanence of Reversals

How then can we discover whether the current disgrace of Lysenko is final? We have not seen the stenographic record of that Central Committee meeting of October 1964 which "satisfied Comrade Khrushchev's request to be freed from his duties"—nor is it likely to be made public soon. According to a suspiciously precise rumor I heard in Moscow, "twelve percent" of the charges against Khrushchev concerned his support for Lysenkoism. All we know for sure is that a flurry of anti-Lysenkoite articles followed the October Central Committee meeting; that several eminent Lysenkoites, including Lysenko himself, were obliged to resign their positions; and that the President of the Academy of Sciences announced that Lysenko would no longer be immune to criticism, and called for the reestablishment of standard biology in research and education. But we also know that Lysenkoism had been in a similar position back in 1956, when Lysenko was forced to resign his most important post as head of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences and public criticism of his school was growing. Nevertheless, he bounded back in 1957-58. In December 1958, anti-Lysenkoite biologists were fired from their editorial posts for violating—as *Pravda* explained—the rules of "courtesy and propriety" in scientific discussion. During the next six years the few brave souls who ventured to criticize Lysenko in print were threatened

[3] Sidney I. Ploss, *Conflict and Decision Making in Soviet Russia,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965. See review by Jerzy F. Karcz in *Problems of Communism,* May-June 1965, pp. 34-6.

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with criminal prosecution for slander. Without resort to Kremlinology, how can we tell whether this sort of reversal will not happen again?

If we limit our observations to the current situation, we get the depressing feeling that there could well be another reversal. Several well-known Lysenkoites have been fired, but their places have not been given to staunch anti-Lysenkoites such as N. P. Dubinin, who would have been the natural replacement for Lysenko as director of the Institute of Genetics. This and other vacant posts have been given to mediocrities with Lysenkoite records. Indeed the most important post, the presidency of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, has been given to P. P. Lobanov, a man of marked Stalinist and Lysenkoite affinities and the same man who succeeded Lysenko in that post in 1956. It is an equal shock to learn that some of the worst Lysenkoites in high places have not been fired. V. N. Stoletov, for example—who, as far as I know, is the only Lysenkoite to have publicly accused a scientific opponent of subversion *before* the man was arrested—remains Minister of Higher Education of the RSFSR and Chairman of the Department of Genetics at Moscow University. The more one examines the current situation, the clearer it becomes that the post-Khrushchev authorities are not determined on a quick, clean sweep of Lysenkoism. In this as in other fields, they seem intent on a mild reform avoiding dislocations and upheavals among the "cadres"—in this case, the people who managed biological research and education under Lysenko, and who still are managing them.

This was indeed the message that President Mstislav V. Keldysh delivered to the Academy of Sciences last February just after he had announced that Lysenko's immunity to criticism had been removed and that a major conference would soon meet to discuss the improvement of biology:

At the same time I would like to emphasize that attention must be focused on scientific and organizational questions; we must rule out any possibility of administrative fiat, pressure, and pasting of labels on any side.[4]

Keldysh insisted that Lysenkoism was not to be rejected *in toto,* and he even singled out for praise its hopelessly vague theory of stages in plant development. It is therefore not surprising that the original flurry of anti-Lysenkoite articles has not swollen to a flood. Only a few articles have made truly sharp analyses, and they have not been written by the chiefs of biological research and education. The most incisive and comprehensive analysis has come once again from an outsider, N. N. Semenov,[5] the Nobel laureate of Soviet chemistry, who was bold enough to tangle with Lysenko in 1959, just after *Pravda* had restored his immunity to criticism. Evidently some boldness is still required of those who would criticize Lysenkoism.

The conference that Keldysh promised in February has not been held. According to rumor in Moscow, it was scheduled for April, postponed to May, postponed again until fall, and now seems to be postponed indefinitely. The biology curricula for secondary schools are being revised—but only slowly—and there are hints that the outcome may be a compromise between Lysenkoism and standard biology. B.M. Kedrov, the eminent philosopher of science, who was a Lysenkoite until recently, has published an anti-Lysenkoite piece in which, however, a number of critical issues are fudged, most notably the existence of "the so-called gene." This appeared in *Novyi mir,* the journal of reform; [6] *Oktiabr* has carried a defense of Lysenkoism,[7] as has Lysenko's own journal, *Agrobiologiia.*

Walking up Gorky Street with two optimistic young Soviet biologists, I focused my fears into a bet: in the new biology textbooks for secondary schools the gene either would not be mentioned at all, or would be dismissed in a few lines, as it had been by Kedrov. One of my companions was so sure I would be proved wrong that he set the stakes at twenty dollars, and I accepted with a flicker of reluctance, for there is reason to hope that I will lose the bet.

The basic reason is that the current paradoxical situation—Lysenkoites presiding over the withering away of Lysenkoism—cannot be regarded as an easily reversible conjuncture of factional politics within the Kremlin. It is part of the larger pattern of Stalinists dismantling Stalinism. Viewed in the historical context

[4] *Vestnik Akademii Nauk,* 1965, No. 3, p. 9.

[5] "Nauka ne terpit sub'ektivizma," *Nauka i zhizn,* 1965, No. 4, pp. 38-43, 132.

[6] "Puti poznaniia istiny," *Novyi mir,* 1965, No. 1, pp. 213-35.

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of evolving policies, of changing patterns of behavior that have proved more powerful than mortal politicians and their transient cliques, the current paradox is the culmination of a process long under way. Lysenko himself, when he was total boss of Soviet biology and agronomy under Stalin, acquiesced in the quiet abandonment of the agricultural nostrums that had won him his position, while clinging with breathtaking stubbornness to the theories that were supposed to be proved by the practical success of these nostrums. (Indeed he clings to these theories even now, proving that there is more of the fanatic in him than of the faker or time-server.)

In Search for Panaceas

The essential puzzle of the Lysenko affair is why successive coteries of Soviet authorities clung to those theories with him, resisting disillusionment for more than thirty years, and even now show reluctance to face the harsh realities of Lysenko's practical record. One of their basic ideological principles is Stalin's formula of the dialectical unity of theory and practice, according to which practice determines the truth or falsity of theory. Of course, this elastic principle is part of their articulate ideology, the ideology that constantly finds its way to politicians' lips. But in the Lysenko affair some element of the more powerful inarticulate ideology seems to have been at work, causing Soviet bosses to praise Lysenkoism for its practical success even as they were abandoning its agricultural recommendations. No wonder outside observers imagine that fanatical adherence to Marxist texts or hope for the remolding of human beings must have been at work.

Even anti-Lysenkoite Soviet biologists, who laugh at the myths entertained by outsiders, usually shake their heads in bewilderment when asked to explain why Lysenkoism, for more than thirty years, survived its agricultural failures and the death or dismissal of its powerful supporters. When I pressed the question, one old botanist exclaimed: "Lysenko is the Rasputin of Soviet biology!" But he would not venture to characterize the faith that this faith healer has preyed upon. A middle-aged geneticist thought that Lysenkoism had flourished when Soviet agriculture was too backward to use the recommendations of standard science, but his colleagues disagreed, unwilling to concede that there had been any rational basis, however unconscious, for the government's hostility to modern biology. I also disagreed, offering the example of the successful hybrid corn program in underdeveloped Mexico. Since they showed no interest in pursuing the subject, I did not add the essential points that would have made the comparison meaningful: Mexican farmers were not violently torn from their traditional social organization, or forced to adopt hybrid corn in a great hurry, or obliged to pay the full price for

[7] G. V. Platonov, "Dogmy starye i dogmy novye," *Oktiabr,* No. 8, 1965, pp. 149-62.



— Зачем вы взяли начальника главка в соавторы своего научного труда! Чтобы он помогал!
— Нет, чтобы не мешал

VALUABLE HELP

—Why did you take the chief of the main committee as a collaborator in your scientific work? So that he would help you?
—No, so that he wouldn't interfere.

—From Krokodil (Moscow), February 28, 1953.

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purchases of high-quality seed, which have been subsidized, partly with foreign assistance, by a government that has not been straining to industrialize at maximum speed.[8]

I am suggesting, of course, that the crisis of collectivization, and the chronic agricultural crisis that issued from it, created the Bolshevik officials' yearning for "agrobiological" faith healers—a yearning that has receded only slowly and spasmodically as agrarian realism has slowly and spasmodically replaced utopianism in the official mind. But this is a vague generalization, conveying little understanding unless one sees the process at work in particular cases. And one *can* see it, on three interacting levels: on the farms, in research and educational institutions, and in government policies. On the second and third levels there is an overwhelming abundance of published evidence. Institutions of higher learning publish profusely (some cynics claim that this is their *raison d'être*); and though Soviet politics are very secretive, Soviet policies, in such fields as agronomy and biology, are highly publicized. The farmer alone drudges in silence, but the profuse statements of his scientific advisers and political masters tell us much about his activity.

One cannot make a precise accounting of the Soviet farmer's experience with Lysenko's nostrums, because adequate data have never been published. In fact, I doubt whether such data can be found in the archives, for the agricultural authorities of the Stalin era were hostile to precise assessments based on meticuously gathered data. Careful statistical reasoning was considered the technique of wreckers, those who would undermine confidence in the new farms. One did not question the value of sowing because the average farm could not be counted on to do it properly or on time; one launched a sowing campaign. The true Bolshevik learned how to rely on his judgment in picking out the *maiaki,* or beaconlight farms; and he drove backward farms toward those lights with force and enthusiasm. Lysenko's agrobiology was admirably suited to this mentality. In the 1930's and 1940's he piled up nostrums thick and fast, explicitly rejecting not only the sophisticated rules of agricultural testing but even the commonsense injunction to look before you leap ("Measure seven times, cut once," in the Russian version). Wrote Lysenko in 1935:

Do we have the right, when we propose a method that is as yet only theoretically grounded, such as "refreshing the blood" of the most important agricultural crops, do we have the right to lose two or three years in preliminary trial of this method on little plots at several plant-breeding institutions? No, we haven't the right to lose even a single year.[9]

Enthusiastic officials caught up each of his proposals and forced a mass-production trial on hundreds of farms, with the press shouting excitedly about the spectacular results. After a few years, as a growing silence indicated the failure of yet another nostrum, Lysenko would have two or three new ones booming.

When he did not have peasants soaking and chilling spring grain before planting, he had them inching their way through fields of ripening wheat and picking at the florets with tweezers (to force cross-fertilization in order to "refresh the blood"), or "vernalizing potatoes (*i.e.,* sprouting them before planting), or tearing leaves off cotton plants, or planting potatoes in midsummer, or trudging through cornfields touching a piece of fur from tassels to silks, or sowing winter wheat in stubble, or planting shelterbelts of trees in "nests." In the 1950's and 1960's his inventiveness faltered, as Bolshevik confidence in farming by intuition and fiat faltered (the current Soviet pejoratives for intuition and fiat are subjectivism and *administrirovanie*). But Lysenko still held Khrushchev's faith with a recipe for stretching scarce mineral fertilizer (by composing it with earth and or-

[8] In the Soviet Union there have been two crash programs for the expansion of corn acreage and the development of hybrid seed: in the early 1930's, and in the 1950's. The former was a total failure, which contributed to the rise of Lysenkoism; the latter has been a limited, costly success. For a description of the hybrid corn program in Mexico, which was begun in 1944 with aid from the Rockefeller Foundation, see E. J. Wellhausen's article in J. W. Gowen, ed., *Heterosis: A Record of Researches Directed Toward Explaining and Utilizing the Vigor of Hybrids* (Ames, 1952). In both countries the reluctance of depressed farmers to buy hybrid seed for each planting has stimulated plant scientists to seek an alternative the the US type of hybrid corn. From the mid-1930's to the mid-1950's the Soviet Union followed Lysenko's very simple alternative: total rejection of the US program in favor of open-pollinated varietal hybrids, which can be easily produced on any farm—and achieve little or no hybrid vigor.

[9] *Sotsialisticheskoe zemledelie,* Sept. 16, 1935.

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ganic refuse), and another for increasing the butterfat content of milk ("training" the heredity of cows by improving their diet).

He has also held the confidence of officials with the memory of much-publicized successes in the past. The outsider finds it well-nigh impossible to believe that abandoned nostrums can be regarded as successes; yet *Pravda,* in slapping down Lysenko's critics in 1958, argued that they were.[10] I once asked an eminent Lysenkoite whether the vernalization of spring grain is still widely used on Soviet farms. "Of course," he answered brusquely. "How extensively?" I persisted. "Over a million hectares," he replied, with a gesture of irritation. Later on, I put the same question to Lysenko's chief ideologist. He replied placidly that vernalization of spring grain is not widely used any more; it was once very successful, but the present condition of Soviet agriculture makes it no longer profitable to add the cost of vernalization to spring sowing. In any case, he concluded, it is still an enormously important method for plant physiologists and breeders. Each of these replies represented a different method of refusing to face unpleasant reality, the one insufferably crude even for the man using it, the other subtle and self-deceiving. (*Pravda* used the second method.) Either way, failures are turned into successes.

All of these nostrums had certain features in common. They promised quick, large returns for little or no outlay of state funds. They were crudely simple, depending on the forcible mobilization of much peasant labor. They were never defended by adequate data or credible reasoning, but relied on Lysenko's intuition and the suppression of criticism from alien specialists. After a few years of forced trial on many farms, each one was quietly abandoned in practice while it continued to be praised in Lysenkoite theorizing.

Mixed Blessings

One should, however, give the Lysenkoites their due. Elements of unwitting rationality were probably mixed in with their nostrums, just as a little useful fertilizer was mixed with heavy earth in their composts. The "vernalization of potatoes," for example, is simply a pretentious and inept name for the worldwide practice of sprouting seed potatoes to give them a head start before planting. When Lysenko quietly abandoned his original proposal to string them up on wire or cord, a procedure that increased the farmer's labor and the potato's infections, the only difference between "vernalization" and old-fashioned sprouting was the vague theory of plant development that Lysenko used to explain it. His failure to urge farm managers to compare the labor costs of sprouting potatoes with the resulting profit from increased yields was typical of the indifference to cost acconting that benumbed Soviet agriculture from 1929, when Stalin decreed that the profitability of agriculture was to be calculated only on the national level, until the late 1950's.

Or, consider the example of the "vernalization of vernal grain" (*yarovizatsiia yarovykh*), for which intensive campaigns were mounted in the 1930's. Farmers were obliged to soak and chill spring grain before planting, with the promise that this would speed development and thus increase yields. Little attention was paid to the cost of extra labor, the increased danger of damaged seed and fungus infestation, and the probability that a speed-up in plant development only occasionally brings higher yields. But it may be that the campaign for vernalization of spring grain was a useful component of the basic campaign for spring sowing in the 1930's; by mobilizing "hut labs" to vernalize seed toward the end of winter, the Lysenkoites were helping to make sure that some kind of seed would be ready at the fleeting moment in spring when planting should be done. In short, Lysenkoite nostrums may have been for Soviet farmers what magic is for primitive farmers—an irrational stimulus to actions that are in part rational. The trouble is that industrial states need a greater surplus than primitive farmers can produce, as Soviet officials began to recognize in the post-Stalin era.

In science, Lysenkoism meant an even sharper contrast between revolutionary chatter and primitive reality. Born in plant physiology, it brought nothing to that discipline but a new term, a slight innovation in an old technique, and much obscurantist confusion. This sorry record needs to be emphasized, for there is a widespread notion that Lysenko's early work with vernalization was a substantial contribution to plant physiology. In fact his coinage, "vernalization," described a phenomenon long

[10] *Pravda,* Dec. 14, 1958.

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known to agriculturists and intensively studied by several plant physiologists for twenty years before Lysenko took up the subject. (Ignorant of most of this previous work, he angered when reminded of it.) His only innovation in technique was to study this phenomenon in swelling seeds instead of seedlings. He drowned this modest achievement in a sea of belligerent confusion. The new term was applied to so many unrelated phenomena that it lost its meaning—except, ironically, in non-Lysenkoite literature, where "vernalization" is still used to describe the delayed effect that temperature alteration in germinating plants has on the time of flowering. Struggling to make his little accomplishments the basis of all plant physiology, Lysenko made war on other scientists' studies of photoperiodism and plant hormones. He would have wrecked plant physiology as effectively as he did genetics if the former discipline had been as neatly focused on a few basic concepts and methods as the latter. A sprawling discipline, however, plant physiology offered its Soviet practitioners various possibilities of continuing creditable work during the years of Lysenkoite domination, by avoiding sensitive issues or by making various compromises. They could, for example, publish chimeras—*i.e.*, books with a scientific body between a Lysenkoite head and tail.

Obscurantism Par Excellence

Scientists in the fields of genetics, cytology, and evolutionary theory did not have such options. In these fields compromise is impossible, for Lysenkoism represents total repudiation of the concepts and methods on which these disciplines are based. It is a mistake to imagine, as many Western observers do, that Lysenkoism was an outgrowth of obsolescent trends in biology, of Lamarckism for example. Until the end of the 1930's the Lysenkoites vehemently denied that they were Lamarckists, and in an important sense their denials were justified. Serious Lamarckists, such as the botanist V. L. Komarov, engaged their minds with the precise experimental study of environmental influences on heredity. This is indeed the main reason why Lamarckists became increasingly rare after the mid-1920's, when Mendelian geneticists began to grapple successfully with environmental alterations of heredity. (The widespread notion that Mendelian geneticists deny the influence of environment on heredity is quite mistaken. On the contrary, it is these geneticists who have been establishing precisely how environment alters heredity in individual organisms and in evolving populations.)

Lysenko did not move from plant physiology to genetics because of concern for this scientific problem. He became entangled with genetics accidentally in 1935, when he claimed that he could satisfy the party's demand for a speed-up in the breeding of improved varieties of agricultural plants. His green-thumb intuition told him, without the necessity of progeny tests extending over several generations, which parent plants would produce desirable combinations of characters when crossed, and which first-generation hybrids would remain stable in further generations. Old-fashioned plant breeders took ten to twelve years to produce an improved variety; he could do it in two or three. When geneticists pointed out the conflict between his convictions and the basic rules of their science, he simply repudiated their science.

From that time to this, Lysenko has refused to acknowledge the existence of the problems, the methods, or the concepts of genetics. He and his followers rejected *a limine* the statistical method of analyzing the combination and segregation of heredity characters in successive generations, and the concept of particulate heredity to which this method leads. They have therefore been entirely indifferent to the experiments and reasoning that locate the origin of heredity characters at particular segments of the chromosomes, the genes. They wound up, in effect, denying the most elementary distinction of all—between that which is hereditarily determined and that which is environmentally determined. Since Stalin died and it became unfashionable to take pride in nativistic isolation from world science, a few Lysenkoites have been making grotesque efforts to absorb elements of genetics into their obscurantist outlook. The most notable example is the attempt to acknowledge the role of chromosomes and nucleic acids in hereditary phenomena while still denying the existence of genes.[11] It is as if one were to acknowl-

[11] It is a hopeless task to seek meaningful thought in the writings of Lysenkoites on this subject. For their most ambitious effort to accept the factual data of genetics while rejecting its theoretical explanations, see N. I. Feiginson, *Korpuskuliarnaia genetika: kriticheskii obzor* (Moscow, 1963). The most recent Lysenkoite treatment of this problem is, by contrast, enormously conciliatory.

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edge the role of the alimentary canal and enzymes in digestion while denying the existence of the stomach and intestines.

It is inaccurate and unfair to attribute such obscurantism to Lamarck or Darwin, who were well aware of the distinction between that which is hereditarily determined and that which is environmentally determined, but were unable to figure out how to study it experimentally. Lysenko and most of his followers could not figure out how to do this either, but simply because they wilfully refused to learn. (Very few Lysenkoites are in the position of Kh. F. Kushner and N. I. Nuzhdin, who were trained in genetics but repudiated it in favor of Lysenkoism.) They have preferred to live in a fantasy world where agricultural plants and animals can be quickly and easily improved by "training" (*vospitanie*). As one might expect, they have produced very few varieties worthy of certification, even though the State Commission for Testing Agricultural Crop Varieties has long been controlled by their sympathizers. Lysenko himself has not a single certified variety to his credit. Those breeders who have pictured themselves as Lysenkoites, whether sincerely or opportunistically, have produced new varieties by the simple old methods of individual and mass selection, following the rules of thumb that sufficed 19th-century breeders before genetics was founded. This retardation of Soviet breeding has probably not resulted in great losses to Soviet agriculture, for most Soviet farms have been too backward to get maximum yields even from the standard old varieties. Farms that have poor rotation schemes, many weeds, little fertilizer, heavy infestation of pests and diseases, cannot benefit much from new, highly-improved varieties. Soviet plant breeders have long complained that the inefficient seed business and poorly run farms frequently destroy the purity of improved varieties.

It was science which paid the most immediate and heaviest price for the authorities' support of Lysenkoism. Genetics, cytology, and evolutionary theory were driven out of educational and research institutions, first from those concerned with agricultural applications, then from secondary education, and ultimately, in the period from 1948 to 1953, from the universities and the research institutes of the Academy of Sciences. Plant physiology, biochemistry, and soil science were not suppressed, but they suffered severe distortion and retardation. Since Stalin died, there has been slow, spasmodic recovery, first and foremost in the universities and research institutes of pure science, much less in applied science, and least of all in secondary education. In the long run, as Soviet agriculture rises to the level where modern science is required, the heaviest price will be paid by applied biology and agriculture, for these are the areas where Lysenkoism has established its cadres of ignoramuses and timeservers, who cannot be expected to disappear overnight. Pure science is already reviving without serious defects, for the Lysenkoites could only destroy pure science; they could not alter or distort what they did not understand. Even if the authorities attempt a compromise with the Lysenkoites in the educational system and allow them to hide the gene from high-school students for a few more years, the victory of genuine biology is assured. In the universities and research institutes, genuine biologists were winning the competition for students and *aspiranty* even before the dismissal of Khrushchev. Lysenkoism may linger in the agricultural institutes for a long time, but it is already moribund in Soviet institutions of pure science. In medical institutes its only influence has been the destruction of medical genetics, now being restored.

What Price Progress?

With these patterns in mind, one can begin to understand why the Soviet authorities embraced Lysenkoism with dramatic suddenness in the 1930's and clung to it with blind persistence for the next three decades. The reason that they themselves endlessly gave was that Lysenkoite theory met the needs of agricultural practice, which bourgeois science did not. The same old formula of theory determined by practice is now being invoked *against* Lysenkoism, with the crucial specification that judgments of success or failure in agriculture and science must not be made subjectively, by fiat. To understand the rapid rise and long delayed fall of Lysenkoism, one must therefore ask what this formula has actually meant in the official mentality. How did the Soviet authorities lose sight of the crucial distinction between subjective and objective judgments of agricultural practice, and how did they win their way back to it?

The Bolsheviks fell into a pit of agricultural and scientific subjectivism (reliance on un-

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bridled intuition, enthusiasm, and force) in the 1930's, quite suddenly. Nevertheless, with the advantage of hindsight, one can see that they had dug this pit for themselves in the 1920's. At that time no one could have foreseen the rise of Lysenkoism. Bolshevik officials, showing a realistic conception of themselves as political bosses lacking in scientific and technical know-how, enthusiastically supported genuine scientists, such as N. I. Vavilov, who, by building the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, were striving to overtake and surpass the United States Department of Agriculture in a great hurry. The Soviet Union was becoming one of the world's leading centers of biological and agricultural research, while its farming methods remained among the world's most backward. Before collectivization, this growing gap between science and agriculture did not greatly disturb Bolshevik officials. They held to the belief—an intuitive judgment flowing from their Marxist-Leninist ideology—that the archaic social organization of Russian agriculture was the only important reason for the gap. One of their important motives in forcing rapid collectivization was the conviction that Russian peasants would leap from primitive to scientific farming once they were in the new system. This was utopian subjectivism clinging to genuine science, and it was quickly frustrated in the early 1930's by the shocking discovery that the new farms could not be counted on to do the simplest things right.

There is no point in commenting that sensible officials would have learned from this experience to resign themselves to a long, slow process of agricultural improvement. Less wild, less utopian men would not have attempted the great leap forward in the first place. Their volatile utopianism, on being checked and frustrated, turned into a dogged, sullen utopianism, the characteristic Bolshevik manner of resignation to painful reality. Lysenko satisfied a great psychological need when he began to preach that American methods could not be applied in Soviet agriculture because the *methods* were backward. Soviet farms were the most advanced in the world; they required the most advanced agrobiology in the world—and that is what Lysenko claimed to provide. In 1938 Stalin even implied a comparison between Lysenko and Lenin, who had confounded hidebound social scientists by discovering that backward Russia would leap into the vanguard of nations, showing them the way to socialism. This nativistic revulsion against world science reached its climax in the last five years of Stalin's reign, when the Lysenkoites took pride in the fact that Western farmers and scientists were against them. If spiteful gods had tried to play a trick on Stalin by obeying his order that practice must guide theory, they could not have done a more neatly ironical job. Self-deceiving tyranny in agricultural practice guided scientific theory to a fantasy world of tyrannical self-deception.

For Soviet officials, Lysenkoite theory was thus a tranquilizer, soothing the Bolshevik psyche during a long period when backward peasants were being forced to pay for rapid industrialization and the enhancement of Soviet power. For biologists and agricultural specialists, it was obscurantist ranting against a science that had disappointed the utopian hopes that the Bolsheviks had placed in it. For farmers, it was a series of nostrums, each forced upon them for a few years and then quietly abandoned.

The Past and the Future

The historian can hardly avoid the question of what might have been. If the Bolshevik authorities had been less utopian and authoritarian, if they had permitted agricultural specialists and peasants to work gradually at self-chosen programs which would have been humanely feasible in a primitive countryside, if they had allowed biologists to keep up pure research as an investment in the long-run future, would they have accomplished more at less cost? These should not be considered rhetorical questions; it is futile to write denunciations of dead Bolsheviks. Such contrary-to-fact hypothetical questions can be a useful stimulus to thought about causal relationships—the historian's version of experimentation. Let Soviet historians, if they have a will to believe that Stalinism was not a dreadful waste, counter with a question stating an opposite hypothesis: If the Bolsheviks had not convinced themselves that they were moving straight to a modern urban heaven, fighting devils to get out of a backward rural hell, could they have generated enough enthusiasm and force to move the countryside at all?

It may seem utopian to expect that Soviet historians will ever be free enough to ask such questions, or to go digging in archives where relevant evidence can be found—the George

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Lefebvres of the Soviet agrarian revolution. But fifteen years ago it seemed utopian to expect that Soviet biologists would ever be free to criticize Lysenkoism and revive their science. Evidently there has been a self-correcting mechanism in the Bolshevik mentality causing it to worry about the intractable objective realities of farming and science, and to struggle to rid itself of its addiction to self-deceiving fantasy. Each silent abandonment of a Lysenkoite nostrum was an unacknowledged admission that the political chiefs are not supreme judges of successful agricultural practice. The long hesitation between the endorsement of Lysenkoism and the final move to stamp out genetics (1936-48), and the rapid abandonment of this final solution as soon as Stalin died, these were silent admissions that the political chiefs, even while claiming to be supreme judges of scientific truth, were not sure of themselves.

These admissions have moved closer and closer to the threshold of consciousness in the Bolshevik mind, and have even erupted into print occasionally as the chronic agricultural crisis and the scandal in biology have grown more and more intolerable. Khrushchev vacillated between recognition and rejection of the principle that farmers and scientists must be autonomous judges of "practice" in their own spheres. His dismissal, and the denunciations of "subjectivism" that have followed it, may prove to be a decisive turning point in the development of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Having confined biological science within ideology (the supremacy of "practice" as interpreted by the political chiefs), the chiefs cannot set biology free without confining ideology, or at least refining it. The influence of biology on Marxism-Leninism may prove to be greater, more enduring, and certainly more beneficial, than the influence Marxism-Leninism has had on biology. The biologists may be helping the Bolsheviks to liberate themselves from their delusion of omnipotence.

Marxism and Geography

By John E. Chappell Jr.

One of the liveliest and also most challenging controversies ever to stir Soviet scientific minds has recently been unfolding in an unexpected area—geography, a discipline held in rather low esteem in most academic circles today all over the world.[1] Furthermore, this provocative discussion does not center on the usual scientific problems of gathering data, conducting experiments, or balancing equations, or even on the theoretical problems closely connected

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[1] For contributing to the development of this study (which represents material condensed from a longer study of environmentalist thought now in progress), I am indebted to George Ivask, Oswald Backus, Roy Laird, John Greene, Thomas Kuhn, Nicholas Riasanovsky, Martin Malia, Marvin Mikesell, Douglas Jackson, Vadim Pahn, and many others.

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therewith. It concerns underlying principles: the philosophy of geography. Here then is a rare (in the 20th century) indication that the solution of important scientific problems may require not the emancipation of science from philosophy, or the humble subservience of philosophy to science, but instead an active collaboration between these two approaches to knowledge.

In the USSR, of course, it has always been maintained that philosophy, *i.e.* Marxism-Leninism, should support science by generalizing the results of its work and directing its course—in other words, that philosophy should serve as a sort of super-science. Yet, in past decades, when Soviet "philosopher-scientists" were more orthodox and less imaginative Marxist-Leninists than they are today, remaining closer within the patterns set forth in Engel's *Dialectics of Nature* and Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, little if anything emerged from the Soviet Union to indicate any real feasibility of such collaboration. Now, however, as old doctrinal fetters are being shaken off and Soviet philosophers and scientists find themselves somewhat freer to engage in a genuine search for truth, not only is the intellectual prospect more promising, but the political implications become serious. For one thing, if a less Marxist science proves to be a more productive science, the prestige of Marxism as a comprehensive ideology must inevitably suffer. For another, if a less Marxist Soviet Union becomes a scientifically more productive country, this may present a more serious threat to its diverse opponents—provided that general disaffection from Marxist ideology in Soviet society does not, in the absence of an alternative ideological world-view, result in general demoralization and lack of direction.

We usually find that in the Soviet Union the intellectual grades quickly into the ideological and hence also the political. Nevertheless, it is this writer's belief that from the ideological jumble in which the recent controversy in geography is enmeshed, one can extract some objectively significant intellectual trends.

Science as Natural Philosophy

Most important among these trends is the increasing concert of effort between science and philosophy. When free of dogma, such cooperation promises to be widely beneficial, for it is now recognized by leading historians and philosophers of science that scientific advance depends not so much on mere accumulation of evidence, or random experimentation, as it does on the scientist's method of procedure (his "paradigm"), including what might be called the metaphysical framework which enables him to organize and apply his thinking.[2] Despite the mass of detailed knowledge that has been piled up by the multitude of 20th-century scientists, most of the really profound scientific advances in modern times were made before the last decades of the 19th century. In the time of Galileo, Newton, Lagrange or Faraday, a scientist was termed a "natural philosopher," for he viewed science not merely in terms of making computations based on readings from dials and measuring sticks, as scientists of the "operationalist" persuasion do today, but he also attempted to probe in a speculative spirit into the logical and conceptual order behind the equations and the evidence, seeking thus to reach the ultimate truths of physical reality. Thus he was not only a philosopher but also, in a sense limited to the physical world, a metaphysician. However, after Newton (whose interests and motives extended far beyond his great achievements) revealed *how* bodies move in space, though not *why* they move, it became fashionable to think of the task of the natural philosopher more and more in terms of mathematical description, experiment and prediction, and less and less in terms of a search after ultimate cause or purpose.

This tendency reached a culmination in the late 19th century with the emergence of the "scientist" as a skeptical denier of all metaphysical propositions who placed all his faith in the tangible and the observable. While this "positivist" viewpoint, best represented by the German scientist Ernst Mach, was helpful insofar as it inspired the searcher after truth to question rigorously all theoretical propositions, it led before long to extremes, such as suspicion of normal intuition and of the ordinary meaning

[2] See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* 1962; and Joseph Agassi, "The Nature of Scientific Problems and Their Roots in Metaphysics," in Mario Bunge, ed., *The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy,* 1964, pp. 189-211. Furthermore, in his "The Function of Measurment in Modern Physical Science," *Isis,* Vol. 52, No. 2 (June 1961), pp. 161-193, Prof. Kuhn demonstrates that significant theoretical innovations in science nearly always precede the exact quantitative tests which confirm them.

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of words. Mach himself went so far in his skepticism as to deny traditional concepts of absolute space and time, and this denial has found unfortunate reflections in subsequent thought. The paradox of Machism—in this writer's opinion—was that although it denied the validity of metaphysics, it led, in fact, to another kind of metaphysics by insisting that ultimate reality must be found in the tangible and the measurable. To fill the theoretical void they helped create, the positivists and operationalists who worked in the spirit of Mach proceeded to fashion their experimental evidence and equations into new theories, but these often took insufficient account of important definitions, even including definitions (such as of "energy") which had painfully been clarified at an earlier date. Philosophy, meanwhile, entered an age of "analysis" and began avoiding the larger ethical and social problems in favor of more limited tasks such as making logical analyses of philosophical conclusions reached by scientists on the basis of experimental evidence.

It is rather unusual to find philosophy creeping back into science by way of geography, as has now occurred in the "Anuchin controversy," named after the principal spokesman for new ideas in Soviet geography. In the past, geography has been generally associated with "natural history," a term implying less a study aimed at reaching abstract physical laws and theories than a discipline concerned with the accumulation of particular facts in geology and biology—realms where facts do not readily yield to nomothetic treatment. The best-known theory that emerged out of natural history is of course Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, which involves a very simple idea (though reflecting a very complex process) supported by a huge mass of observational detail. At the same time, however, evolutionary theory does qualify as philosophy; and it also illustrates the fact that very profound and far-reaching intellectual revolutions can spring from very simple concepts, and that, despite their simplicity, such concepts may find acceptance only with extreme difficulty if they are opposed to the prevalent world-view or are wrongly presented in such light. Geography, as Anuchin treats it, is likewise natural philosophy as well as natural history. It, too, involves theoretical ideas which are simple at root but extremely subtle and complex in actual operation and which encounter barriers to understanding imposed by current opinion.[3]

In the sections that follow, no attempt is made to cover all recent theoretical developments in Soviet geography. Rather, the special purpose of this article is to focus on those particular areas of controversy which affect changing ideological patterns.

Problems of Geography

The controversy in Soviet geography was recently brought to the attention of the Soviet public in a series of articles published in the literary newspaper *Literaturnaia gazeta.*[4] The discussion was initiated by Anuchin, who characterized contemporary geography as the "Cinderella science"—a conclusion that few geographers in the West would object to. Yet strangely enough, although a handful of Western experts have devoted some cogent comment to the Anuchin controversy,[5] the geographers have not seriously grappled with the issues that Anuchin has raised.

[3] It should be mentioned that the term "natural philosophy" has lately been used in a notably unhistorical sense by such Soviet philosophers as B. M. Kedrov to refer to *pre-scientific* philosophical speculation about nature, as opposed to a "scientific" philosophy incorporating the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic, which is used by the Soviets to derive general laws of change and motion and cognition that govern all the laws and methods of the particular sciences. See B. M. Kedrov, "Philosophy as a General Science," *Voprosy filosofii,* Nos, 5 and 6, 1962, as translated in *Soviet Studies in Philosophy,* Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 1962) pp. 3-24.

[4] V. Anuchin, "Istoriia s geografiei," *Literaturnaia gazeta,* Vol. 36, No. 21 (Feb. 18, 1965); D. Armand, "Davaite ne budem," *ibid.*, No. 38 (Mar. 25, 1965); I. P. Yerasimov, "Ischezla li geografiia?" *ibid.*, No. 52 (Apr. 29, 1965); V. M. Gokhman, M. B. Gornung and V. P. Kovalevski, "Ne radi chesti mundira . . .," *ibid.*, Vol. 37, No. 60 (May 20, 1965); I. Zabelin, "Chto sluchilos s geografiei," *ibid.*, No. 66 (June 3, 1965); Iu. Saushkin, "Sevodnia i zavtra geografii," *ibid.*, No. 71 (June 17, 1965).

[5] See David Hooson, "Methodological Clashes in Moscow," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec. 1962), pp. 469-475; and O. H. K. Spate, "Theory and Practice in Soviet Geography," *Australian Geographical Studies,* Vol. 1, No. 1 (Apr. 1963), pp. 18-30; Ian Matley, "The Soviet Approach to Geography," Ph. D. thesis, Univ. of Michigan, 1961; and George Demko, "Trends in Soviet Geography," *Survey* (London), No. 55 (Apr. 1965), pp. 163-170.

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In part this is due to the current general lack of interest in the problems of man's relationship with his geographic environment, which concern Anuchin and his colleagues: in the consensus of American (and most Western European) geographers, geography should deal primarily with problems of areal differentiation and spatial interaction, preferably those lending themselves to quantitative analysis. Attempts of such early 20th-century geographers as Ellsworth Huntington and Ellen C. Semple to trace the influence of the geographic environment on human affairs have been attacked as inaccurate, oversimplified, or trite, and have remained out of fashion for over thirty years.[6]

Actually, the current outlook in geography is the natural product of our highly industrialized, automated culture. When the idea of causation is presented to mid-20th-century man, it is much easier for him to think in terms of cultural or biological causation than in terms of the influence of the external natural environment. His whole mode of existence and the man-made comforts that surround him seem to draw him away from awareness of the surface of the earth. Analogous beguiling influences have also been at work to blind many Soviet geographers to the problems of man-land relationships; for Marxism is after all an ideology that glorifies industry and science and looks forward to nothing less than a world in which man escapes the constraints of natural forces.

The general lack of concern with the Anuchin controversy is regrettable and unfortunate, for with the possible exception of the developments in physics in the 1950's, the Anuchin question probably ranks as the most important scientific problem of communism since the widely-publicized genetics debates of the 1930's and 1940's. Furthermore, the problems of man-land relationships raised by Anuchin clarify some very critical aspects of the nature and evolution of Marxist ideology.

Yet, when all this is said, Anuchin's greatest significance may in fact lie beyond both the discipline of geography and the area of Soviet and Marxist studies, for his ideas on the desirability of a unified geography clearly amount to a critique of the current scientific endeavor as a whole, which, despite much overlapping between the traditional disciplines, has become dangerously overfragmented in all advanced industrial nations. In a sense, Anuchin is the C. P. Snow of the Communist world, crying out not against the gap between the literary and the scientific intelligentsias, but against a multitude of gaps between various branches of the sciences, of which the one between those who study nonhuman nature and those who study man is only the most obvious. This characterization has validity despite the fact that Anuchin rarely discusses problems outside the field of geography, for geography, as defined in the USSR, comprises elements of nearly all the major scientific disciplines, such as physics in meteorology and climatology; chemistry in soil science; biology in vegetation geography; and, of course, economics and demography in "economic" (human) geography. And although Anuchin has mainly concerned himself with the rift between physical and economic geography, he also recognizes a dangerous over-fragmentation within each of these major branches—so much so that geography is turning into a number of isolated lines of endeavor pursued by scholars who have lost sight of the work of their fellows.

Soviet Geographic Theory

In the 1920's, geography, like most other fields of study in the Soviet Union, was open to various theoretical approaches. Some of these led down blind alleys, such as an exaggerated development of "centrography," a statistical geography based superficially on the earlier ideas and techniques of the chemist-economist D. I. Mendeleev.[7] More successful was the regional

[6] But a few geographers, without much effect yet on the profession in general, have pointed out that environmental determinism has been refuted only in regard to its specific applications, and not as a basic philosophical position. These include A. F. Martin, "The Necessity for Determinism," *Transactions and Papers of the Institute of British Geographers,* No. 17 (1951; publ. 1952), pp. 1-11; and Erhard Hostlund, "Twentieth Century Magic," *Landscape,* Vol. 5 (1956), pp. 23-26. That it is possible to eschew environmentalism and still maintain a vigorous emphasis on man's relationship to the land is illustrated by the work of Carl Sauer and his many active followers.

[7] Thomas Poulsen, "Centrography in Russian Geography," *Annals, Association of American Geographers,* Vol. 49, No. 3 (Sept. 1959), pp. 326-327; Dmitri Mendeleev, *K poznaniiu Rossii,* 1906. Mendeleev computed "the center of gravity" of the Russian population after the fashion of American census statisticians and designed maps of Russia in which the vertical meridian passed through the population center rather than through empty steppes farther east.

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school, tracing its inspiration and its ideas on the unity of geography to such notable scholars of Tsarist times as the soil scientist V. V. Dokuchaev and the climatologist A. I. Voeikov, as well as to Westerners such as the German regionalist Alfred Hettner. It happened that the regionalist approach to geography (as opposed to its traditional counterpart, the systematic or topical approach, as well as specialized Soviet schools) lent itself well to the job of identifying meaningful economic regions for purposes of state planning—the Gosplan regions. Along with the similarly-inclined "*landschaft*" school, which included the great physical geographer Lev Berg, the regionalists dominated Soviet geography during its first decade and a half.[8] From the very beginning they numbered among their ranks the late N. N. Baranski, a remarkably durable economic geographer who emerged through the years of Stalinism as the "grand old man" of Soviet geography, and became a prestigious addition to the ranks of V. A. Anuchin's supporters.

Next came collectivization and Stalinism, and the subordination of nearly all intellectual activity to the dictator's attempts to build an industrialized Soviet state. In geography, ties with the Russian past were played down and all workers had to acknowledge, at least nominally, their belief in the "scientific" principles of Marxism-Leninism as articulated (or obfuscated) by Stalin or party ideologists writing in his name. In Chapter Four of his *Short Course,* published in 1938, Stalin asserted that the chief causal force in social development is to be found not in the geographic environment, but in the means of production, in the "mode of production of material values." This position, which reflects the early Soviet revolutionary optimism, has not been substantially altered in official Soviet presentations as recently as 1963.

What did the Stalin dictum on environment mean to geographers? Although few Soviet geographers in the early years after the Revolution were convinced determinists, many of them saw no harm in stressing the importance of environmental influences when the facts warranted it, as they often do. But faced with Stalin's declaration that the physical environment can never decisively determine the pattern of growth of society, all traces of environmental determinism (or environmentalism, as it is often called) had to be eliminated or subdued. One result was to make it difficult to produce truly integrated regional studies in which the complex interrelationships of all elements of the environment could be analyzed and defined. Physical geography and "economic" geography had to develop along separate paths. Physical geography, including many sub-sciences such as hydrology and oceanography which in the West are usually studied outside geography proper, has shown some impressive work in the years that have followed; but economic geography, hampered by Stalin's pronouncement on environmentalism, stagnated. Certain "leftists," or extreme dualists, including O. A. Konstantinov, have even attempted to absorb economic geography into economics.

Stalin's desire to separate physical and economic geography had its roots in the general Marxist-Leninist conception of science according to which natural laws and social laws occupy two separate realms; man, however, is assumed to be capable of mastering nature through social development. Accordingly, if natural laws do not operate in society—at least not when man is nearing, or has actually achieved, communism—then man is not subject to the influence of his physical environment; and this independence should be reflected in the separation of physical geography from "economic" geography.

The denial of any kind of environmental influence often also leads to a denial of all interconnection between environment and man. This has been the tendency amongst the followers of the Stalinist line on environment. Not only have they attacked environmental determinism, reflecting the typical impatience of the Marxist revolutionary spirit with any kind of restraint, natural or otherwise, and falsely imagining—until very recently—that most Western geographers were "decadent bourgeois determinists," but they have also stood in opposition to such Western alternatives to total determinism as "possibilism." The French "possibilists" saw

[8] Robert Taaffe, "Evolution of the Regional School in Soviet Geography" (abstract), *Annals Assoc. Amer. Geogs.,* Vol. 50, No. 3 (Sept. 1960), pp. 349-350. On these and later developments see Julian Saushkin, "Economic Geography in the USSR," *Economic Geography,* Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jan. 1962), pp. 28-37.

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A PAGE FROM THE RECENT PAST

Down with Subjectivism, Imperialism, and the Rotten Bourgeoisie!

Subjectivism—the reactionary outlook which denies the existence of the objective world and laws of its development—is vigorously propagandized in present-day bourgeois philosophy. A turbid wave of subjectivist concepts also has seized natural science.

In physics, Machism, a sharp manifestation of subjective idealism, is the denial of causality, of laws. Subjectivist concepts in physics arise from the fact that the latest discoveries of nuclear physics, new data on the inseparability of matter and motion, allegedly cannot be explained by the principle of causality, necessity and laws. To explain nuclear processes, subjectivist "theories" are advanced in which "freedom of will in the electron" is taught and energism, whose antiscientific nature was exposed by V. I. Lenin, is revived. . . .

Subjectivism, as a typical manifestation of idealism in the natural sciences, is observed in capitalist countries also in astronomy. Here the theory of the fortuitous formation of heavenly bodies, denying any kind of laws in the development of the universe, is vigorously developed, with assorted variations. Persistently circulated is the old theory of the "thermal death of the universe," which was exposed by Engels even in his day and which is deeply inimical to the scientific position on the material nature of the world and the eternity and infinity of matter. . . .

The subjectivist point of view, declaring that laws of science are not the reflection of real processes but some kind of product of fantasy, is also taught in other branches of natural science. In chemistry, for example, bourgeois scientists strenuously preach the subjectivist theory of "resonance" and "mesmerism." According to this "theory" chemical formulas are considered conventions which do not reflect the actual structure of the molecule. . . .

The attempt to put chemistry on the path of subjectivism, to rob chemical formulas of their objective content, is directed against the scientific conception of the world.

Subjectivist distortions also are characteristic of biologists who take idealistic positions. Denial of the objective principles of the development of nature unites all of them. In capitalist countries Weismannism-Morganism continues to play a role ruinous to the science of biology. Arising on the Machist basis common to physical idealism, Weismannism-Morganism is one of the manifestations of ideological reaction in the epoch of imperialism.

According to the Weismannists' view, the organism at the time of its conception depends upon the bearers of heredity—genes. Combinations of genes create the characteristics of the organism and determine its life. These combinations themselves are accidental and are not conditioned by causality. Genes are beyond cognition and therefore it is impossible to know life processes. Denying law in the development of animate nature, denying causal conditionality, the Weismannists teach pure chance in the development of the organism and species.

In the land of the Soviets, Weismannism has been utterly routed. Michurin biology, which is creative Darwinism, has revealed very important principles of animate nature and applied methods of active influence upon [it]. . . .

Marxism-Leninism teaches that science cannot live and develop without recognizing objective principles, without studying these principles. To deny the existence of objective laws is to deny science. It is obvious for this reason that scientists upholding the principles of subjectivism look upon science pessimistically. The most outspoken idealists speak frankly of the replacement of science by faith.

The decline of natural science in bourgeois countries, its ideological stagnation, is not an accidental phenomenon. It has been conditioned by the whole system of imperialism.

The bourgeoisie, attempting somehow to justify its anti-popular policy, compels scientists to draw from scientific discoveries reactionary conclusions which conform to the misanthropic ideology of imperialism. Imperialism requires scientists to improve technology and especially the methods of exterminating people, in order to obtain maximum profit and to further militarize the economy.

Only the consistent application of dialectical materialism can lead science out of the ideological blind alley.

—From "In Captivity to Subjectivism—On Preachers of Reactionary Ideas in Natural Science," by D. Troshin, Pravda, Nov. 16, 1954. (For a translation of the entire article, plus a commentary compiled by several leading Western scientists, see Problems of Communism, No. 2, 1954.)

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man not as constrained by narrow environmental limitations, but rather as enjoying numerous possibilities from which to choose, in any particular geographic situation. Stalinists detected in"possibilism" nothing more significant than an overemphasis on bourgeois individualism and on plundering of resources.

While the Stalinist view in geography predominated, other ideas were suppressed, but not eradicated. One of the most important men working in Soviet geography during the 1930's was N. N. Kolosovski (also an engineer and an economist), who played an important part in the planning and subsequent development of the Ural-Kuznetsk metallurgical combine. The story of this combine provides some valuable lessons in economics and economic geography. It is well known how mathematical economists have rendered Marx's labor theory of value obsolete in many applications even within the USSR.[9] The geographical critique of the labor theory of value, although less precise and quantitative, is no less devastating than the mathematical one. Firstly, one finds that natural resources may be easy or difficult to extract, depending on local physiography and stratigraphy, on the quality of the ore, and on other factors. The same amount of labor may yield widely differing amounts of a given resource in different locales: thus in and near the Kuzbas, iron ore is obtained at a higher cost of labor than in the Urals. Secondly, another discrepancy is even more obvious: Marx attached no value-producing power to transportation, and so did not reckon adequately with its cost; but, in the long haul required to exchange Kuzbas coal for Urals iron ore, the cost of transportation figures very prominently. Marx attempted to get around such difficulties with his idea of "socially-useful" labor, modifying the simple number of man-hours expended; but this complication has proved difficult to apply.

Although he did not spell out these criticisms of Marxist economics—he considered himself a good and consistent Marxist—Kolosovski's work led him to a healthy appreciation of the importance of the environment in the affairs of men and of the related necessity of a unified geography. He lived on into the 1950's, when some of his more important theoretical statements were published[10] and when he found an able disciple in the young Anuchin. Until the latter arrived on the scene, problems of theory in geography had received little more than routine attention from Soviet scientists and philosophers. But now all that is changing, if it has not already changed. Moreover, leading Soviet philosophers, aware of the fact that problems of environmental influences loom important in the larger framework of Marxist-Leninist thought, have become seriously engaged in the theoretical disputation.[11]

The Anuchin Controversy

Vsevelod Aleksandrovich Anuchin began his professional career with substantive regional studies dealing with the Far East (1948 and 1952) and with Soviet Transcarpathia (1956). His outspoken views in favor of a unified geography and in favor of an increased emphasis on environmental determinism, which this implies, were developed in connection with his desire to integrate the various elements of the earth's surface by concentrating on a single "geographic environment." Such a concentration, in his view, would enable Soviet geographers to reconcile their approach with that of the great prerevolutionary Russian earth scientists, including Dokuchaev, Voeikov and the geographer-anthropologist, D. N. Anuchin.

Well into the 1950's the climate remained unfavorable to open debate and a discussion of the basic principles in geography. But in 1955 and 1957, Anuchin managed to get into print with articles calling for a unified geography.[12] In

[9] See Robert Campbell, "Marx, Kantorovich, and Novozhilov: Stoimost versus Reality," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Oct. 1961), pp. 402-418. See also Alfred Zauberman, "Breakthrough to Economics," *Survey*, No. 56 (July 1965), pp. 118-124.

[10] See for instance N. N. Kolosovski, "On the Concept of the Unity of Geography" (a 1950 letter to V. M. Chetyrkin), *Vestnik Moskovskovo Universiteta, Seriia V, Geografiia*, No. 4, 1962, pp. 22-26, as translated in *Soviet Geography: Review and Translation*, Vol. 3, No. 7 (Sept. 1962), pp. 39-44, which clarifies several points made in Kolosovski's article "Nauchnye problemy geografii," *Voprosy geografii*, Vol. 37 (1955).

[11] See for instance L. F. Ilichev, portions of article "Methodological Problems of the Natural and Social Sciences," *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, 1963 No. 11, pp. 4-47, as translated in *Soviet Geography*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (April 1964), pp. 32-34.

[12] "K teoreticheskim voprosam stranovedeniia," *Voprosy geografii*, Vol. 37 (1955), pp. 173-194; "O sushnosti geograficheskoi sredy i proiavlenii indeterminizma v sovetskoi geografii," *ibid.*, Vol. 41 (1957), pp. 47-64.

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1960, he followed with a book, *Theoretical Problems of Geography,* which has served as the focus of the controversy over a unified geography ever since. In line with Soviet academic practice, which awards doctorates only well along in a scholar's career, Anuchin offered this book as a doctoral dissertation in geography at Leningrad University. But in April of 1961, the Faculty of Geography unanimously rejected the book because of its alleged shortcomings in originality and in scientific method of presentation.[13]

Undaunted, Anuchin then moved on to Moscow University, stronghold of the more congenial regional school, including Baranski and Yu. G. Saushkin, who since Baranski's recent death has become the dean of Soviet economic geographers. In June of 1962, Anuchin's book came up for consideration as a dissertation in Moscow. The debate which it had already engendered attracted to the sessions a large number of students, faculty, public and press, many of them "reacting sharply" to the discussion. The "official discussants" included two doctors of geography and one of philosophy. Twenty-five unofficial discussants also spoke, and of course the author spoke in his own defense. Discussants in Anuchin's behalf included chiefly economic geographers, such as Baranski and Saushkin; against him were ranged chiefly leading physical geographers such as I. P. Gerasimov (since 1951, Director of the Institute of Geography of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR) and S. V. Kalesnik (since 1964, President of the Geographical Society of the USSR). Among the defenders were two philosophers, D. I. Koshelevski and L. V. Vorobev.

The opposition naturally centered its arguments on whether or not Anuchin's views were correctly Marxist. There were also more general charges such as lack of documentation, a theoretical posture unsuitable for a dissertation, veiled support for outright "decadent" determinism, and a lack of concern with an experience in practical economic problems. Anuchin's opponents felt that all effectual interconnections between physical and economic phenomena could be well handled within the scope of a dualistic geography which stressed separate laws governing each area. Anuchin was accused of undue sympathy with American methodology and was compared with such "reactionary bourgeois" geographers as Alfred Hettner, the British-American Soviet specialist David Hooson, and the Swiss-American theoretician Hans Carol.[14]

Anuchin, in his own defense, declared that his case was firmly grounded in Marxist texts and that he was arguing only for an *indirect* and *limited* influence of environment on population and economy. He claimed to seek not a retreat into determinism but avoidance of the ills of indeterminism, which he described as the necessary concomitant of a "sundered" geography. The philosopher Vorobev pointed out the absence in the Marxist corpus of a complete exclusion of natural laws from the social sphere and praised Anuchin's attention to the interpenetration of social and natural laws. Saushkin declared that geography needs to be unified by a common object of study—Anuchin's geographic environment—not just by the existence of institutes and faculties.

Despite the recommendation of the official discussants to award the doctorate to Anuchin for "the boldness of his ideas, the originality of his concepts, and the great theoretical and practical importance of the unity of Soviet geography," the necessary two-thirds vote of the Council of the Faculty of Geography was not obtained. Twenty-nine voted for Anuchin, seventeen against, and three abstained.[15] Therefore Anuchin technically remains, despite his position as the most controversial and thought-provoking geographer in the Soviet Union, a mere "candidate," rather than a doctor, of geographical sciences.

The controversy has of course not faded away since the publication of Anuchin's book and its defense as a proposed dissertation. Numerous

[13] "Report on Discussion of Anuchin's Book," from *Izvestiia Vsesoiuznovo geograficheskovo obshchestva,* No. 4, 1961, pp. 362-370, as translated in *Soviet Geography,* Dec. 1961, pp. 18-32.

[14] For Carol's views see for instance "Geography of the Future," *Professional Geographer,* Vol. 13, No. 1 (Jan. 1961), pp. 14-18.

[15] Accounts of the second defense of the Anuchin book as a dissertation have appeared in *Vestn. Mosk. univ. Ser. V. Geogr.,* 1962, No. 5, pp. 65-68; and in *Izvest. Vses. geogr. obshch.,* No. 5, 1963, pp. 285-292. Both of these have been translated in *Soviet Geography,* the Jan. 1963 and Oct. 1963 issues, respectively.

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other geographers have entered the fray and, indeed, Anuchin was not alone even before 1960 as a critic of current trends in Soviet geography. Some of these critics have developed arguments rather different in emphasis from Anuchin's. One leading theoretical mind, who exemplifies the presence of more than two poles of opinion among the disputants, is I. M. Zabelin. In his article in the *Literaturnaia gazeta* discussion referred to above, Zabelin affirms his belief in a dualistic geography but is also strongly critical of the Institute of Geography for such reasons as that the Leningrad geophysicists have stolen the thunder from geographers with their studies of the earth's heat and water balance.[16]

Anuchin himself has continued to expound his basic views and to seek an ever wider audience for them. In 1961, he issued a pamphlet, *On the Criticism of the Unity of Geography,* answering some of his early critics.[17] In 1964, he published an article in *Voprosy filosofii,* marking one facet of the increasing collaboration between the disciplines of geography and philosophy during the course of the controversy.[18] Finally his latest foray, into the pages of *Literaturnaia gazeta,* has extended his audience to most of the intellectuals of the Soviet Union.

The Issues

Let us take a closer look at the issues involved in the controversy. The chief practical question, at least in Soviet minds, appears to be this: To what extent do geographers need a greater unity of theory and method in order to harness their efforts most effectively to the tasks of economic planning? In theoretical terms, the problems of main concern are these: To what extent will environmental determinism creep back into geography, and can a renewed emphasis on environmental determinism be made consistent with the Marxist positions on the division of the sciences and on the primacy of economic factors? Anuchin goes to considerable pains to differentiate his own limited and indirect determinism from what he, along with others Marxists, still considers "decadent bourgeois" determinism. He in fact identifies in the history of geographic thought a kind of healthy and positive determinism and associates it with the monistic materialism which all Marxists continually claim to represent in contradistinction to material-spiritual dualism or idealism. Among healthy determinists he includes L. I. Mechnikov, a 19th-century Russian geographer-sociologist, whose book *Civilization and the Great Historical Rivers,* with a foreword by Elisée Reclus (an important French pre-possibilist geographer and anti-Marxist socialist), made a considerable impression on Plekhanov.[19] The undesirable stream of geographic thought is identified by Anuchin not so much with determinism as with idealism, which he finds in the geography of Immanuel Kant and certain of his spiritual descendants.

But all this does not alter the strong contrast between Stalin's pronouncement of 1938 and what Anuchin would offer in its place. He writes:

The interaction between society and nature always bears a clearly defined geographical character, and given any social structure, it will be different in different countries and regions, since it depends on the geographical environment, which cannot be alike all over the surface of our planet.[20]

Anuchin's general attitude towards the Marxist classics, especially towards Stalin's interpretation of them, is therefore hardly one of abject submission, but rather a combination of traditional respect, critical awareness, and opportunism. He may use a quotation from Marx or Engels to advance his own argument, or he may take it with a grain of salt, if he cannot find reason to accept it at face value. For instance, he claims that the separation of natural science from social science is only "conventional," and that Stalin's 1938 statement should not be taken too seriously because it was made only "casually."[21]

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[16] See Zabelin, *op. cit.* in note 4 above.

[17] *O kritike edinstva geografii,* 1961; translated in *Soviet Geography,* Sept, 1962, pp. 22-39.

[18] "The Problem of Synthesis in Geographic Science," *Voprosy filosofii,* No. 2, 1964, pp. 35-45, as translated in *Soviet Geography,* Apr. 1964, pp. 34-36.

[19] Georgii Plekhanov, *The Development of the Monist View of History,* Moscow, 1956 (originally published 1894), p. 329. The best recent summary of the work of Reclus is by Marvin Mikesell, "Observations on the Writings of Elisée Reclus," *Geography,* Vol. 44, Part 4 (Nov. 1959), pp. 221-229.

[20] *Teoreticheskie problemy geografii,* 1960, p. 183.

[21] V. A. Anuchin, *op. cit.* in note 12 above, pp. 48 and 54.

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There are, nevertheless, some points on which the two camps of Soviet geographers agree, although not without dispute over the finer details. One is the matter of definition of the environment. The late geochemist V. I. Vernadski defined the geographic environment to include that sphere of the earth's surface which has been consciously transformed by man —the "noosphere"—but not necessarily to include the entire "envelope" of the earth's surface.[22] There is general agreement with Vernadski's view, which contrasts with that of some (but hardly all) Westerners who prefer the more obvious interpretation of the geographic environment as equivalent to all non-human nature, regardless of whether or not it has been reshaped by man. Furthermore, most Soviet geographers agree with Anuchin that the term "geographic environment," supposedly in the sense intended by Vernadski, was introduced into Marxist literature by Plekhanov, not by Marx, and that it derives ultimately from the writings of Reclus.[23]

Like the recent firing of T. D. Lysenko for his failure to produce enough genetically-improved strains of seed or of milk cattle to bolster Soviet agricultural endeavors, the Anuchinist protest may be interpreted as a theoretical analogy to the administrative reassessment of Soviet shortcomings in various attempts to conquer the physical environment. Already by the time of Stalin's death a grandiose plan to transform nature in the arid regions of the USSR had met with great disappointment, and the efforts of Khrushchev, although more successful, still fell far short of expectations because of an inadequate evaluation of the limitations and possibilities of the natural environment. Anuchin himself is fond of criticizing recent mistakes in land use and conservation practices, such as the conversion of good cropland into urban land or into the bed of an excessively large reservoir, or the felling of a forest without adequate plans for its regrowth.[24]

The obvious validity of such criticisms makes it easily understandable that, despite Anuchin's challenge to some apparently crucial tenets of the orthodox ideology, Soviet geographers in 1964 made a serious attempt to pull together into some kind of revised doctrinal unity which yields somewhat to Anuchin, but retains as much as possible of the division between physical and economic geography and of the stress on the ultimate significance of the economic factor. Papers attempting to produce such a new common front were given at the Fourth Congress of the Geographical Society of the USSR in May 1964.[25] Not only leading geographers such as Gerasimov, but also F. V. Konstantinov, Director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, joined in this effort, which was marked by considerable fine-line-drawing and straining of definitions, at times almost to the point of contradiction. Apparently a general retreat from the freer discussion of the earlier Khrushchev years into new forms of doctrinal rigidity was taking place at that time. But in 1965, as indicated by the articles in *Literaturnaia gazeta,* the way was opened again for some measure of controversy.

Anuchin and Marx

The Anuchin controversy provides clear evidence that scientific theory in the Soviet Union is becoming less and less distinctively Marxist in character. It does not at this time disclose a

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[22] On Vernadski see especially F. V. Konstantinov, "Interaction between Nature and Society and Modern Geography," *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Seriia Geograficheskaia,* No. 4, 1964, pp. 12-22, as translated in *Soviet Geography,* Vol. 5, No. 10 (Dec. 1964), pp. 61-73.

[23] V. A. Anuchin, *Teoreticheskie problemy geografii,* p. 45.

[24] *Ibid.,* pp. 223-235, contains an argument that only synthesized knowledge of the many facets of the environment can lead to sound economic planning. See also Anuchin, 1965, *op. cit.* in note 3 above. The relevance of Anuchin's critique to economic planning may have figured in his being named in 1958 as editor of a new periodical, *Geografiia i khoziaistvo* (Geography and the Economy).

[25] Papers from this conference dealing with the Anuchin controversy appeared in *Soviet Geography,* Dec. 1964; they include F. V. Konstantinov, *op. cit.* in note 22 above. The resolution of the conference was printed in *Izvest. Vses. Geogr, Obshch.,* No. 4, 1964, pp. 274-283, and was translated in *Soviet Geography,* Apr. 1965, pp. 30-40; its clearest reflection of Anuchinism is the statement that "the complex problem of the interaction between nature and human society requires further study and concretization. . . . A solution of these problems should help overcome the erroneous theoretical views that arose from the dogmatism and voluntarism of the personality cult." Perhaps the influence of Anuchinism can also be read in the Institute of Philosophy's *Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii,* 2nd ed., 1963, pp. 331-359, where the issue of man vs. environment is accorded a more many-sided and sophisticated treatment than Stalin gave it; but the conclusion still attributes ultimate causation to economic factors.

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clear rejection of Marx as a general economic, political, and historical guide; yet I believe this must be the ultimate result of the trends now clearly in evidence. For Marxism was originally touted as the ultimate in "scientific" method applied to the curing of social and economic evils. If it now appears that Marxism is an unreliable guide to correct procedure in natural science, this can hardly help but suggest that the pretention of Marxist theory to embody the ultimate in scientific method is less than justified.

Furthermore, the problem of environmental influences as raised by Anuchin points up the theoretical inconsistencies of Marxism-Leninism, although Anuchin and his supporters have not actually used it for that purpose.[26] What they have done is to resurrect some neglected ideas which have heretofore been most strongly expressed in the writings of non-Bolshevik Marxists such as Plekhanov. Plekhanov, unlike Lenin and Stalin, had a strong sense of the importance of the environment, and he drew upon some of the writings of Marx in order to prove that in his more cautious and philosophical passages Marx was in effect an environmentalist himself. A return to Plekhanovism would be a return, according to the judgment of Lenin himself, to the greatest writer in world Marxist literature; thus it would hardly be an abandonment of Marxism *per se*. It would, however, mark a sharp break with Marxist revolutionary orthodoxy and it would probably hasten the day when Marxism would be regarded in the Soviet Union, as it is in much of the West, as a useful temporary guide, of limited rather than universal significance.[27]

It should not be forgotten that both the Anuchinists and their opponents style themselves loyal and consistent Marxists. The most radical hope that any of them have so far expressed—whatever their private thoughts—is for a revision of Marxist doctrine, not an abandonment of it. But there are times when revision, followed to its logical conclusion, amounts to rejection. Let us hope that logic will triumph.[28]

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[26] The role of the environmentalist issue in Marxist literature is perhaps best exemplified in the questions raised by the concept of "oriental despotism." Marx himself took up this notion—according to which the particular environmental challenges presented by large floodplains have produced the particular socio-political-economic system found in most Asian nations—in order to explain why these societies have not experienced the "normal" transition from ancient to feudal to capitalist and, finally, to socialist conditions. Lenin, of course, as well as other Russian Marxists, knew of the concept and discussed it in his early writings, but by the time of the outbreak of World War I he suddenly dropped all references to it (Karl Wittfogel, "The Marxist View of China," *China Quarterly* [London], July-Sept. 1962, and Oct.-Dec. 1962), probably because he had no desire to put environmental restrictions, even if only in theory, on his own political ambitions, for Marx considered Russia a borderline case of "oriental despotism." In his *Oriental Despotism* (1957), Karl Wittfogel has performed the valuable service of bringing out into the open the importance of the issue of man-land relationships in Marxist thought.

[27] In distinguishing between an environmentalist and an antienvironmentalist attitude in Marxist geography, I draw approximate parallels with the "analyst" and the "revolutionist" strains seen in Marx by Karl de Schweinitz, Jr. in his "On the Determinism of the Marxian System," *Social Research,* Vol. 29, No. 1 (Spring 1963), pp. 37-49; and with the "revisionist" and the "radical" strains characterized by George Lichtheim in his *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* (1961); and with many other analyses as well. In his book and also in his "Marxist Doctrine in Perspective," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. 7, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1958), pp. 32-37, Lichtheim points out that nearly all the existing non-revolutionary socialist movements have a common source in early Marxism; these socialists see the "analyst" Marx, and so in effect the environmentalist Marx, as the "true" Marx.

[28] In my original article I continued my illustration of the usefulness of combining the scientific with the philosophical approach by discussing certain developments in Soviet physics over the past decade. Lack of space as well as the highly technical nature of this discussion have compelled the editors to omit it.

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Economics: Roads and Inroads

By Robert W. Campbell

This article is being written at a time of confusion and debate in Soviet society over economic theories, policies and institutions. Nikita Khrushchev was an innovator of impressive zeal in Soviet economic life who worked indefatigably to remove some of the more intolerable crudities of the Stalinist approach to running the economy. In his exuberance and naiveté he sometimes made things different without making them better. His successors during the past year have endorsed and even extended some of the changes, such as the rationalization of farm prices, but some others they have judged as misguided and, accordingly, rescinded or revised them. Thus they have moderated his attempted downgrading of steel in favor of plastics and of coal in favor of oil and gas.

Despite all the reforms, the Khrushchev era ended with several important economic issues broached but unresolved, among them the two most fundamental and persistent questions in Soviet economic life: (1) the proper degree of centralization in economic administration and (2) the relative emphasis to be given to the desire of the population for a better living today as against the use of resources for such goals as high investment, military strength and foreign aid, favored by the party leadership. Because these are questions on which the regime differs sharply with the rest of society, they have always tended to be "ideological" issues, protected from public argument by an armor of official doctrine. Such doctrine usually obscured more than it clarified, but it served the goal of precluding open discussion. During the Khrushchev era, significant breaches were made in

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this armor as a result of more frank discussion, even though little was changed in either the degree of centralization or in the order of priorities.

Perhaps the most important development of the period was the freedom allowed some unorthodox theoreticians to elaborate new theories of economic decision-making and resource allocation. By ignoring Marxian dogma, these men discovered the connection between prices and economic administration and developed a theory of rational choice in the sphere of resource use. Following the intellectual leadership of L. V. Kantorovich and V. V. Novozhilov, an elite of Soviet economists, mostly young, able and well trained in mathematics, has acquired a sophisticated understanding of what economic efficiency means and how a decentralized system operating on something like market principles could employ prices and profit indicators to assure effective use of resources.[1] This revolution in economic theory has prepared the way for more venturesome consideration of possible institutional changes, though it is still too abstract and esoteric to have had much influence on the current discussion of reform.

The present regime has not yet given any very clear indication of what it would do about the two fundamental issues outlined above. It has, however, given evidence of accepting the new economics by permitting the award of the Lenin prize to Kantorovich, Novozhilov and the official sponsor of the new economic theory, V. S. Nemchinov. On the other hand, no rapid institutional changes can be expected. Premier Kosygin said last March that decisions about reforms in economic administration would be made only after careful thought and preparation, and it is an indication of the unsettled state of mind of the leaders that this inoccuous statement was not made public until a month after it had been made.[2] Real decisions about priorities are being embodied in a new Five-Year Plan now being drawn up for 1966-70, but despite a few tantalizing hints thrown out by Kosygin about guidelines for that plan, the priorities it is to embody are still unknown. Since the basic problems involve such difficult choices, it is unlikely that they will be resolved in a clearcut manner at any one point in time. It is more useful, therefore, to concentrate on the underlying issues than to try to guess what changes are likely to occur in the near future.

Diseases of Soviet Planning

The liveliest topic in Soviet economic discussion today is the question of how to reform the planning and supervision of enterprise behavior. The debate has already resulted in the experimental application of schemes which leave more decisions in the hands of enterprise management and rely on profits to measure performance for purposes of incentive payments. This new departure has acquired the label of Libermanism—after one of its most active proponents, Professor Yevsei Liberman—and is often described as a return to the familiar "profit motive" of capitalism. These labels tend to distort and obscure what is really happening, and suggest a more fundamental kind of change than is actually taking place or being considered. To demonstrate this, it will be helpful to describe the kind of problems facing the economists.

The process of making decisions about resource use in the Soviet Union is beset by some notorious maladies. Producers are insensitive to the wishes of their customers regarding quality, variety, convenience and reliability. Enterprises are often encouraged to persist in producing unwanted and unsalable goods by a deranged bonus system. Perfectly obvious desiderata, such as the introduction of more efficient production methods, full utilization of productive capacity, conservation of property and avoidance of waste, seem impossible to achieve because the producers find them disadvantageous to their interests. These diseases are specific to the Soviet system and they are explainable in terms of its basic institutions. To turn a Marxian slogan against its makers, Soviet central planning suffers from a fundamental antagonistic contradiction. According to Soviet ideology, central planning is supposed to guarantee the primacy of the general interest over parochial interests in the economic sphere by subjecting the whole process of production and consumption to central supervision, direction and control. The whole apparatus of this sys-

[1] For details see Robert Campbell, "Marx, Kantorovich and Novozhilov: Stoimost Versus Reality," *Slavic Review* (New York), October 1961.

[2] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), April 21, 1965, pp. 3-4.

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tem—state ownership of the means of production, centralized allocation of resources, and detailed plans regulating the activity of each production unit—was intended to replace the anarchy which Marxian socialists professed to see in the market system by a harmonious, consciously co-ordinated pattern of activity. But this apparatus has developed independent values and rules of behavior. It seems to have a will of its own, often exercised against its supposed masters. Thus the very devices by means of which the vision of a harmonious unity is to be realized—the detailed orders from above, drastic sanctions and material incentives, and the massive bureaucracy of controllers and supervisors—have often not only fostered what is patent folly from any overall point of view but actually interfered with the accomplishment of the leaders' goals. There is a piquant irony in the neatness with which the Marxian idea that property relations can become fetters holding back the growth of production fits the Soviet situation.

Why has the administrative system led to these results? Basically the problem is this. The overseers set for production enterprises numerous targets as well as restrictions and they employ an elaborate system of reporting to determine how well the plan has been fulfilled. "Successful" performance by a production enterprise is a complex phenomenon, but given the tremendous variety of conditions from enterprise to enterprise and the immensity of the control job when a whole national economy is subjected to this kind of procedure, the Soviet controllers have had to content themselves with checking only on a few dimensions of performance. In practice, the Soviet control system has emphasized the volume of output and adherence to cost budgets as criteria of plan fulfilment. Because they have made these or other unidimensional targets the measure of success and because these targets have often been defined in peculiar ways, enterprises have been encouraged to ignore quality, falsify reporting, alter the assigned output mix, balk at innovation, conceal resources and hoard assets. Higher control organs then usually respond by introducing more indicators and targets to which enterprises are made to conform. If the new indicators are backed up by material rewards and sanctions, new evasions on the part of enterprise managers —and new departures from what is desirable from an economy-wide point of view—follow, and this in turn brings a new counterattack from above in the form of more rules, regulations and reporting. As a result, the typical enterprise manager loses interest in making decisions or exercising initiative because his efforts are likely to be frustrated by regulations from above. As the upper-level administrators arrogate more decisions to themselves and interfere more and more with the detailed management of the enterprise, their decisions tend to become more irrational, inconsistent and bureaucratic. This is the famous "petty tutelage" about which Soviet enterprise management has always complained.

In a sense, the behavior of enterprise management in the Soviet Union has always been controlled by the "profit motive." Since the managers are confronted with a system of constraints and incentives which makes some actions profitable to them personally, and others disadvantageous, the rule of survival is to do what the system makes profitable. What is distinctive is the fact that the profitability of an act is measured less by its impact on accounting profit than by its effect on one of the established success indicators. It has been a favorite slogan of socialists that capitalism means "production for profit rather than for use"; yet in the Soviet economy, where gross output has been made the most important success indicator, this slogan, amended to read "production for the sake of production, rather than for use," is equally applicable. And another socialist slogan, which proclaims that in capitalist economies profit is put ahead of the general welfare, can also be converted to fit the Soviet economy once it is recognized that what counts in the Soviet case is not money profit, but "success" as determined by the system of administrative controls.

The case of light industry illustrates best some of the main elements of the problem. Heretofore, clothing producers, for example, worked to fulfill the plan set by their superiors, rather than satisfy the people who were going to consume their output. They took the raw materials the planners sent them, and within the rules and restrictions set for them by the bosses, worked to earn bonuses by producing

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whatever would be accepted as output under the existing rules. They did not care what happened to this output, but just shipped it off to some warehouse and had no reason to be concerned with the desires of their customers for quality, variety, or novelty.

Efforts have always been made to overcome the deficiencies of the administrative approach by further administrative tinkering: specific irrationalities have been counteracted by redefining the success indicators, by changing the specification of tasks in the plan, by varying the form of reporting. Experiment in these matters is the daily business of the administrative economy, in the same way that there is continuous trial-and-error adjustment of the money supply in a market economy. The novel element in the USSR in the last several years has been the great increase in the frankness with which these problems are discussed by Soviet officials, a more trenchant criticism of the fundamental rationale of central control, and some fairly bold proposals for changing it. This critical and reformist outlook often goes under the label of Libermanism, but the movement for reform should not be treated as a personal crusade on the part of Liberman himself; what is significant is the official encouragement of a wide-ranging public discussion of the basic issues.

The Liberman Proposals

Liberman put the fundamental problem very pungently when he declared that in principle there should be no conflict under socialism between the interests of society and the interests of the individual enterprise, and that to validate this principle it is necessary to assure that what is useful to society is also advantageous to the firm, and that anything harmful to overall interests be penalized at the enterprise level.[3] Here is where the argument begins—how is this to be done?

Liberman's answer is that the manager ought to have the authority to determine most of the details of his plan, such as the size of his labor force, his budget, choice of inputs, technology, etc. He should be answerable to his superiors not for a host of separate indicators, but only for overall results, and these can best be measured by profit. The interest of management in increasing profit can be assured by making profit the only source of bonuses, and by scaling the amount of bonuses to the rate of profit earned (figured as the ratio of total profit to the total capital under the control of the enterprise). This latter feature would give management an incentive to utilize capacity as fully as possible and to avoid piling up hoards of surplus equipment and inventories. Furthermore, to give the enterprise an interest in continuous improvement, the profit scale would remain in effect for several years, so that rewards for improved work would continue to accrue for a significant period of time. At the present time, better work is usually rewarded with a harder plan in the next period.

Liberman first made these suggestions in the mid-1950's, but he achieved fame only in 1962 when his ideas were set out in an article in *Pravda* (September 9, 1962) with the evident aim of stimulating a wider public discussion of the problems of enterprise planning and control. Many responses to his proposal, both favorable and unfavorable, were published in the central press and many alternative proposals for reform were made. Because this discussion occurred shortly before the November 1962 plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee, many believed that the leadership might be preparing to introduce some real changes in economic administration. In the end, however, no changes were made. The proposals were premature, Khrushchev announced in his final words to the session, and the issue was turned over for further discussion to a special group, the Scientific Council on Khozraschet and Material Stimulation of Production, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Nevertheless, the 1962 discussion revealed a great deal of sympathy for the idea of freeing the managers from petty tutelage, though much disagreement as to how this might be accomplished. Many economists and planning officials feared that the proposals infringed on the principle of planning, which they considered inadmissable.[4] On the other hand, spokesmen for enterprise management supported the general Liberman line, and a great many of the comments received by the press and by the Scientific Council apparently favored even more in-

[3] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 11, 1962, p. 105.

[4] Many such expressions are found in *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 11, 1965.

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dependence for management than Liberman had proposed. A subsequent review of the discussion revealed that some of the proposals went so far as to divorce the enterprise from the whole idea of national economic planning and to make profit a universal, automatic regulator of enterprise activity.[5]

It is also significant that the argument against Libermanism was conducted less from an ideological than from a practical and technical point of view. In part at least this was undoubtedly the result of a lecture delivered to the party Central Committee (November 1962 Plenum) by Nikita Khrushchev, in which the former First Secretary pronounced profit a legitimate measure of enterprise performance. He then stated that although socialism did not assign to profit the universal importance it enjoys under capitalism, it does have "in the individual enterprise . . . great significance as an economic index of the effectiveness of its work."[6] Consequently, most of the criticism of Liberman ran in terms of what would happen if certain indicators were not planned from above, how misleading profit would be as a measure of national economic advantage under existing prices, and other such pragmatic considerations.

The strongest argument against the Liberman idea is to be found in the deficiencies of the Soviet price system. Profit can be a reliable measure of the social usefulness of enterprise activity only if the prices of the inputs the firm consumes accurately measure the social cost of its work, and if the prices for its output reflect the value of its contribution to the achievement of overall objectives. The Soviet price system as it exists today certainly does not meet this criterion. The new mathematical economists of the Kantorovich persuasion have developed a thoroughly sound understanding of the principles of rational pricing, and they surely know

[5] *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 2, 1964, p. 144.

[6] *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 20, 1962.

Liberman and His Critics

What can be the guarantee that enterprises will give proper priority to state interests? In our view such a guarantee is necessary and feasible. This is the key question in the perfecting and simplifying of planning work. This can be achieved under the condition that what is good for society as a whole be made advantageous for each producing collective. . . . In principle, under socialism there should be no room for contradictions between the interests of society and those of the individual enterprise.

A guarantee of conscientiousness of planning from below, in our view, can be established by utilizing the principle of "income sharing." The greater the value that an enterprise has created for society, the greater should be the amount assigned to its incentive funds. . . . The principle of income sharing will be realized in the form of a planned long-term rate of profitability.

—Liberman, in *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 8, 1962, p. 105.

E. Liberman says that we ought to plan only the production program. But surely we have a planned economy, and what will happen to such indicators as the balance of labor resources? If we leave enterprises free to plan their own labor force, very quickly there will arise the question of how to employ a considerable part of the labor force.

—I. Kasitskii, in *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 11, 1962, p. 89.

Some economists have made proposals which take very little account of the specific character of the planned economy. Their proposals would lead in varying degrees to divorcing the enterprise from the whole system of national planning. Some have proposed, essentially, to turn profit into a kind of universal self-regulator of the work of the enterprise.

—"Report of the Scientific Council for Khozraschet and Material Stimulation," *Voprosy Ekonomiki,* No. 2, 1964, p. 144.

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how prices must be reformed before the use of profit as a measure of enterprise success will be feasible. But it is interesting that this group has had very little to say in the current debate on planning reform. Thus the traditional economists, planners, and managerial officials, who are seriously handicapped by their lack of appreciation of how price is related to profit control of producers, have been most active in the argument, while those who really understand the issue have been curiously silent.

The New Experiments

The Liberman controversy of 1962 was only an episode, and the discussion of possible reforms in administration smoldered on more or less continuously until fanned into vigorous life once again by the announcement of the post-Khrushchev leadership that they intended to take action. Moreover, many of the proposals made in the course of the discussion became the subject of "economic experiments" in a sample of enterprises. This experimental bent is another indication of the weakening of doctrinal imperatives in favor of pragmatic considerations. Some of the experiments have involved a refining of the measurement of output, as in the substitution of the "value added" concept for the formerly used "gross output" in light industry. As of January 1, 1965, all enterprises in light industry were to be using the new system.[7] Similarly, a number of construction projects are being experimentally financed by long-term loans from the Stroibank (to be repaid from profits), rather than by outright grants as is the usual practice.[8]

But the most striking of these experiments has been the attempt to put something like the Liberman idea to work in enterprises of light industry. In July 1964, two clothing manufacturers, the Bolshevichka firm in Moscow and the Maiak firm in Gorky, received permission to work out their own output plan on the basis of orders from retail clothing outlets and to assume control over other factors in their plan, such as the wage fund and working capital. In addition, their managements obtained the right to manipulate wages within the plant to stimulate regard for quality in production. Success was to be judged by fulfillment of the sales plan the firms had set themselves, and by profit. Bonuses for the officials of the firms were to be paid from profits, and a share of the profits was to be left at the disposal of the enterprise for its own purposes. In order to assure responsiveness to customers' preferences, some flexibility was allowed in price setting and strong financial sanctions were stipulated for failure to make deliveries according to contract. For each day's delay in scheduled delivery, the enterprises were to be docked .3 to .4 percent of the value of the undelivered goods, and at the expiration of 20 days, 5 to 6 percent. This year, the program has been extended to an additional 400 firms in the textile, clothing, leather and footwear industries with essentially the same provisions. It was also suggested that the system be tried in some branches of heavy industry, and variations on it have now been reported in mines, food processing, retailing and machine building.[9]

In spite of some measure of success with these recent experiments, the experience with the new system so far does not augur well for the success of applied Libermanism under present conditions. Reports on results under the new rules mention some serious problems and suggest that much more thoroughgoing reforms will have to be put into effect if the new idea is to work. Prices have turned out to be one problem, as might have been expected. To make the producer sensitive to the buyer's desire for something special, prices must be a negotiable item, but this requirement has been met only partially. The Bolshevichka and Maiak experiment permitted direct negotiation about prices for new items, and special markups for special finishing and trimmings,[10] but in general the prices of their products are still taken from the standard price lists established by higher control organs, and this has caused trouble. The Bolshevichka firm found that on some of its most popular items it incurred losses or made

[7] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,* June 1, 1965, pp. 35-36.
[8] *Ibid.,* Jan. 13, 1965, p. 15.
[9] *Ibid.,* Jan. 27, 1965, and *New York Times,* May 28 and July 3, 1965.
[10] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,* Jan. 6, 1965, Supplement, p. 2.

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little profit, and the result of the first year's work in both enterprises was a decline in both value of sales and profits compared to earlier periods. The enhanced emphasis on profit as a success measure is not going to make producers interested in catering to buyers' wants if doing so reduces profits.

In view of this basic problem, it is interesting to find in the official magazine of the textile industry a discussion of textile prices which shows no awareness of how the old price structure in the industry will affect the behavior of textile plants under the new system.[11] The author of the article, an official of the Gosplan bureau in charge of price setting, says that existing prices are out of line with present costs (the price list for cotton goods was fixed in 1955 and for woolen goods in 1958), producing big profits in some lines, losses in others. But he seems totally oblivious of what this must mean for the behavior of textile firms transferred to the system of profit incentives. Yet, in some cases, more sensitivity to the price problem has been shown. Thus a Urals producer of bearings has recently been granted permission—by way of a quality incentive—to charge higher prices for bearings with a guaranteed life.[12] The Nevskii Machinery Plant in Leningrad has been treated the same way. These price changes, however, have been achieved as a result of decisions taken by higher echelons at the Sovnarkhoz level, not as a result of negotiations between producer and consumer.

The enterprises' freedom of maneuver under the new system is still too restricted to expect much improvement in their work. For one thing, their suppliers have remained under the traditional system of controls. One feature of the Bolshevichka and Maiak experiment was the right granted the two firms to contract for deliveries of clothing to retail outlets on a monthly schedule and in fabrics specified by the customer. But when they turned to textile plants to secure the necessary materials, they could get delivery commitments only on a quarterly basis and found it impossible to obtain the fabric qualities and varieties they needed to fill their orders. The textile firms were still working under the old system on the basis of quarterly output plans, and they cared little about quality or variety. This is surely one of the main reasons for the subsequent extension of the experiment to a larger circle of light industry plants. Unless Libermanism is made universal, however, an interface between the domain of the old system and the new will remain, which will seriously restrict the flexibility of enterprises in the latter sector.

But the really amazing inhibition on the promised freedom in the new domain is foot-dragging by the bureaucrats. The plant managers under the new system find that their former administrative superiors still prescribe endless detail for them exactly as before, and one fascinating article claims that despite unequivocal instructions in the decrees establishing the new order, the local branch of the Gosbank refused to let the managers of the Bolshevichka and Maiak plants use profits as they saw fit, and that the state arbitration agency refused to allow the financial sanctions for late delivery that were to make suppliers adhere to their promises![13]

Altogether, the experiment in applied Libermanism has been a less radical departure from tradition than advertised. Moreover, even though the obstacles to change seem to have been bureaucratic rather than doctrinaire, it seems unlikely that the new system will be extended much farther. The willingness to try Libermanism in light industry was conditioned by a special emergency not likely to be duplicated elsewhere in the economy. The last two or three years have seen a frightening buildup of unsold goods precisely in the industries involved in the reform. Stocks of apparel in the retail trade network rose from 1,485 million rubles on January 1, 1959 to 4,133 million rubles worth on January 1, 1964. Many of these goods are said to be unsalable because they are out of fashion and of low quality—second and third grade.[14] There was also a large, though not quite so spectacular, growth in retail stocks of textiles and footwear, at least through the end of 1962. Subsequent trends are not known because, interestingly, in the 1963 Statistical Handbook, data on stocks of goods in retail

[11] *Tekstilnaia promyshlennost* (Moscow), No. 2, 1965.
[12] *Pravda,* June 1, 1965.
[13] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,* June 16, 1965, pp. 35-36.
[14] *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow), No. 5, 1965, p. 35.

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

COMMENT ON A SOVIET CONSUMER

—From Krokodil (Moscow), November 10, 1964.

trade no longer appear. It is known, however, that in 1963 sales of textiles and sewn goods actually declined and that in sales of footwear stagnation had set in. No figures are available yet for 1964, but it is likely that the situation became worse rather than better and that this emboldened the authorities to hasten the extension of the new system to much of the rest of the textile and apparel industry—even though the feasibility and effectiveness of this move was far from proved. The piling up of several billion rubles worth of resources in totally useless output must impress the Soviet leaders as an intolerable waste, especially when so many other resource needs are competing for attention.

The Battle of Priorities

The second issue—the priority to be given to consumption relative to other claims on national resources—has always been the most sensitive question in Soviet economic life. It held a central place in the one period of open debate about economic policy, the industrialization debate of the 1920's, but the outcome of that debate was a decision so adverse to the interests of consumers that the subject could never again be discussed honestly in public; it had become a divisive issue that had the potential for shattering what measure of social consensus there has ever been in Soviet life. The problem was therefore officially laid to rest, embalmed in sterile doctrine and hypocritical slogans and publicly touched upon only obliquely and euphemistically.

Soviet ideologists assert that continuous improvement of the population's welfare constitutes a basic economic law of their society, but this is usually coupled with statements about the priority of the need to build the technical-material base of socialism. They have also rationalized the postponement of improvements in consumption levels by doctrinal references to an "objective necessity" for the output of Sector I, producing the means of production, to grow more rapidly than the output of Sector II, producing goods of consumption. But any discussion of these assertions in operational terms has been notably absent. National income figures on the relative shares devoted to investment, consumption and other end uses have until recently not been published and, one suspects, not even systematically compiled; that would have been too direct, too blunt a revelation of the low priority assigned to consumption. Even today, what information is published on national income allocation is essentially fantasy. If the official figures are to be believed, no part of the Soviet national income is devoted to military purposes.[15]

Because this question of consumption versus other uses of national resources is so explosive, it is ideally suited as an issue for political maneuver within the ranks of the power elite in Soviet society. The favorite method of alluding to it has usually been in terms of the relative rates of growth of "Industry A" versus "Industry B." It has been a part of Soviet economic ideology that the output of Industry A must grow faster than the output of Industry B. This idea is elaborately grounded in Marxian eco-

[15] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR* (Moscow), recent issues.

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nomic theory and it is also supported by numerous pronouncements of Lenin (especially in his pre-revolutionary article "On the So-called Question of Markets").

The distinction between Industry A and Industry B is based on the application to the industrial sector of the Marxian distinction between activities producing the means of production and those producing goods of consumption. Industry A covers the former, Industry B the latter. Great emphasis is placed on this distinction, which invariably appears in Soviet plans and statistical reporting for industry. Yet the question of the relative rates of growth of these two elements in the national output is only vaguely related to the issue of consumption versus other resource use. For one thing, the definition of Industry A and Industry B in Soviet statistical practice differs from the Marxian concepts from which the proposition is drawn. In the real world it turns out that nearly any branch of industry produces both producers' goods and consumer goods. Although we think of the textile industry as a consumer goods industry, much of its output consists of producers' goods. Many products, such as gasoline, for example, can be used either for consumption, as in passenger automobiles, or for further production, as in farm tractors. Moreover, the proposition itself need be true neither in the Marxian growth model, nor in more sophisticated theories of growth. But just because of this unreality, the distinction and its terminology have provided an ideal idiom for referring obliquely to the real problem, and at any time of crisis, such as the Stalin-Malenkov-Khrushchev transition, there is likely to be renewed controversy about relative growth rates of Industry A and Industry B. The last several years of the Khrushchev era and the first year of the new regime have again seen a great deal of discussion in these terms, which implies uncertainty and conflict within the leadership over the relative priority to be given consumption.

What is actually happening to allocational priorities, or what the intentions of the new leadership are, is difficult to discern. But to the extent that evidence on actual resource use is available, it appears that there has been no serious shift from a growth and power orientation toward a consumer-oriented set of priorities, even though numerous policy acts have been so interpreted. In the late 1950's, the government had begun to make loans to citizens for the purchase of consumer durables and for the construction of privately-owned housing, which seemed to indicate encouragement for consumption. But after 1960, the volume of such credit declined sharply.[16]

The introduction of incentives in enterprises of light industry is also interpreted as evidence of a new appreciation of consumer claims. To be sure, the reform is intended to make enterprises producing for household consumption more responsive to the wishes of the population, but as was suggested above, the real concern is to avoid waste within the portion of national resources allocated to consumer goods production; it does not imply greater priority for consumption in overall resources use.

Other indications of a kind of welfare revolution have been seen in such acts as the raising of minimum wages and the extension of the pension system, most recently to collective farmers. But all of these are better interpreted as efforts to improve production efficiency. They represent a rationalization of incentives to encourage more effort on the part of the labor force—a reform of means rather than a shift in the regime's preferences about ends.

Indeed, there has been much evidence in recent years of a repressed inflation in the Soviet economy, which suggests a tendency to cut back on intended consumption goals when overambitious commitments begin to press against resource limitations. Moves intended to result in higher consumption levels, such as wage increases, increases in farm prices, pension improvements and tax reductions, are not validated by sufficiently large corresponding increases in consumer goods production. The failure of agricultural production to grow appreciably since 1958 has been an important factor in this development, as has also been the refusal of Soviet citizens to buy the obsolete and low-quality goods produced for sale to them. Postponement of the scheduled tax reduction in the early 1960's and the raising of the prices for meat and dairy products in the summer of 1962 were clearly called for by the need to extract excess purchasing power from the population. And frequent comment during the past year

[16] *Ibid.*, various years.

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that it is important to coordinate fully the monetary demand of the population with the supply of consumer goods attests that the problem remains.[17]

Encroachments of Rationality

Yet despite the lack of any real change in the share of national income allotted to consumption, it is undeniable that there is a new tone in Soviet discussions of overall priorities. Under Khrushchev, there was a much more explicit acknowledgement of the importance of improving the welfare of the Soviet citizen, and the new leadership, to the extent that a change in tone can be distinguished in its pronouncements, appears even more openly committed to the importance of improving living standards. This emphasis is particularly evident in the commentary on the 1965 Plan by the Deputy Chief of Gosplan, in which promises are made to advance the timing of some scheduled wage increases, to increase housing construction and to make special efforts to raise the output of construction goods.[18]

But the most interesting development, which may be symptomatic of a genuine reordering of priorities, is an attack on the traditional ideological supports for the high investment policy and especially a reevaluation of the "A versus B" doctrine. Khrushchev first called the doctrine into question when in a discussion of growth priorities he declared that it was important to distinguish between different kinds of investment within the means-of-production category. Equipment for new steel mills and equipment for textile factories are both means of production, but the production of textile mill equipment leads directly to increases in consumer goods output, whereas steel mill equipment does not. He asserted that the consumption of the output of Industry A was changing toward items of the textile mill equipment type, so that notwithstanding the continued high priority for Industry A, this now embodied a real promise of an early improvement in the supply of consumer goods. In the past, of course, insistence on priority for Industry A had meant in effect increasing the production of steel to build more steel mills to produce more steel to build more steel mills. In thus digging beneath the surface of the polished cliché, the former Premier prepared the way, whether intentionally or not, for a more intelligent discussion on the consumption-versus-investment issue.

Another form of the same revisionist tendency is the assertion, made frequently of late, that—even admitting the necessity of predominant growth of Industry A over Industry B—the time has come when the divergence between the two growth rates ought to be lessened. More recently, the doctrine has been attacked as altogether false, notably in a series of articles published in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* in the spring and summer of this year. On the consumption-investment issue, just as in the argument over profit and prices in the proposed economic reform, discourse in the Soviet Union runs along two completely separate lines. The new mathematical economists have taken up the question in the context of their efforts to construct optimizing economic growth models. These models inevitably stress one central feature of the growth process, namely that consumption can be sacrificed in the present to make available increased consumption in the future via investment. The question of a criterion for choosing an optimal growth rate is inescapable in this kind of theorizing. The obvious and sensible criterion is the preference of the population concerning postponement of some of today's potential consumption to increase that of future years, and this general idea is incorporated in some of the models that have been discussed. So far, there has been no interaction between these two universes of thought. The new economists completely ignore the "A versus B" distinction as meaningless, while the traditional economists and the men of affairs are less interested in the fundamental abstract principles than in chipping away at received doctrine just enough to clear the way for more open discussion. Though limited, this activity is in a way more significant than the more fundamental theorizing of the new economists. Once the ideological obstacles are openly and publicly questioned, an honest discussion becomes possible and the way may be opened for a real debate on allocation priorities.

The adaptation of economic doctrine and practice to changing circumstances is not a new

[17] See, *e.g.*, Kosygin's report on the annual plan for 1965 to the Supreme Soviet. *Pravda*, Dec. 10, 1964.
[18] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 1, 1965.

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thing in the Soviet Union. There have been numerous instances in the past when an established bit of dogma has had to be ignored or repudiated if those in charge of making economic policy and running the economy were to be free to pursue effectively the primary ends of the regime, such as the goal of pushing the growth rate to the limit or maximizing the economic wherewithal that could be wrung from available resources. Whether the doctrinal point at issue was derived from Marx (as in the idea that an interest rate was inadmissable under socialism) or whether it was invented by the Soviet leadership itself (for example, the now repudiated idea that obsolescence did not exist in the Soviet economy), ideology has seldom been able to maintain itself when it came into obvious conflict with expediency. What is happening today, therefore, is remarkable less for the fact that ideological positions on economic affairs are being subverted than for the fact that the offensive against ideology is now touching on doctrines that are more basic than any that have been involved before, and that it calls into question the fundamental institutions of the Soviet economic system as well as the authority of the party. There is probably some truth in the charge against Liberman and the groups for which he is a spokesman that they are at heart against the principle of central planning. Moreover, the argument about priorities, muted and incoherent though it is, does involve an attack on the right of the party leadership to enforce its preferences over those of the population. This is what makes the encroachments on ideology in economic questions today so portentous.

* * *

Postscript

On September 27, a plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee was convened to discuss and approve the long-awaited reforms in economic administration. The changes turn out to be a blend of some elements of the Liberman-style proposals discussed in this article, some other less widely advirtised increases in managerial autonomy, and a new round of administrative reshuffling. The central administrative structure is to be organized once again on the sectoral principle, and the territorial economic councils are to be abolished. The lush growth of central planning agencies has also been pruned back somewhat with the abolition of the Supreme Economic Council and the All-Union Economic Council.

The indicators to be planned for the enterprise from above have been decreased and now include volume of sales, output of principal products, wage bill, total profit and the ratio of profit to capital, payments to the budget, centrally planned capital outlay, introduction of new technology, allocations of materials, and disposition of output. Management has gained considerably more authority over personnel matters, especially in establishing incentive systems within the plant. The profit indicator is new and has been given an important role, since significant amounts of profit will be left under the control of the enterprise to be spent for investment, wage incentives, etc. But it is not at all clear to what extent the managerial bonus system will be tied to profit performance alone, as recommended by Liberman. It is also interesting that the reforms do not envisage an extension of the system of direct ties between producers and their customers beyond its present sphere of application. For the moment, inputs are to be made available, and output disposed of, through a central allocation system not noticeably different from that now used.

One far-reaching change will be some decentralization of investment decisions. Enterprises are to have new sources from which they can make investments on their own, and more investment is to be made from repayable bank credit, less from outright grants. The price-reform issue is left unresolved. Its importance for making the profit indicator a meaningful measure of success is acknowledged, but actual price reform has been put off again. The reform scheduled for the end of 1965 will apparently not take place, and an overhaul of the price system is not expected before 1967.

Altogether, the reforms probably mean a certain increase in managerial autonomy and an improved system of incentives, but they are far from the bold move toward decentralization via market techniques that some had expected. With regard to the matter of priorities, the trends described earlier in the text are affirmed in the great emphasis that Kosygin has placed on the need to increase consumer welfare. In his report to the Central Committee he said outright that the share of consumption in national income must be increased.

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The Dilemmas of Soviet Sociology

By Paul Hollander

In discussing the problems and defects of American sociology, Soviet sociologists sometimes refer to a book written by the eminent American sociologist, Robert Lynd. In this book, *Knowledge for What?* (Princeton, 1939), Lynd castigated American sociology for failing to engage itself effectively in the solution of prominent social problems. Today, the same question—knowledge for what?—acquires new dimensions and significance when applied to the recent and current work of Soviet sociologists. What is the nature of the knowledge *they* are seeking? What use are they, or other groups in their society, going to make of that knowledge? Is it intended to supplement existing mechanisms of social control, or could it become a point of departure for social change unanticipated at present? Could it become a solvent of restraints and rigidities which, despite destalinization, continue to characterize the Soviet social order?

It is more than likely that official spokesmen of Soviet sociology would contend that the alternatives implied by the above questions are false ones. In their view, Soviet sociology can be, and is, both a tool of social control and an agent of controlled social change in a dynamic and at the same time planned society.[1] In the Western perspective, by contrast, the utilization of social-scientific information is inseparably tied to the issue of the autonomy of the social sciences; there has been a traditionally strong awareness of the impact of the relationship between science and society upon the results of social inquiry. Soviet observers have

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[1] *Cf.* A. M. Kulkin and N. I. Kondakov (eds.), *Stroitelstvo kommunizma i obshchestvennye nauki,* Materialy Sessii Obshchevo Sobraniia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Oct. 19-20, 1962, Moscow, 1962; and L. F. Ilichev, *Obshchestvennye nauki i kommunizm,* Moscow, 1963.

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themselves shown a lively interest in the interaction between Western, particularly American, sociology and its social-political environment. Thus, perhaps, it is only fair for this survey of Soviet sociology to start with the same concern.

In Western societies, sociology is frequently evaluated in two simplified ways: either as a potentially dangerous instrument of social manipulation (an imagery deriving from such partial applications as advertising and political propaganda), or as a fine fruit of Western rationalism and an expression of the frank examination of the societal self. The latter positive conception of sociology credits the discipline with power to combat prejudice, falsehood, and obscurantism. Some note, however, that this potential of sociology can be realized only when it is free from external, and particularly political, interference.[2]

To be sure, there are other conceptions of sociology which differ from those just mentioned. In the United States in particular, critical and sceptical voices are sometimes raised, both within and outside the profession, cautioning against taking sociology too seriously, as a force either for good or for evil. The most common criticism is that sociology all too often indulges in ponderously stating the obvious. The more radical critics, carrying the argument further, claim that American sociology refuses to come to grips with the truly important problems of society, either when it soars to the heights of abstract theorizing, or when it descends to the level of petty empirical investigations.[3]

The questions raised regarding the overall character of American sociology also have a ready applicability to its Soviet counterpart, particularly in view of the strikingly close interdependence between Soviet sociology and Soviet society. This interdependence is freely admitted by Soviet sociologists and is likely to constitute one of the few points of agreement in East-West social-scientific discourse. Many of them, in fact, acknowledge that the relationship between political objectives and institutions and the pursuit of scientific goals can be suffocating. No secret is made of the fact that the social sciences, and sociology in particular, atrophied in the period of the "cult of personality,"[4] during which there was a total lack of objective inquiry into the fabric of Soviet society. It is for such reasons that Western observers of Soviet sociology feel compelled to look first of all at the official Soviet attitudes toward sociology, secondly at its proclaimed goals, and lastly at its substantive findings.

Contrary to the implications of Soviet statements about the ideological bias of Western sociologists and the hostile attention paid by them to developments in Soviet sociology, very little has in fact been written in the West on this subject.[5] This is by no means surprising. The paucity of comments on and studies of Soviet sociology in the West generally, and in the United States in particular, corresponds to the

[2] "Sociology can thrive only under freedom. Indeed, the extent to which sociologists may pursue their interests, fully publish their results, and freely state their conclusions, is one important index of the degree to which a nation qualifies as a free and open society. A nation cannot have quality in sociology by fiat. It can, if it chooses, write a kind of "contract" for that kind of sociology which guarantees, in advance, to produce results which affirm the established order and confirm received doctrine. It may then get what it orders, as it does in the Soviet Union, but it will not get good sociology. Only a nation which provides the conditions for free inquiry may with reason hope for development of social-science knowledge which permits an ever deeper understanding of man in society." Alex Inkeles, *What Is Sociology?* Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1964, p. 117.

[3] A good example of such criticism is M. Stein and A. Vidich (eds.), *Sociology on Trial,* Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1963.

[4] For admissions to this affect, see, *e.g.,* V. Fokin (ed.) *Sotsiologiia v SSSR,* Vol. 1, Moscow, 1965, pp. 4-5; L. F. Ilichev, *op. cit.,* pp. 9-46; G. K. Ashin *et al.* (eds.), *Voprosy organizatsii i metodiki konkretno-sotsiologicheskikh issledovanii,* Petrozavodsk, Rosvuzizdat, 1963, p. 7; G. Osipov and M. Yovchuk, "Some Principles of Theory, Problems, and Methods of Research in Sociology in the USSR," *American Sociological Review,* No. 4, 1963, p. 621.

[5] For Western observations on Soviet sociology, see: Joseph Roucek, "Russian Sociology and 'Sociology' Under Communism," in J. Roucek (ed.), *Contemporary Sociology,* New York, Philosophical Library, 1958, pp. 892-921; Robert K. Merton and Henry W. Riecken, "Notes on Sociology in the USSR," in National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science Symposia Series, No. 10, *Current Problems in Social-Behavioral Research,* March 1962; Lewis S. Feuer, "Problems and Unproblems in Soviet Social Theory," *Slavic Review,* March 1964, and "Meeting the Philosophers," *Survey,* April 1964; George Fischer, *Science and Politics; The New Sociology in the Soviet Union,* Cornell University Center for International Studies Monograph, 1964; Elizabeth A. Weinberg, *Soviet Sociology, 1960-1963,* Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies, 1964; and Talcott Parsons, "An American Impression of Sociology in the Soviet Union," *American Sociological Review,* February 1965.

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small number of sociologists focussing their attention on Soviet society. This seemingly paradoxical phenomenon of widespread indifference toward Soviet society, even under conditions of competitive coexistence, can be explained by a number of factors. American sociologists have been traditionally preoccupied with their own society; they face linguistic barriers; and, most importantly, they are disinclined to become students of a society which they cannot themselves investigate empirically.

Among the attitudes of the minority concerned with Soviet sociology, two basic positions can be discerned. On the one hand, there is much justified suspicion, stemming in part from the time when even the word "sociology" was banned from Soviet scholarly discourse, except to be applied in a pejorative sense to Western studies.[6] It is easy, after all, to be skeptical of the accomplishments of a discipline which was extinct for decades and never had well-established traditions; and it is correspondingly difficult to see how political-administrative decisions and sudden legitimation can have imparted scholarly maturity to Soviet sociology in a short space of time.

The nature of Soviet society itself lends further support to such skepticism. Sociology and the social sciences in general represent a most sensitive area of inquiry in a society whose leaders adhere to firm ideological preconceptions and insist that a body of social thought conceived more than a century ago—namely, Marxism—remains largely applicable and relevant to the present. The continued penetration of Soviet sociology by philosophy, and the acknowledged Soviet desire to saddle sociological investigation with the task of providing empirical support for the official system of values, make for uneasiness among those who see sociology as a means of expanding knowledge about society, regardless of the preferences of those who rule it. The lack of institutional autonomy for Soviet sociologists is yet another reason for misgivings, because it is seen as impinging upon the questions they can ask, the methods they can use, and the conclusions they can reach. In the view of the skeptical group of Western observers (among them are Feuer, Inkeles, and Labedz), the prospects of sociology in the USSR will remain dim as long as Soviet society as a whole remains totalitarian and hence hostile toward findings which could call into question its officially-proclaimed value premises.

Last but not least among the factors that make it difficult for most American sociologists to take a favorable approach to Soviet sociology is the very antagonism which Soviet sociologists show toward their American counterparts. Their compulsion to dismiss American sociology as unscientific, fraudulent, and degraded by subservience to the "monopoly capitalists" does little to invite a sympathetic response and at the same time hinders truly fruitful exchanges of social-scientific opinion and experience. Soviet claims to the contrary notwithstanding, not even the most critical American statements regarding Soviet sociology can match the shrill hostility and venom of the abuse which Soviet sociologists feel obliged to heap on their American colleagues as their contribution to the ideological struggle.

On the other hand, in spite of the psychological obstacles created by Soviet sociologists themselves, there is nevertheless a group of several American sociologists who take a more optimistic and positive approach to the present state and prospects of the Soviet social sciences. Such American observers as Fischer, Kassof, Merton, and Parsons are united in their desire to give more than the benefit of the doubt to Soviet sociology. They recognize the difficulties (partly admitted, partly denied on the Soviet side) which restrict the scope and depth of sociological inquiry in the USSR. One can also discern on the part of some of them a lurking expectation and hope that current trends in Soviet sociology may have a liberalizing and rationalizing impact upon Soviet society. Such hopes are generated by the linking of the development of Soviet sociology to the fruits of industrialization, and by the attribution to sociology of indispensability in an increasingly complex modern society. Among them one also finds an effort to separate what is viewed as a ritualistic ideological element from the substantive findings of Soviet sociologists. It is unlikely that the latter would themselves approve of this effort.

The survey of Soviet sociology that follows will address itself to seven topics: 1) Soviet criti-

[6] See, *e.g.*, G. Aleksandrov, "Bankrotstvo burzhuaznoi sotsiologii," *Moscow*, 1948.

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cisms of "bourgeois" sociology; 2) the impact of ideology on Soviet sociology; 3) time budget and leisure studies; 4) the sociology of work; 5) studies on marriage and the family; 6) public opinion polls; and 7) studies of crime and delinquency.

On "Bourgeois Sociology"

> ***Even honest bourgeois sociologists arrive at false conclusions, inasmuch as they are far from a scientific understanding of the laws of social development***
>
> —M. Kh. Igitkhanian, in *Voprosy filosofii,* June 1963.

> ***Against bourgeois falsification of the history of social thought of Babylon***
>
> —Chapter heading in G. F. Aleksandrov, *Istoriia sotsiologicheskikh uchenii, drevnii vostok* (Moscow, 1959).

As already indicated, a considerable proportion of the resources and intellectual energies of Soviet sociologists is expended in criticisms of Western and particularly American sociology. To get a complete picture of Soviet sociology itself, therefore, it is necessary to review briefly the scope and nature of these criticisms. Ironically, many of them appear to be projections of criticisms which could be directed at Soviet sociologists themselves. This is especially true of the Soviet charge that American sociologists are totally subservient to the ruling classes or cliques of their society, being dependent upon them for facilities and financial support ("The majority of American sociologists, particularly the 'industrial sociologists,' are in the service of the most powerful monopolies"[7]). From this alleged dependence of American sociologists, it is asserted, stems their active support of the social-institutional order of their society. This support is said to take two forms: diverting attention from genuine problems by trivial investigations; and formulating false theories about the sources of these problems and their remedies.

Soviet critics also like to stress the fatally handicapped character of American sociology resulting from its rejection of the only genuine scientific theory of society, Marxism, and its attendant disregard of structural-economic factors. In particular, it is frequently charged that American sociologists treat problems in a fragmented manner, failing to grasp the broader interconnections between them.

The alleged effort to reduce everything to psychological explanations and structural-functional theory—with a consequent neglect of social conflict and an overemphasis on the role of values in society—is singled out as one of the major causes of the undesirable state of affairs in American sociology. "Bourgeois sociologists" are criticized for stressing the role of the irrational in social life. For example:

Bourgeois social psychologists strive to present matters as if ideology had an extremely limited part in the formation of public opinion. They maintain that the major role in the formation of public opinion is played by irrational and emotional factors.[8]

Apparently, the Soviet critics are unwilling to entertain the possibility that ideological positions themselves can be rooted in irrational and emotional factors.[9]

More recently, the so-called "convergence" theory (or the concept of a single type of industrial society) has come under unusually heavy fire from Soviet sources, which have assailed it as one of the most insidious ideological weapons devised by American sociologists. Zamoshkin, for example, ascribes to this theory "a leading position in the ideological struggle conducted by imperialism against communism."[10] Persistent Soviet concern with convergence is further illustrated by the following passage in a *Kommunist* editorial:

Of late, anti-Sovietism has often been presented under the guise of the theory of the "growing together" of capitalism and socialism, as a result of capitalism's "modernization" and some "in-

[7] V. P. Rozhin, *Vvedeniie v marksistskuiu sotsiologiiu,* Leningrad, 1962, pp. 63-4.

[8] A. K. Uledov, *Obshchestvennoe mnenie sovetskovo obshchestva,* Moscow, 1963, p. 194.

[9] A similar point has been made by Feuer in discussing Soviet hostility to Freudian psychology. See *Slavic Review,* March 1964, p. 122.

[10] Yu. A. Zamoshkin, "Teoriia Edinovo industrialnovo obshchestva na sluzhbe antikommunizma," in *Marksistskaia i burzhuaznaia sotsiologiia sevodnia,* Moscow, Izd. "Nauka," 1964, p. 94.

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ternal degeneration" in socialism. Capitalism and socialism are portrayed as different variations of a "single industrial society." . . . Two purposes are thus pursued at once: first, to explain the defects of capitalism . . ., and second, to ascribe the same defects to socialism. Anti-Sovietism thus acquires the appearance of an "objective," scientific analysis of the path of development of the two systems.[11]

Even those Soviet studies of Western society and social thought which seem less polemical at first sight take every opportunity to attack the "bourgeois" social sciences.[12] Yet, notwithstanding all this criticism, Soviet sociologists and their ideological advisers—presumably in the spirit of "catch up and overtake"—never tire of stressing the need to make use of the advanced *techniques* of Western sociological investigation.[13] The same ambivalent fascination with Western techniques and technology that has manifested itself in other spheres of Soviet activity is also apparent in the field of sociology.

Ideological Limits

The Soviet sociologist is . . . part of the united socialist body. When he is certain of the support of the general will, he can conduct social research . . .

—G. Osipov and M. Yovchuk, "Some Principles of Theory, Problems, and Methods of Research in Sociology in the USSR," *American Sociological Review,* No. 4, 1963, p. 622.

Properly organized scientific investigation of social phenomena is the foe of voluntarism and arbitrariness, for any opinion, even the most authoritative, is considered no more than a hypothesis unless tested by experiment and practice. The development of social research is closely bound up with the democratic nature of our social system; it is inconceivable without it.

—V. Shubkin, in *Kommunist,* No. 3, Feb. 1965.

Sentiments such as those expressed in these quotations indicate that there is some room for tension between the authoritative conception of the sociologist's role in Soviet society and the assumed results of sociological investigations. Hence, it may be worthwhile to see what Soviet sociologists consider to be their tasks, what guidance they receive from the appropriate authorities, and how they view the relationship between ideology and sociology, Marxism-Leninism and field studies. While the necessity of "concrete sociological investigation" (*i.e.*, gathering factual data) is recognized, there remains a certain ambivalence toward ascertaining facts of social life which might prove incongruous with established theoretical premises and the desired results of investigation. ("It goes without saying that the practical orientation of concrete social research in party work has nothing in common with creeping empiricism, with the blind worship of facts."[14])

Appropriately enough, in the realm of sociology as in other spheres, one also finds both the claim and a genuine effort on the part of the Soviets to "unite theory and practice." Marxism-Leninism is viewed as providing the ultimate inspiration and vindication of all sociological activities, yet at the same time it is being admitted that the "complexities" of the period of transition from socialism to communism raise problems which cannot be solved merely by the application of a relevant citation from Marx or Lenin. Reliance upon ideological authority for inspiration in sociological research raises additional problems in view of the inseparability of ideological authority and political power. The predicament of Soviet sociologists in search of secure ideological vindication of their work is

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[11] *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, July 1965 (trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* August 4, 1965, p. 4.)

[12] See, *e.g.,* M. A. Dynnik, V. V. Mshvenieradze, *et al.* (eds.), *Sovremennaia filosofiia i sotsiologiia v stranakh zapadnoi Evropy i Ameriki,* Moscow, Izd. "Nauka," 1964; A. G. Zdravomyslov, "Problema Interesa v sotsiologicheskoi teorii," Izd. Leningradskovo Universiteta, 1964; A. A. Arzumanian *et al.* (eds.), *Gorodskie srednie sloi sovremennovo kapitalisticheskovo obshchestva,* Moscow, 1963; B. A. Denisov, "Kritika sovremennykh burzuaznykh teorii o budushchem obshchestve," *Vysshaya shkola* (Moscow), 1961; M. A. Kirillova, "Amerikanskie sotsiologi o Seme," *Sov. Pedagogika,* No. 11, 1964; and Yu. A. Zamoshkin, "Problema amoralizma i prestupnosti v sovremennoi Amerikanskoi sotsiologii," *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 7, 1963. For a more general criticism of Western sociology, see: G. V. Osipov, *Sovremennaia burzhuaznaia sotsiologia* (kriticheskii ocherk), Moscow, 1964.

[13] *E.g.,* see "On Two Neglected Fields of Sociological Research," in *Kommunist,* No. 17, Nov. 1963 (trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Feb. 26, 1964).

[14] "Apply Social Research to Party Work," *Pravda,* May 11, 1965 (trans in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* June 2, 1965, p. 11).

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illustrated by the fact that footnote references to the works of N. S. Khrushchev, which were formerly abundant in Soviet sociological writings, have now disappeared from the more recent publications.[15]

Soviet authors are fond of saying that much of their research is geared to problems whose solution is demanded by "life itself." Exactly how the requirements of this elusive entity are conveyed to Soviet sociologists is not always clear to the outside observer, nor is it known by what devices they make their selection among the problems with which "life" confronts them.

In view of all this, what explains the emergence and recent growth of sociology in the USSR? The upsurge is certainly part of the drive for greater efficiency proclaimed by Soviet spokesmen and observed by Westerners. This drive is focussed primarily on production, but also extends to the realm of non-economic administrative activities. Soviet sociologists are expected to contribute to the better functioning of party, Komsomol, and trade union organizations. Even more ambitiously, they are called upon to assist the regime in achieving its ultimate goal: that is, by inculcating the appropriate attitudes and personality traits, they are to help create the "new Soviet man," fit to live under communism.

In retrospect, destalinization appears to have been the necessary precondition for the emergence of sociology. To the extent that Stalinist totalitarianism implied a pathological indifference toward many aspects of social reality, to the extent that it reflected a total disregard for the wishes and attitudes of the population, and to the extent that it relied upon massive coercion, it was deeply suspicious of any effort, activity, or inquiry which had the slightest potential for calling into question the wisdom of the supreme leadership and its value premises. As long as coercion was used as the major, if not single, cement of social organization and instrument of social change, and as long as ideological claims provided the *only* rationale for whatever policies the regime initiated, there seemed to be little need or room for sociological investigations.

Conversely, the resurrection of sociology seems to reflect an effort on the part of the post-Stalin leaders to diminish their isolation from the masses and from social realities, and to understand better their own society, which their predecessors had managed in such a high-handed as well as inefficient fashion. The peculiarly problem-solving character of actual Soviet sociological research (as distinct from the ideological discussions frequently called "sociological") is also indicative of the regime's desire to fill in the gaps left by decreasing reliance upon coercion. Yet it would be going too far to suggest that there is an *inherent* incompatibility between sociological research and a totalitarian society. To think so would be to overestimate the potency of sociological inquiry and to ignore the possibility of conducting it on a limited scale, within the bounds of the dominant, officially-enforced value prescriptions. Sociology need not be a subversive force or a force irresistibly gnawing at official restraints on personal freedom as long as it exists in a narrowly-prescribed institutional and conceptual framework, and as long as the political institutions of society are intent upon and capable of exercising control over it.

To be sure, sociological research and its findings can lead to consequences unintended and unforeseen, but even in societies where sociology is unrestricted by political pressures, we have yet to see any major social upheaval or dramatic transformation that can be ascribed directly to the work of sociologists. At the same time, the very effort to keep research within the bounds of ideological respectability can lead to conflict between the legitimate curiosity generated in the course of "concrete investigations" and the possibility that satisfaction of this curiosity may produce findings that do not accord with the basic official assumptions about the nature of Soviet society. Such conflicts can, however, be avoided or minimized by 1) restricting the scope of sociological investigations; 2) using methods that increase the likelihood of obtaining the desired, ideologically correct results; 3) finding some appropriate quotation in the "classics" or reinterpreting these so as to create an illusion of harmony between their propositions and the results of specific investigations; and 4) by a more broadminded and tolerant attitude toward the revealed deficiencies of popular attitudes and Soviet institutions. Each of these mechanisms is used to a certain degree.

[15] *E.g.*, see G. V. Osipov, *op. cit.* (f.n. 12); and *Sotsiologiia v SSSR, op. cit.* (f.n. 4).

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Leisure with a Purpose

> ***Our society cannot reconcile itself to the fact there there are still people who fritter away their free time.***
>
> —L. Bibik and M. Markovich, *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie,* No. 7, 1962.

> ***The process of molding the new man and his Communist consciousness takes place not only while he is working but also in his non-working time.***
>
> —G. S. Petrosian, *Vnerabochee vremia trudiashchikhsia v SSR,* Moscow, 1965.

A major substantive area of Soviet sociological investigation is the study of time budgets and the utilization of non-working time. Such studies were among the first actual research activities undertaken with the post-Stalin rebirth of sociology.[16] Several underlying elements, both practical and ideological, unite the numerous studies which have been undertaken in this field, for instance those by Prudenski, Petrosian, and their numerous associates and followers. In the first place, these studies have been prompted by the realization that not only the quantity of time spent outside work but also the manner in which it is used is relevant to work itself, or, in other words, that the productivity of labor depends to a large degree on the ways in which non-working time is spent. This is particularly so in view of the actual and anticipated reduction in hours of work.

The concern with non-working time has two further components. One is the ideological abhorrence of idleness, the veneration of activity for its own sake, which has been an enduring part of the Soviet system of values. The second is the impulse to be in control: those in command of Soviet society want to know in detail how the citizen spends his time outside the most tangible institutional frameworks (such as the workplace); they want to regulate and influence systematically his non-working hours. In the last analysis, concern with non-working time amounts to concern with privacy. While the welfare of the citizen is part of the motivation for the studies in this field (as evidenced by the desire to reduce the amount of time spent on housework by women, by recommendations to improve cultural-recreational facilities, etc.), non-working time and leisure are seen as essentially collective rather than private concerns, as resources over which ultimate control rests with society rather than with the individual. The definitions of the categories used in these studies illustrate the official preoccupation with the socially useful aspects of time spent away from work:

Non-working time (vnerabochee vremia) . . . *[that which] is not directly absorbed by participation in socially productive activities. Non-working time includes the routine activities of daily life and free time. The rational organization . . . of non-working time is one of the most important objective indicators of harmonious personality development and hence a necessary element of social planning. Free time* (svobodnoe vremia) *is the part of non-working time which includes study, . . . voluntary public activities, leisure, hobbies, creative activities, etc. Leisure is one of the parts of free time, connected with the restoration of the psychic and physical energies of man.*[17]

As the last of these definitions suggests, the Soviet conception of leisure and its acceptable uses differs markedly from that prevailing in the pluralistic societies of the West. The Western concept allows for a variety of legitimate interpretations, ranging from the opportunity for self-development and spiritual enrichment to recreation, relaxation, and simply "having a good time," and is thus closely tied to the values of individualism, privacy, and freedom of choice. On the other hand, the Soviet concept is narrower and more functionalized, heavily stressing the "rational" and socially beneficial uses of leisure. Thus, Petrosian observes:

Free time does not amount to idleness. . . . This is the time devoted to study, to the raising of [occupational] qualifications, self-education, and self-development (attending lectures, cultural groups, and museums; the reading of fiction, journals, newspapers, etc.); to sports and

[16] It is perhaps significant that time-budget studies have a tradition in Soviet sociology going back to the 1920's. Early investigators of this subject included Strumilin (1922), Mikheev (1932), and Lebedev-Patreiko (1933).

[17] *Sotsiologiia v SSSR, op. cit.,* Vol. II, pp. 485, 487, 495.

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hobbies (hunting, fishing photography, etc.); to active rest and rational leisure (visiting places of entertainment, walks and excursions, travel, open-air festivals, creative disputes, bringing up children, etc.); and also to participation in the life of society.[18]

The actual findings of Soviet time-budget studies contain the usual admixture of positive and negative elements. The positive ones focus mainly on the decline in working hours and the increasingly rational and creative uses being made of non-working time, as in the pursuits enumerated above by Petrosian. (To these should be added the watching of television, which in the USSR is considered a useful rather than a wasted expenditure of time.) Other positive findings stress the progressive reduction of distinctions between urban and rural uses of free time because of the general closing of the gap between town and country. In conjunction with this latter question, there have also been many studies concerning the diminishing differentiation between manual and mental labor, which is seen at once as a precondition and essential feature of a fully Communist society. (In fact most of the discussions on the nature of Communist society convey the impression that the achievement of communism requires little more than the elimination of these distinctions.)

On the negative side, there have been studies pointing up the persisting inadequacy of cultural and recreational facilities in certain areas, the insufficient use made of those available, the indifference of some party, Komsomol, and trade union officials toward the utilization of free time, and the continuing disadvantages of women, who are not yet freed completely from the double burden of work and household chores.

Time-budget studies frequently include recommendations as to the best utilization of free time, stress the need for its rational organization, and exhort party, Komsomol and trade union organizations to concern themselves more actively with the matter. Most typically, these studies emphasize the need to utilize free time for the improvement of the citizen's occupational qualifications, technical skills, and level of education. Chapter headings such as "Free Time and the Raising of the Cultural-Technical Level of the Workers" abound in the pioneering time-budget study edited by Prudenski, which contains many other evidences of interest in improving and shaping the free-time activities of workers.[19] Petrosian's previously cited study reflects a similar concern:

Workers sometimes do not know how to use their free time. It is therefore necessary for the leaderships of the relevant social organizations [to concern themselves with] the most rational utilization of the workers' free time. . . . In some plants the organization of collective cultural activities is particularly unsatisfactory—[such as] collective attendance at theaters, movies, museums and recreational evenings, [the organization of] excursions, picnics, meetings with eminent individuals, etc. . . . Raising the level of the work of party, Komsomol and trade union organizations in the sphere of cultural and other services . . . is the precondition for the greatest rational utilization of the free time of workers.[20]

Workers and Their Attitudes

> ***The establishment of socialist production relations signifies an objective change in the position of workers in society, which in turn leads to a substantial change in the attitude toward labor However, this latter process proceeds in an extremely complex way.***
>
> —A. G. Zdravomyslov and V. A. Yadov, *Voprosy filosofii,* No. 4, April 1964.

A second major area of investigation is what Western sociologists would call the sociology of work. Here again, the main emphasis is on problems of productivity and efficiency. More specifically, Soviet sociologists are studying such questions as: What factors make for work satisfaction? How can the turnover of labor be reduced? What is the impact of social relationships at the plant on workers' participation and initiative? In studying work satisfaction, the sociologists are making painstaking efforts to devise a proper balance of material and spiritual

[18] Petrosian, *Vnerabochee vremia trudiashchikhsia v* SSSR, Moscow, Ekonomika, 1965, p. 16.

[19] G. A. Prudenskii, *Vnerabochee vremia trudiaschikhsia,* Novosibirsk, 1961, pp. 53, 99, 119, 121, 125, 181.

[20] Petrosian, *op. cit.,* pp. 179-80.

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motives and incentives. The legitimacy of material incentives is increasingly, if vaguely, admitted, but at the same time the concept of the Soviet worker as motivated in large part by a sense of civic duty is also retained. Thus, *e.g.*:

Moral and material motives operate in unison in any form of labor activity. The basis for this interaction lies in the fact that labor fulfills a dual function under socialism: it is a means of satisfying a person's vital needs and also a means of expressing and enriching the personality. It is therefore incorrect to consider motives of a material nature "inferior" to those of a moral nature. At the same time, the precise correlation of these motives . . . is far from a matter of indifference.[21]

Questions relating to the worker's attitude toward his job have been receiving particular attention, partly as a result of the familiar problems arising from mass production, mechanization and automation, such as monotony. Not all the findings support the claim that the attitudes of Soviet workers differ sharply from those of workers in capitalist countries. The study just quoted showed, for instance, that 54.4 percent of the workers questioned were dissatisfied with or indifferent toward their jobs. Not surprisingly, some of the findings also indicate that, just as among capitalist workers, the more highly skilled Soviet workers tend to derive greater satisfaction from their jobs. Thus far, Soviet studies on work satisfaction seem to have focussed disproportionate attention on industrial as compared to agricultural workers.

Marriage and Family

> ***. . . scientific research on the family and the dissemination of sociological information about the family have not only intellectual but also an enormous moral-educational significance, serving as one of the instruments of the formation of the Communist personality and Communist social relations.***
>
> —A. G. Kharchev, *Brak i semia*, Moscow, 1964, p. 5.

Sociological studies of the family and marriage were most severely retarded by Stalinism. In reviewing Soviet writings in this field, Kharchev, the most prominent Russian scholar of the subject today, mentions not a single work produced between 1937 and 1958.[22] From a quantitative point of view, progress in the field still remains slight, but the emergence in recent years of a thoroughly changed approach can be gauged from a comparison of the bibliographical references contained in the last major work of the Stalinist period, S. Ya. Volfson's *Semia i brak v ikh istoricheskom razvitii* (Moscow, 1937) and those given in Kharchev's most recent book, *Brak i semia v SSSR: opyt sotsiologicheskovo issledovaniia* (Moscow, 1964). While Volfson relied almost exclusively on the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, plus party and Komintern resolutions, Kharchev's makes use of both Soviet field studies and some of the relevant Western literature.

The still underdeveloped state of this important sociological field of inquiry is not hard to explain. For one thing, despite increasing interest in the subject and recognition that sociology could be of significant help in solving problems of family life,[23] Soviet society still has not shed certain inhibitions which derive from the basically puritanical official system of values, and which restrain inquiry into the more intimate aspects of personal relations. Concern with sex remains suspect and is regarded as not far removed from immorality.[24] Family and marital relationships continue to be treated largely as if sex played no part as an area of conflict or compatibility.

The predilection to avoid the more subtle psychological issues involved is yet another obstacle to the development of this field of study. It cannot be ruled out, either, that the subject receives low official priority in terms of resource allocations for research because it is less relevant to the more tangible areas of societal efficiency. Work satisfaction is, after all, more directly re-

[21] A. G. Zdravomyslov and V. A. Yadov, "An Experiment in Concrete Research On Attitudes Toward Labor," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 4, April 1964 (trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, July 8, 1964, p. 12).

[22] A. G. Kharchev, "On Some Results of a Study of the Motives for Marriage," *Filosofskie nauki*, 1963, No. 4 (trans. in *Soviet Sociology*, Spring 1964, p. 43).

[23] "Literature About Communist Morality," *Pravda*, June 9, 1965, p. 4 (trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, June 30, 1965, p. 32).

[24] *Cf.* "'Delicate' topic," in *Sovetskaia pechat*, No. 4, April 1964, pp. 19-20 (trans in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, June 17, 1964, p. 19); also *Gigiena polovoi zhizni*, Moscow, 1964, p. 19.

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lated to *per capita* production than are the motives for marriage and divorce. Research may also be inhibited by the possibility that certain findings about marriage and interpersonal attraction might confront the investigator with evidence of all too many "survivals," including the persistence of desires for privacy and personal autonomy conflicting with the official preference for a more politicized and collectivized personal life.

In spite of the somewhat less doctrinaire approach taken in recent years, Soviet studies in this field continue to resemble those of the past in that they still start invariably with an attempt to demonstrate the decay and inferiority of the bourgeois family. Correspondingly, their set goal is to prove that Soviet marriages are motivated by love and high moral principles rather than material-economic considerations. Although Kharchev has presented a sampling showing that the majority of respondents professed to have given priority to love, the claimed irrelevance of economic motives is nevertheless open to serious doubt in a society where housing is a major problem and income differentials remain great.

There is, in fact, some evidence that the Soviet family faces more problems than official pronouncements would care to admit. Some of these problems are peculiar to Soviet society; others can be found in most modern societies. For example, a 1964 survey of newlyweds in Leningrad revealed that only about 10 percent of them expected to live in their own apartments.[25] In the absence of further inquiry into the subject, one can only speculate on the effects of semi-communal housing on marital relations and the stability of the Soviet family. Other problems have been reflected in published criticisms of Kharchev's book. One critic observed that unregistered marriages are widespread, and that the number of unwed mothers in the USSR increased from 282,000 in 1945 to 2,700,000 in 1960.[26] The same article further noted that 28 percent of divorces in the Leningrad area were caused by marital infidelity, 21 percent by loss of love or incompatibility of character, and 17 percent by inability to have children or sexual separation. Another reviewer criticized Kharchev for failing to give due attention to the sexual aspects of marriage, which he said had been "treated with embarrassment."[27]

In view of the present backwardness of Soviet sociological studies of the family and growing official concern with the pathological aspects of family relationships, it is reasonable to expect an upsurge of work in this field. The practical relevance of these studies to the solution of such problems as juvenile delinquency is becoming increasingly clear to the more farsighted Soviet social scientists and policy-makers.

Public Opinion

> ***. . . there are real grounds for the opinion of many bourgeois sociologists that the results of a newspaper poll cannot be representative, for this is precisely the case in capitalist countries, where every bourgeois press organ expresses the viewpoint of definite privileged social groups. . . . The principle is different in a socialist society, where the press represents the entire people and reflects the* basically unanimous *world outlook . . . of all classes and social groups.***
>
> —M. Kh. Igitkhanian, *Voprosy filosofii,* No. 6, June 1963. (Emphasis added.)

The introduction of public opinion polls in the Soviet Union represents one of the most striking departures from the climate of Stalinism. The total absence prior to destalinization of any inquiry into popular attitudes rested on the manifest premise that public opinion was completely unanimous on all issues of importance and revealed itself through the chosen instrument of history and the embodiment of the general will of Soviet society—the party and its leaders. This assumption of complete congruence between official pronouncements and popular attitudes made it superfluous to ascertain the exact nature of public opinion on specific issues. From what we know about Stalinist totalitarianism in general, moreover, it is clear that the regime's disregard of public opinion represented a mixture of indifference and per-

[25] See *USSR Today,* March 1964, p. 56.

[26] *Novyi mir* (Moscow), December 1964, pp. 260-62 (trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* March 17, 1965, p. 9).

[27] I. S. Kon, in *Nauchnye doklady vysshei shkoly—filosofskiie nauki,* No. 1, 1965 (trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* June 2, 1965, p. 14).

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verse paternalism deriving from the belief of the leadership in its boundless omnipotence and omniscience.

Against this background, the current sanctioning of public opinion polls in the USSR ranks as one of the foremost evidences in Soviet sociology of a desire on the part of the post-Stalin leaders to understand their society better and thereby reduce their need to rely upon coercion. As in the case of other sociological studies, the official explanation of public opinion polls invokes the "increasing complexity" of the tasks confronting Soviet society in the current transition to communism and the multitudinous problems of everyday life requiring careful attention and concrete solutions not to be found in the ready-made ideological prescriptions of the regime.

Yet this new Soviet concern with public opinion has a paradoxical quality. For one thing, assertions of a fundamental and essential unanimity persist. For another, public opinion is not seen as an autonomous force relatively independent of the institutions of society, but rather as an integral part of them, as a resource to be manipulated even while it is being gauged and assessed. The following illustrates this view:

The role of public opinion in the establishment of a single norm of Communist social intercourse is determined by the thorough transformations taking place in the life of our society. . . . Public opinion supporting the patriotic initiative of Soviet citizens, particularly in the development of new forms of socialist competition, strengthens spiritual motivation in the field of work.[28]

Nevertheless the emergence of opinion polls seems to reflect implicit official recognition that differences of opinion are legitimate in certain areas of life as long as they do not call into question basic ideological propositions. It may conceivably also reflect an increased confidence on the part of the leadership in the masses under the conditions of destalinization. To be sure, the long exposure of the Soviet people to totalitarian terror, coupled with the use of certain dubious polling practices,[29] substantially reduces the chances of uncovering too much unorthodoxy or deviant opinions. Older Soviet citizens in particular are not used to revealing their views freely to investigators or institutions inevitably identified with the state.

Soviet opinion polls cover a fairly broad range, from the aspirations and values of youth to the preferences of theatergoers, from attitudes toward military service to favorite leisure-time activities, from observations about conditions of work to opinions on the adequacy of cultural amenities in rural areas—and even to the choices of Soviet youth as to what objects might be dispatched to Mars to represent earthly achievement in our time.[30] Few of the findings are likely to cause much official apprehension, although some do occasionally reveal disquieting trends, such as the spread of apolitical attitudes, cynicism, frivolousness, and dissatisfaction with available opportunities. The short and long-range purposes of the polls may be summarized as follows:

1) to gather information needed in order to achieve greater efficiency, or for the purpose of gauging the mood of various strata of the population, youth in particular. (Significantly, the Public Opinion Institute of *Komsomolskaia pravda* is the major agency which conducts such investigations.)

2) To combat apathy and instill a greater sense of participation. Eliciting popular opinions implies an interest on the part of the regime in acting upon them and hence can be seen as a first step toward taking popular wishes into account in the formulation of policies.

3) To "educate" the public in a special way, by using polls to illustrate correct and improper attitudes. The assumption seems to be that the bulk of the opinions gathered will be correct and

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[28] A. K. Uledov, *Obschestvennoe mnenie sovetskovo obschestva,* Moscow, 1963, pp. 324, 356.

[29] There is, for example, a pronounced ambivalence with regard to preserving the anonymity of poll respondents. For instance, a soldier who had made unfavorable comments about army life in answering a questionnaire was described in a published report as "not brave enough to give his last name and come forth openly against the collective." (*Krasnaia zvezda,* July 7, 1964: trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Dec. 9, 1964, p. 11.) It is also questionable whether the sampling procedures used are such as to yield truly representative results. In a recent major poll conducted by *Komsomolskaia pravda,* for example, the newspaper questioned a self-selected sample of 17,000 out of its total four million readers, with only 601 collective farmers included in the sample.

[30] G. Oganov and V. Chikin, "Seven Thousand Rockets Take Off for Mars," *Komsomolskaia pravda,* Oct. 20 and 24, 1963 (trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Dec. 4, 1963, p. 7).

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that giving wide publicity to actual examples of proper opinions and attitudes—together with a careful dosage of negative examples—will serve to enliven propaganda and enrich indoctrination. The effect of the polls is thus to support the overall agitprop effort.

Communism and Crime

> ***It is rather easy to differentiate two groups of crime in socialist society: 1) crimes whose basic cause is the existence of capitalist countries in the world; and 2) crimes deriving from the vestiges of capitalism in men's minds.***
>
> —M. D. Shargorodski, "The Causes and Prevention of Crime," trans. in *Soviet Sociology,* Summer 1964, p. 24.

A sociology of crime based on actual investigations barely exists in the Soviet Union. There are, however, numerous discussions of the problem—legal, ideological and journalistic—and if not systematic studies, at least theories and explanations of crime in a socialist society are being offered.

It is one of the irrational, yet ideologically explainable facets of Soviet society that considerations of societal efficiency and the desire to combat a major problem have not so far led to serious sociological study of crime in the USSR. This is all the more surprising since the existence of crime in Soviet society is admitted and official explanations of its persistence have been put forward. The dubious nature of these explanations, however, is measured by the fact that they have inspired hardly any actual studies or "concrete investigations," while on the other hand social scientists are rarely called upon to render assistance in solving problems of crime. Practical recommendations regarding crime are generally limited to calling upon party, Komsomol, trade union and other public organizations, local collectives, parents and teachers, and legal authorities to take a more active part in meeting the challenge.[31]

What sort of social-theoretical explanations, then, are being offered for the persistence of crime in Soviet society? Briefly summarized, the following major propositions emerge: 1) Crime is caused by "survivals" or vestiges of pre-Soviet values and attitudes which cannot be eradicated rapidly because social consciousness lags behind social existence. 2) Outside capitalist influences contribute to antisocial behavior among Soviet citizens through ideological warfare, propaganda, and corrupting examples. 3) Parents, teachers, and collective organizations occasionally fail to instill the proper attitudes in the young and to take care of the faltering. 4) World War II accounts for some criminal behavior, especially among those age groups directly affected by it. 5) Heavy drinking is another cause of crime (but despite the preceived correlation between drinking and antisocial behavior, no explanation is offered for the prevalence of excessive drinking in the USSR).

Problems and "Unproblems"

The current limitations and peculiarities of Soviet sociology can perhaps best be illustrated by a comparison with socialist realist literature, with which it has many features in common. These similarities may be enumerated as follows: emphasis on the future, on the emergent patterns of social life, particularly those which herald the advent of a fully Communist society; the search for the "typical" (or, as two Soviet sociologists put it, "the process of concrete sociological research includes . . . [the] determination of the characteristic social situation"[32]); the desire to present models of behavior, to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate forms of conduct, between positive achievements and negative "survivals"; avoidance of portraying fundamental social conflicts; reliance on the premises of Marxism-Leninism and their prevailing interpretation by the party; and emphasis on a practical approach ("The practical orientation . . . is common to all the intellectual disciplines in the Soviet Union—the natural sciences, economics, psychology, and, indeed, the arts under the formula of socialist

[31] Characteristically, the relatively few studies of crime undertaken in the USSR have not been made by sociologists, nor have the results been published in social science journals. *Cf.* O. L. Morozov *et al.,* "Opyt kompleksnovo obsledovaniia prichin i uslovii, sposobstvuiushchikh sovershenii prestuplenii podrostkami, *"Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo,* No. 9, 1963.

[32] V. V. Mshvenieradze and G. V. Osipov, "Sociology in the USSR," *Social Science Information Bulletin,* Oct. 1962, p. 57.

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realism"[33]). Finally, it should be noted that Soviet sociology and socialist realism have their distant yet unmistakable ancestry in 19th-century Western sociology and 19th-century Western critical realism, respectively. In each case, however, the Soviet adaptation represents a crucial departure from the Western original in that it disavows the questioning attitude toward society which was fundamental to both Western sociology and Western literary realism.

Perhaps because of the youthful nature of the discipline, a spurious sense of discovery permeates much of Soviet sociological writing. For example, it is pointed out with pride that "Soviet sociologists regard social life not as a chaos, not as a tangled conglomerate of accidental events, but as a natural connection of these phenomena in which there is mutual conditionality."[34] Or again: "The subject of scientific sociology, in our opinion, is the perception of social life in its entirety . . ."[35] Not infrequently, propositions which Western social scientists now regard as axiomatic are presented as fresh insights peculiar to Marxist sociology:

In our opinion, all information gathered from polls should be checked and supplemented with data gathered by other methods. . . .
In our opinion, sociological research demands the closest cooperation between scientists from various branches of learning.[36]

On other occasions, Soviet sociologists claim, as if it were peculiar to their approach, that they rely upon all forms of data-gathering: *e.g.*, questionnaires, interviews, statistical sources, documents, personal diaries, etc.

Another source of pride among Soviet sociologists, namely the close cooperation that exists in the USSR between sociological investigators and party and government officials at the level of data-gathering and field studies, seems a dubious advantage from the Western social scientist's viewpoint. For the very association of the sociologist with the government raises the crucial problem of eliciting candid responses and trustworthy information from the Soviet citizen. This problem can be dismissed only on the premise that the Soviet people identify with the political institutions and leaders of their society to the degree claimed by the authorities. In the outsider's view, however, neither general historical experience nor contemporary social-scientific evidence support the likelihood of such a complete identification. The reliability of Soviet sociological research is further impaired by methodological weaknesses, notably by poor sampling techniques and the use of the distinctively Soviet device of the "mass" or "group interview."

The current state of Soviet sociology is also marked by neglect of many important areas of inquiry. Besides the scant sociological attention devoted to crime in general, and particularly to crimes against public property, the following topics remain virtually ignored and constitute—to borrow Feuer's term—"unproblems": the processes leading to the concentration of power and its abuse, both at the top and at local levels, and resulting in such evils as the "cult of personality" and "harebrained schemes"; the recruitment and selection of personnel for high political and managerial positions; the social backgrounds of various elite groups; the reintegration into Soviet society of the surviving victims of Stalinist repression who have been rehabilitated and released from concentration camps; attitudes toward various ethnic groups, including the Jews, colored foreign students, etc.; problems of old age; participation in and effectiveness of criticism and self-criticism; and the causes of capitalistic "survivals" in Soviet society. (A genuine sociological study of this last phenomenon would have to include a precise definition of the concept of "survivals," an inquiry into the conditions of transmission, the degree of susceptibility of various age and social groups, the determinants of persistence, and the specific ways in which Western influences can reactivate "survivals.").

To speculate on the future prospects of Soviet sociology requires no less courage than to try to predict the future of Soviet society as a whole. In this writer's view, however, it appears improbable that the trends in Soviet sociology will diverge from those prevailing in other realms of Soviet life. For better or for worse, the state of Soviet sociology is likely to remain a striking illustration of the interdependence between the political institutions and economic needs of a society on the one hand and its capacity to examine and understand itself on the other.

[33] Parsons, *op. cit.* p. 122.
[34] Mshvenieradze and Osipov, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
[35] Osipov and Yuvchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 620.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 622.

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Psychology: A Checkered Course

By Michael Cole

The starting point in a review of the position of psychology among the Soviet sciences would seem obvious: "In the beginning there was Pavlov and a salivating dog." But contrary to this popular notion, it is not at all easy to mark the beginning and define the subject matter of Soviet psychology. The difficulty stems in part from the general lack of clear ideas about what "psychology" should properly include.

As we know it in the United States, psychology is a vast and diverse enterprise. The term is applied at one and the same time to the work of clinicians, educators, and laboratory workers —men like Freud, Jung, Terman and Skinner. In this article, however, the discussion will be restricted to the work which falls under the American rubric of "experimental psychology." Traditionally, experimental psychology in the United States has meant the study of the adaptation of organisms to their environment within the framework of Darwinistic functionalism. It is a discipline which has relied almost exclusively on the experimental method, with theory kept close to the empirical findings. The stereotype of the experimental psychologist would be that of a man in a white coat watching rats run down mazes, or a school psychologist administering an I.Q. test. Such description, then, removes from consideration that part of psychology which deals with the study of personality and the clinical treatment of mental disorders—a large but separate field that must be dealt with in its own right.

The men in the USSR who are engaged in experimental psychology work in two separate Soviet disciplines: psychology and a branch of physiology called psychophysiology or "higher nervous activity." Strange as it may sound, the study of "higher nervous activity" is actually closer to American experimental psychology than is Soviet "psychology." Pavlov, the popular symbol of Russian psychology, was not a

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psychologist at all, but the founder of this branch of physiology. The present examination of Soviet psychology will thus trace the course of two sciences which only in recent years have shown signs of uniting.

Prerevolutionary Beginnings

As with so many other aspects of contemporary Soviet culture, an understanding of today's developments must be sought in a review of events preceding the advent of Soviet power. In the case of psychophysiology, the starting point is the 1863 publication of I. M. Sechenov's monograph, *Reflexes of the Brain.* This small book was written shortly after Sechenov returned from Germany where he had studied with some of Europe's most renowned physiologists. Sechenov's central thesis was that psychic life (ideas, intuitions, etc.) is synonymous with reflex actions of the brain. Thus he saw no need (in fact, he considered it harmful) to posit the existence of a psyche independent of brain matter. It followed that the proper way to study such phenomena as the association of ideas was to study the relation between reflexes. So controversial was this thesis in the Russia of the 1860's that the book was banned for several years. Its publication in 1863 can be considered the first victory of psychophysiology over state interference.

One additional paper written by Sechenov is of particular interest because it marks the beginning of the division between psychophysiology and psychology. In "By Whom and How Shall Psychology Be Studied" (1873), Sechenov maintained that psychology as studied by the psychologists was a hopeless enterprise. He advocated that physiologists, using the objective, reflex method, should take over the field. Echoes of this viewpoint can be found in Soviet science today.

While Sechenov was propagandizing for a new, physiological psychology, a new generation of Russian students was abroad absorbing another new brand of psychology—the "structuralism" of Wilhelm Wundt. These men sought to decompose thinking, sensation and emotion into their basic "elements," using the method of trained introspection. Their dissatisfaction with the speculative psychology of the early 19th century was less a question of philosophy than of methodology. They substituted measuring instruments for armchairs, yet retained the old psychological categories. Adherents of this "psychological" approach to psychology were predecessors of today's Soviet *psychologists.*

The program for an objective physiological psychology which Sechenov advocated was ahead of its time. It was not until forty years after the publication of *Reflexes of the Brain* that Pavlov began the experimental work that would give substance to Sechenov's ideas. (The American movement toward an objective psychology began about the same time, but found its first clear expression a little later in the work of John Watson.) Pavlov often expressed his indebtedness to Sechenov and it is no wonder that he also inherited Sechenov's distaste for traditional, philosophically oriented psychology. Time and time again Pavlov blamed the backwardness of a science of the brain on the contemporary psychology, proposing to replace it by the study of "higher nervous activity." In describing his own early attempts to deal with conditioned reflexes (which he first regarded as a nuisance in the study of digestive processes), his low opinion of psychology is clearly stated:

Why had we formerly, like cowards, returned to the old subjective methods? The secret is simple: because the subjective method is the method of thinking without real causes, because psychological reasoning is indeterminate reasoning, recognizing phenomena, but not knowing whence they came and where they lead. . . . The psychological explanations were fantastic and without basis.[1]

Thus, prior to the advent of Soviet power, the main divisions between psychology and psychophysiology, which together correspond to our discipline of psychology, were already clearly drawn.

Period of Experimentation

Nor were matters to change a great deal in the decade following the October Revolution. The period from 1917 to 1929 marked a high point in wide-ranging experimentation and new approaches to the study of both psychology and

[1] I. P. Pavlov, *Conditioned Reflexes* (G. V. Anrep, Trans.), London, Oxford University Press, 1927.

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psychophysiology. At the same time, many significant developments took place in already established laboratories.

There can be little doubt that psychophysiology benefited greatly from the accession to power of a materialistic, science-oriented regime. Pavlov's laboratory, freed from the suspicious eyes of the Tsarist church, enlarged its staff tenfold after the revolution. The authorities took special care to insure that his laboratory was well-equipped and his animals well-fed (no small feat during the first post-October years). Another great Russian psychophysiologist, V. M. Bekhterev, also expanded his output during this period. Bekhterev, who developed a general physiological-psychological theory based on the study of all psychological phenomena such as the formation and modification of reflexes, which he termed "reflexology," was, in fact, the more influential of the two men during this period.

In psychology proper, the 1920's represented a period of unprecedented experimental and theoretical innovation. Every known school of psychological thought had its adherents: behaviorists, *gestalt* psychologists, reflexologists, reactologists. Even a Freudian circle existed at that time. In the general search for a materialist psychology consonant with Marxism, each school asserted its particular affinity with the ideas of Marx and Engels. If any one school of thought could be said to dominate during the period, it would be the system of "reactology" developed by K. N. Kornilov, the director of the Moscow Institute of Psychology. Reactology was an attempt to synthesize the variegated concepts then popular in psychology, with the addition of some Marxist economics. It reflected the view that psychology should be concerned with the study of simple reactions since, by measuring the speed, form and duration of these reactions, one could measure mental energy. To demonstrate the philosophical advantages of reflexology, Kornilov wrote a *Textbook of Psychology from the Standpoint of Dialectical Materialism*, which went through five editions between 1926 and 1931.

The Party Steps In

The advent of a new era in Soviet psychology was marked by the publication in 1929-30 of Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*. This event stimulated the party cell of the Moscow Institute of Psychology to reexamine the contemporary schools of psychology in order to establish the correct party line for the discipline. Never again would the influence of the party be as diffuse and indirect as it was in the 1920's. The party review resulted in the adoption of four general methodological principles to govern Soviet psychology:

1. The laws of dialectics apply to all areas of science.
2. Each level of organized matter has its own laws which cannot be reduced to the laws of any "less complicated form of matter," that is, subjective phenomena cannot be explained entirely *in terms of physiology, physics, biology or chemistry.*
3. . . . each system of matter or events has autogenic movement; it moves itself.
4. A dialectical system of explanation provides for chance and accident, although, of course, not denying determinism.[2]

No one seems to have been very certain exactly what type of psychology was implied by these principles, but the party decided that the schools of psychology popular until 1930 did not fit the bill. Consequently, the number of schools began to dwindle rapidly. One of the first to go was Kornilov's reactology, which was found to be vulgarly mechanistic, presenting man as a passive reactor instead of an active initiator, and hewing too closely to American behavioristic (and thus capitalistic) psychology. (Kornilov shared with the behaviorists the view that only objectively definable and measurable aspects of behavior could be the subject matter of psychology.) The same type of argument was used to undermine the other contenders, so that by the middle 1930's several of the schools of Soviet psychology had disappeared.

The single most important event in the development of Soviet psychology during that era was the 1936 CPSU Central Committee decree on pedological perversions, which outlawed all forms of psychological testing, including I.Q. tests and tests based on "projective" techniques such as the Rorschach test. Up until 1936, the use of paper-and-pencil psychological tests had

[2] R. A. Bauer, *The New Man in Soviet Psychology*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 94.

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been standard practice in Soviet industry and education. Many of these tests were simple translations of American tests like the Stanford-Binet I.Q. Test. Under Stalin's guidance, the party now decided that such tests were at least worthless, and almost certainly harmful, and the assumption that any paper-and-pencil test could determine a "fixed" number measuring a person's inherited capacities was called a bourgeois hoax. It was argued that this notion ran directly counter to the correct Marxist position that man is formed by his socio-economic environment and that the new socialist environment would produce a "new Soviet man."

Although part of this argument was a simple reflection of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the general objections to testing were not unlike those often heard in the United States. A sampling of the work of those who were involved in the Soviet testing movement in the 1920's yields a fair amount of evidence to back up the claim of the Central Committee that the testing was indeed worthless.[3] (It is only in recent years that cautious experiments with the use of such tests have again begun in the USSR.[4]) At about the same time that rival schools of psychology disappeared from the scene and the testing movement was terminated, the many psychological journals that had come into being during the 1920's were discontinued. Psychologists who wanted to publish their work had to turn to educational journals for an outlet.

Students of the Soviet psychological scene are generally agreed that the discipline went into a decline during the period 1935-50.[5] Ivan London, perhaps the harshest critic in this group, characterized the situation as follows:

Since the famous 1936 resolution against "pedological distortions," psychology has been relegated in the main to the service of pedagogy where it has been grubbing out a somewhat pedestrian existence.[6]

Psychological textbooks devoted a great deal of space to discussions of the tasks of psychology in the light of Marxism-Leninism, and political-philosophical references often seemed to outweigh the psychological, while references to foreign authors were either absent or derogatory.

Yet, recent evidence indicates that this picture of complete barrenness, based on the material that had reached print at the time, is somewhat overdrawn. The severe ideological restraints placed on Soviet psychology during the Stalinist period found their expression in part in the lack of publication outlets for the psychologists: since psychology was viewed as an arm of education and since the only way to publish, therefore, was through an educational journal, only work that fitted a strictly educational format found its way into print. In 1959-60, however, a two-volume handbook of Soviet psychology was published,[7] and the contents indicate—albeit indirectly—that meaningful research had not ceased altogether during Stalin's time. The handbook includes many references to work done during the 1930's and 1940's, which was unpublished at the time or appeared only in the form of *zapiski* (notes) of the institution where the research was done. Evidently, students of Kornilov, Bekhterev, and the other leading figures of the 1920's were busy in the 1930's even though they could not publish their findings; many monographs covering work then done remained unpublished as late as the 1950's.

During the war years that followed, Soviet psychologists were reorganized in laboratories for the study of rehabilitation following brain injury and other battle-related disabilities. This wartime work of many of the Soviet Union's leading psychologists is only now becoming known in the West.[8]

[3] A. Mintz, "Introduction to Contemporary Soviet Psychology," in R. A. Bauer (ed.), *Some Views on Soviet Psychology,* Washington, D. C., American Psychological Association, 1962.

[4] R. A. Bauer, (ed.), *Some Views on Soviet Psychology, op. cit.*

[5] R. A. Bauer, *The New Man in Soviet Psychology,* p. 162; I. D. London, "Contemporary Psychology in the Soviet Union," *Science* (Washington, D. C.), No. 114, 1951, pp. 227-233; G. Razran, "Recent Russian Psychology: 1950-56," *Contemporary Psychology* (Washington, D. C.), No. 2, pp. 93-101 and "Soviet Psychology and Psychophysiology," *Science,* No. 128, 1958, pp. 1187-1194.

[6] London, *op. cit.,* p. 231.

[7] B. G. Ananiev *et al.,* (ed.), *Psikhologicheskie nauki v SSSR* (Psychological Sciences in the USSR), Published in English in Washington, D. C., US Joint Publication Research Service, Vol. 1, 1961 and Vol. 2, 1962.

[8] A. N. Leontiev and A. V. Zaporozhets, *Vosstanovlenie dvizhenii* (Restoration of Movements), Moscow, Izd-vo Sovetskaia Nauka, 1945.

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The psychophysiologists went very much their own way during the 1930's and World War II. The Pavlovian laboratories undertook a wide variety of investigations of far-ranging import. Thus the Pavlovian experimental station at Koltushi, outside of Leningrad, was the scene of large projects on anthropoid behavior, directed by N. Yu. Voitonis.[9] Pioneering work was begun in the use of electrodes for the study of brain functions, and new techniques were developed for the study of conditioning the internal organs. Modifications of Pavlov's reflex theory, introducing the notion of feedback systems, were elaborated by P. K. Anokhin. In general, the amount of data collected by the psychophysiologists during the period prior to 1950 is staggering.[10]

Ambivalent Role of Pavlovianism

The year 1949 marked another turning point in the development of Soviet psychology. It was the 100th anniversary of Pavlov's birth, an event which received a great deal of attention in the press and the academic world. With the flood of anniversary literature, Pavlov was elevated to the position of a demigod of Soviet biological sciences, and events soon showed that the extraordinary attention given to the physiologist's birthday was more than a token of grateful admiration. Politics was involved, with Stalin himself evidently the instigator.

In a recent essay, Robert C. Tucker makes an interesting case for Stalin's direct involvement in the events which followed the Pavlovian jubilee.[11] These events included a Joint Session of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences on the teachings of Pavlov, and the subsequent forced Pavlovianization of Soviet psychology. Prof. Tucker argues that during the late 1940's, when faced with difficult domestic problems, the government, and Stalin in particular, reacted with plans to

[9] G. Razran, "The Observable Unconscious and the Inferable Conscious in Current Soviet Psychophysiology: Interoceptive Conditioning, Sematic Conditioning and the Orienting Reflex," *Psychological Revue,* (Washington, D. C.), No. 68, 1961, pp. 81-147.

[10] Razran, "Soviet Psychology and Psychophysiology," *op. cit.*

[11] "Stalin and the Uses of Psychology," in *The Soviet Political Mind,* New York, Praeger, 1963.

Some Self-Criticism

At a joint session of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences in 1950, attention was correctly called to the need for the development of the ideas and scientific directions of I. P. Pavlov. However, serious mistakes have been made in doing so.

Of all the wealth of teaching of the brilliant Russian physiologist I. P. Pavlov, in essence only one line, higher nervous activity, was singled out. . . . All of the other lines of physiological investigation (other aspects of the study of the nervous system, evolutionary physiology, the physiology of cells, the physiology of endocrine organs, etc.) were interdicted, unless they were linked with the study of higher nervous activity in its sole and dogmatic treatment.

Almost all the departments of normal and pathological physiology, as well as the clinics for nervous and mental diseases, in our country were wholly engaged in the study of higher nervous activity alone, dogmatically using in different variants what had already been done by I. P. Pavlov instead of creatively developing his teaching. . . .

Dogmatism and administration by fiat in physiology led to the virtual cessation of the original research of L. A. Orbeli, which had won world recognition and a high appraisal from I. P. Pavlov himself. . . . After the 20th Party Congress the situation in physiological science was rectified, although the harm that was done is felt even onw, and there are still relapses. . . .

Science never rests on its laurels. But its progress is seriously jeopardized when hypotheses and theories are not subjected to painstaking experimental checking, and when on the basis of preconceived opinions and mistaken conclusions certain proposals of scientists are recommended for introduction in practice. This danger is transformed into a tragedy if unfounded dogmatic ideas that contradict the actual data of science are persistently and widely introduced into practice, and people who think differently are subjected to persecution by the "scientific administrators."

—From "Biology and Medicine," by S. Mardashev, Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, Pravda, June 11, 1965.

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"transform" the source of the difficulty. Pavlov's conditioned reflex was made the model for the transformation of man in the same way that Michurin's genetic theory had been made the model for the transformation of nature. It was believed that through an understanding of the laws of conditioning, the behavior of men could be directly controlled and thus transformed. The 1950 Joint Session was convened with the explicit purpose of forcing deviant physiologists back into the fold and effecting total Pavlovianization of psychology.

Evidence of Stalin's direct involvement comes from K. M. Bykov, one of the organizers of the 1950 Joint Session, who wrote:

The initiator of the events that have elevated the teachings of Pavlov in our country, the initiator of the creation of the most favorable conditions for the development of Soviet psychology [is] . . . Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin.[12]

Unhappily for many of the participating physiologists and psychologists, their work was not recognized as being within the realm of the "creative developments" which the 1950 Joint Session required of workers in the medical sciences.

Prior to 1950, Pavlov was certainly the leading figure in Soviet physiology, and psychologists habitually referred to the study of "higher nervous activity" as the science of the "substratum of the psyche" (*i.e.*, the physiological foundation of the mind). Nevertheless, Pavlovian theory was not a prominent part of their conceptual arsenal. One leading psychologist went so far as to state in 1947:

The explanation of all the phenomena of psychic life by the principle of the formation of associative or conditioned reflex connections is, of course, utterly wrong. . . . By itself, the theory of conditioned reflexes is not even adequate for understanding the physiological foundations of human behavior.[13]

No such statements were heard following the 1950 meetings. In fact, many of the Soviet Union's leading physiologists and psychologists came under attack: the psychologists for failing to use Pavlov "creatively," and the physiologists for deviating from Pavlov's teachings. During the 1950 meetings and the later sessions held by a special Scientific Council on Problems of the Physiological Theory of Adademician I. P. Pavlov, individual scientists were called in to confess their errant ways. They were accused of "vicious affirmations," which usually amounted to modifications in Pavlovian theory, the adoption of new methods, favorable references to foreign scientific work, and regression to "pre-Pavlovian idealism." In the case of L. A. Orbeli, then director of the Institute of Evolutionary Physiology, the added charge was made that he deviated from "progressive Michurinist" genetic theories.

The psychologists received their share of criticism too. They were mainly accused of ignoring Pavlov rather than of distorting his teachings. Many of those attending the 1950 Joint Session were at a loss as to just what they should do, and some went so far as to write a joint letter to A. G. Ivanov-Smolenski, a leading figure at the Joint Session, inquiring, "What is the subject of psychology, and what are its tasks?"

In the light of this interference in the internal development of psychology and psychophysiology, it would seem logical to conclude that these sciences were in for a long drought. This was indeed the conclusion reached by many American psychologists when the proceedings of the 1950 Joint Session were published. Ivan London commented: "Soviet psychology, straitjacketed and dogma-bound, will probably continue to be the discipline of little significance that it is now."[14]

However, events have not borne out this gloomy prognostication. The fifteen years since 1950 have seen rapid, though uneven, growth in both psychology and psychophysiology. Setbacks have occurred, to be sure, but the overall trend has been unmistakenly in the direction of more scientific output, higher quality of work, and wider theoretical horizons. What has accounted for this trend?

First, of course, there was the death of Stalin,

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

[13] B. M. Teplov, *Sovetskie psikhologichekie nauki za* 30 *let* (Soviet Psychological Sciences After 30 Years), 1947, quoted in Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

[14] London, *op. cit.* p. 233.

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which affected developments in psychology and psychophysiology as it affected everything else in the Soviet Union. Because of Stalin's direct involvement, changes in certain scientific fields after his departure were rapid and far-reaching. The most striking general change was the decrease in dogmatism. By the middle of 1954, an article appeared in *Pravda* by S. L. Sobolev, a physicist, who made "caustic reference to the unmerited claims of certain Soviet scientists to monopoly of the truth, mentioning three names in this context: Lysenko, Bykov, and Ivanov-Smolenski."[15]

A second point is that the events surrounding the 1950 Joint Session should not be equated with the genetics purge of 1948. There is a natural tendency to draw a parallel between Lysenko on the one hand and Bykov and Ivanov-Smolenski, the chairman of the 1950 Joint Session, on the other. However, the analogy is a poor one. The political nature of the role which the latter two men played is unquestionable, but the opportunity to reassert the prestige of their viewpoint against what they believed to be a stagnant and misguided status quo was in line with their scientific convictions. As Ivan London put it:

Lysenko's ignorant and aggressive charlatanism is not matched by Bykov and Ivanov-Smolenski, the official watchdogs over Pavlovian puritanism . . ., for these two men are first-rate experimentalists, though in the narrow tradition of classical conditioning. . . .[16]

The influence which they exerted on psychology and the "physiology of higher nervous activity" was not the same because of differing conditions within these two sciences at the time of the 1950 Joint Session.

The first response of the psychologists to the new situation was to present all of their ideas with a thick overlay of Pavlovian terminology while retaining their traditional psychological concepts. However, eventually the changes turned out to be more significant than the acquisition of a new vocabulary. It was remarked earlier that Soviet psychology in the 1930's and 1940's left much to be desired; it indulged in philosophizing about the qualities which man *ought* to have, with little attention devoted to an experimental analysis of the qualities man *does* have. There is thus little wonder that, when confronted with the demand to make their science more "Pavlovian," the psychologists first resorted to a mere change of terminology. But because Pavlov was above all an empirical, experimental scientist, the new requirements meant also that many psychologists had to get out of their armchairs and into the laboratory. In this respect, then, the outcome of the Joint Session had a positive effect. Ivan London observes:

In contrast to what happened in genetics, the official introduction of Pavlovian conceptions and methodology ripped Soviet psychology out of moribund positions, made it interdisciplinary minded, experimentation conscious, and problem sensitive in new directions.[17]

This does not imply that all the problems of Soviet psychology were soon to be solved. The areas of investigation shut off in the 1930's remained closed. Years of isolation from the world scientific community and neglect of experimental techniques had left their mark. Nevertheless, psychology was firmly pushed onto a new path.

Unlike the psychologists, the Soviet psychophysiologists had a flourishing science in 1950. The Pavlovian school dominated the study of physiological problems related to psychology, although some scholars supported theories that differed greatly from Pavlov's and there were many shades of opinion even among his students. For all the scientists whose views were not exactly in line with traditional Pavlovian ideas, the Joint Session was of course a disaster. The attacks to which such men were subjected have already been described. In addition, great pressure was applied to get them to renounce their views publicly; work in their laboratories was disrupted and attempts were made to have their co-workers renounce them.

[15] Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

[16] I. D. London, "Toward a Realistic Appraisal of Soviet Science," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, No. 13, 1957, pp. 169-173.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

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Fortunately, this concerted attack on "physiological deviationists" was never completely successful, and in a few years the influence of the Joint Session came to an end. The most important factor was Stalin's death, which cut short the supremacy of Bykov and Ivanov-Smolenski. Another factor was the courage of the individual scientists who were attacked during the Joint Session. These men never stopped reading and developing their ideas. They retained the loyalty of their co-workers to such an extent that when the extreme pressure which followed the Joint Session was removed, they were able to take up where they had left off.[18]

Psychology, as was stated earlier, showed a great spurt of activity following the 1950 Joint Session. By 1955, the initial period of dislocation was overcome and several new areas in psychology were undergoing rapid development. A new psychological journal, *Problems of Psychology*, appeared. In the inaugural article, S. L. Rubenshtein asserted the need to study the psyche as an autonomous force, but he also maintained that the study of psychology must be linked with the experimental study of "higher nervous activity." The need to stay within a broadly Marxist-Leninist, as well as a Pavlovian framework, was not neglected.

The way in which Soviet psychologists accomodated themselves to this framework can be illustrated by two new and important areas of psychological research developed in the 1950's: verbal behavior and the reflex basis of perception. The original source of the very large number of studies that were done at that time on verbal behavior and language learning was the idea, put forth by Pavlov a few years before he died, that language acts as a "second signal system." Pavlov held that because words are abstractions by their very nature, they act as "signals of signals." Thus, when Ivanov-Smolenski set about to promote studies of the second signal system in 1950, the stage had been set. There followed a huge outpouring of work which is still going on and which has attracted the interest of many American psychologists.[19] In the hands of skilled scientists like A. R. Luria,[20] this topic has yielded important information on the development of voluntary behavior and the disturbance of language as the result of various pathological conditions.

Studies on the reflex basis of perception represent the development of another idea which can be found in embryonic form in Pavlov's writings. Certain of Lenin's philosophical ideas concerning human consciousness as the reflection of reality are sometimes quoted in this context, although in a programmatic sense only.[21] Using objective indicators, such as the galvanic skin response or brain-wave recordings, E. N. Sokolov and his colleagues have carried out dozens of studies on man's reactions to novel stimuli, the dependence of perception on past experience, the disturbance of orienting responses in schizophrenic subjects, etc. American interest is reflected in a growing volume of research on this topic in American journals.

Although other examples could be used, the problems of the "second signal system" and the orienting reaction point up the fact that Pavlovian ideas did begin to play a role in psychological research and did result in solid laboratory experimentation. A narrowing of the division between psychology and physiology is also evident in this work. On the other hand, many areas of fruitful research interrupted in the 1930's had still not reappeared in the 1950's. This development had to wait another decade.

The 1960's and After

The current progress in psychophysiology represents, for the most part, a continuation of generally high-level research. There has been a conspicuous increase in the use of sophisticated electronic machines and a much better knowledge of the relevant Western literature. The trend which promises in the long run to reap the largest rewards is the noticeable decrease in dogmatism and the almost total lack of obeisance to authority figures. Indeed, this writer, who attended the 20th Pavlovian Congress held in Leningrad in 1962, has never heard such

[18] Indicative of the support these men enjoyed is the fact that P. K. Anokhin now heads the Sechenov Institute of Physiology in Moscow and I. S. Beritashvilli heads the Institute of Physiology in Tbilisi (named in honor of Beritashvilli!).

[19] Razran, "The Observable Unconscious," *op. cit.*

[20] A. R. Luria, *The Role of Speech in the Regulation of Normal and Abnormal Behavior,* London, Pergamon Press, 1961.

[21] E. N. Sokolov, *Perception and the Conditioned Reflex,* London, Pergamon Press, 1963.

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candid (or heated) exchanges as took place at that meeting. When one young researcher ended his paper with the assertion that he had just demolished a certain Pavlovian doctrine, the head of one of the traditionalist Pavlovian laboratories rose to denouce the man's work as well as his audacity in questioning a "proven principle." Unabashed, the young man first answered some substantive questions and then turned on his attacker with the statement that the day for such irresponsible criticism was past. He followed this with the observation that "it is now our task to lead our science out of the blind alleys into which some have mistakenly led it."

Perhaps because psychology started from a less advantageous position, events in the 1960's in that discipline have been more dramatic than those in psychophysiology. Like psychophysiology, psychology has witnessed a significant increase in the sophistication of its techniques and a decrease in dogmatism. Computers are beginning to find general application among psychologists, and psychology students are required to study mathematics on a scale unheard of ten years ago. When philosophical issues are raised, it is almost always in programmatic articles, rather than in attacks on someone's research. Most significant, however, is the development of new fields of research, some of which are growing out of the wreckage left in the 1930's and some of which have grown out of new technological methods.[22]

Representative of the former is a budding social psychology, which had its beginnings in the 1920's but was squelched in the 1930's. For years, this field had been considered no more than a pseudoscience, a capitalist sham used to trick workers into supporting the exploiting classes; Marxism, the party had held, was the only true social science. The new social psychology is growing out of problems encountered in industrial and educational institutions. For instance, one of the topics currently under investigation is the social structure of outstanding work-groups in factories and the factors which distinguish them from less productive groups. Production figures are thus beginning to influence ideology in determining the value of a given research area.

In the same spirit, a new industrial psychology has arisen to take the place of its defunct ancestor, killed off along with psychological testing in 1936. With the advent of automation, there is a great need for determining how best to design machines so that they can be run efficiently and safely. A large number of psychologists are now working on problems of this type.

Another of the new branches of psychology resulting from technological and scientific innovations is the study of information processing in man. This area is closely tied in with industrial psychology on the one hand and the traditional psychological study of perception on the other. It is also very closely connected to Western science, for it was developments in the mathematical theory of information in the West that opened up this new and important field.

The list of new departures could be continued, but the overall picture is already clear. Soviet psychology-psychophysiology in the 1960's is a much more pragmatic, much less dogmatic discipline than it was twenty or even ten years ago. Moreover, the prevailing political climate does seem to encourage those who are determined to place psychology-psychophysiology on a firm empirical base. Aprioristic dogmatism may not be dead in the Soviet Union, but it is certainly badly bruised and out of favor, which gives hope for a healthier and more even growth of this branch of Soviet science in the future.

[22] Freudian psychology as such is still not acceptable in the Soviet Union, although the blanket rejection of all Freudian concepts is becoming rarer and rarer. Soviet personality theorists have begun to grapple seriously with the problems which Freud raises, and Soviet psychiatrists are now concerned with understanding unconscious processes whose very existence they were denying fifteen years ago. Thus a period of serious, critical evaluation is now replacing one of total rejection. Whether this period of evaluation will in turn give rise to acceptance of Freud is difficult to say at this time.

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Cybernetics: Key to the Future?

By Lee Kerschner

Though still a relative infant among the established disciplines, the science of cybernetics has had a profound impact upon the modern world, touching directly or indirectly upon many areas of social and scientific concern. Nowhere has this development been more controversial—or potentially more significant—than in the Soviet Union, where cybernetics has come to be regarded by some as the brightest hope, by others as the gravest danger, for the future of Soviet communism.

Cybernetics was first developed as a separate science in 1948 by Norbert Wiener, the late mathematician associated with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Taking the name from the Greek word for "steersman," he regarded it as symbolizing the art of the pilot or, literally, "steersmanship." It may be defined as the scientific analysis and control of animate or inanimate systems of organization, based upon their methods of communication. Emphasizing the essential unity of all systems, cybernetics disregards apparent differences in the construction of men and machines, and stresses such obvious functional parallels as neural networks and electronic circuits.[1]

The basic thesis of cybernetics, then, is the assumption that man, machine and society are very similar in structure and can best be understood and controlled through the study of their control and communication facilities. A second assumption is that messages of control between man and machine, machine and man, and machine and machine will play increasingly larger roles in society. Cyberneticians consider as parallel not only the nervous system and com-

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[1] Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Man and the Machine,* New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1948.

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munication machines, but also all forms of behavior to the extent that they are regular, determinate, or reproducible.

It is the newer computation machines with their ability to calculate, compute, retain in memory, react to environment, and select free alternatives on the basis of experience, in short to duplicate to a great degree the human system, which provide the background and basis for all current cybernetic activity.

Western scientists first received the new theories of cybernetics with interest and enthusiasm. A more cautious attitude now prevails, and cybernetics as a separate comprehensive science has been generally disregarded. Research in "subordinate" areas such as automation, computer theory, programmed learning, artificial intelligence, automatic data processing, bionics, and operations research is carried on separately without recourse to an umbrella definition.

More or less the converse has taken place in the USSR. Soviet scientists were at first skeptical and party ideologists actively hostile toward the new science. But this is no longer true. The scientists have, in general, embraced cybernetics, and the philosophers are now bitterly divided over it. Interest in cybernetics is intense, and its methods are being used to solve complex economic, social and military problems. For the USSR there appears to be no limit to the possibilities inherent in cybernetics—no limit but one. This limitation is Soviet philosophy itself.

Ideological Dilemmas

The sophisticated Marxist-Leninist may deny that dialectical materialism is the science of sciences, or that it is superior to the special sciences. He must hold, however, that his philosophy examines the most general laws and relationships of all being and of every development, and that although the special sciences may examine their respective fields in depth, they can only do this with a proper dialectical approach.

Cybernetics as a unifying science—a general systems theory that provides a model by which all systems can be ordered and understood—is clearly an alternative and a challenge to Marxism-Leninism. Its primary categories include information, control, feedback and homeostasis. As a discipline which sees structural-functional parallels in all systems, it has profound theoretical implications which cannot be isolated from the science itself. Conscious attempts to introduce the concepts, methodology, and techniques of cybernetics has, of necessity, resulted in the raising of fundamental philosophical questions.

The conflict has touched almost every area of dialectical materialist philosophy. In several cases it has provided an opportunity for the "old guard" to continue struggles that have developed in other fields; in other instances cybernetics creates newer, more pressing problems.

The so-called laws of the dialectic have been intimately involved in the debate. The First Law of the Dialectic, the Qualitative Leap, seems to imply that with an increase in memory components a computer may change from a lower form of organized matter to a higher form —a viewpoint which is assailed as mechanistic and reductionist by the traditional philosophers and welcomed by the cyberneticians. These in turn reinforce their position by pointing to the Marxist view of the material unity of the world. The objectors are then faced with the difficulty of either denying the validity of the material unity of the world or of being unable to accuse the cyberneticians of reductionism.

At the center of the Marxist-Leninist view of man is the assumption that consciousness and cognition are properties of man alone, as highly organized matter; by definition these abilities cannot be the properties of lower forms of matter—i.e., machines. Cybernetics offers totally new ways of viewing consciousness and cognition; acceptance of them would undermine this aspect of traditional Marxism-Leninism.

The second Law of the Dialectic, the Unity and Conflict of Opposites, has already lost to formal and mathematical logic, but the conflict is continued in the philosophical discussion surrounding cybernetics. The Third Law, the Negation of the Negation, seems not to be involved in the controversy. Other basic categories of Marxist theory are not so fortunate. The traditional view of the relationship between necessity and chance has been subjected to severe strain by the developments of probability theory; the argument is continued. The position that the general can only be known by a process which proceeds from the individual through the particular to the general is denied by cybernetics' insistence on the use of analogies.

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Finally, dialectical materialism claims that the world is divided into two spheres: matter, which is primary, and consciousness, which is secondary and is a form of the movement of matter. Unfortunately, this leaves no room for information—regarded by cyberneticians as a separate, independent entity, neither matter nor energy.

Historical Materialism is likewise subject to re-evaluation as a result of cybernetic theories. Introduction of such concepts as linear programming and operations analysis strains such traditional economic concepts as surplus value theory. The "cyberneticians" hope to revolutionize the planning process and change the basis for economic decision-making by introducing mathematical economics and ignoring traditional positions based on the labor theory of value. Cybernetic analysis of social change and development results in the deprecation of "social consciousness" and the "class struggle" as explanations of social phenomena. The cyberneticians substitute survey research, polls, and statistical techniques for the traditional Marxist explanations. They imply that Marxian categories are not sufficient to explain social phenomena and thus place "concrete" or empirical social research directly in conflict with historical materialism.

All of these arguments reveal three general positions among Soviet theorists. At one pole there is a group of reactionary philosophers who wish to destroy cybernetics, or, failing this, want to restrict it to a narrow role comparable to that of statistics. These orthodox philosophers insist upon the traditional positions of dialectical and historical materialism.

In the middle are the moderates, who are prepared to accept cybernetics but who also wish to limit its scope. They are aware of the party's expressed interest in cybernetics, but understand and perhaps fear its philosophical significance. Placed in a position of compromising and bringing cybernetics into accord with dialectical and historical materialism, they succeed in neither placating the orthodox nor satisfying the "ultras".

The "ultras," at the other pole, are interested solely in scientific advance. Actual if not avowed positivists, they pay lip service to dialectical materialism but are not prepared to subordinate science to philosophy. For them epistemological and ontological problems are solved by reference to scientific experimentation.

Such deepseated philosophical quarrels caused by new scientific advances are not unique to any society. A system whose foundations rest upon theories accepted as scientific facts will bitterly resent contradictory discoveries. This is demonstrated historically by the controversies surrounding such men as Copernicus and Galileo. For more recent evidence an American need only recall the famous Scopes "Monkey" trial; even now many churchmen and churchgoers still find it impossible to assimilate Darwinian evolution into their own beliefs of the origin and purpose of man.

The acceptance of new scientific ideas and concepts is especially difficult when a society has already pronounced a particular philosophical outlook as the only acceptable *Weltanschauung*. This happened with the Marxist-Leninist credo—so much so that it has become increasingly difficult for the Soviet philosophical system to adapt to the discoveries of 20th-century science.

The Pseudo-Science

"Cybernetics is one of those pseudo-sciences to which contemporary imperialism has given birth and which are destined to perish before even imperialism itself."[2] This statement in a 1953 article in the Soviet professional journal *Voprosy filosofii* indicates the reception that cybernetics first received in the Soviet Union. The authorship of the article was attributed to "Materialist," a pseudonym with dual significance: first, obvious orthodoxy, and second, the need for a pseudonym in a journal of considerable official importance. Manifestly, the author was uneasy about the possibility of condemnation by either officials or fellow scientists.[3]

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[2] "Materialist" [pseud.], "Whom Does Cybernetics Serve?," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 5, 1953, p. 218, as cited by Constantine Olgin, "Soviet Ideology and Cybernetics," *Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR*, Munich, February 1962, p. 3. Olgin, who is with the Institute, is a frequent commentator on the Soviet philosophic scene. Since his article quotes and adequately summarizes "Materialist's" position in English, it is used herein for reference. However, the analysis in the text is the author's own.

[3] See Olgin, *op. cit.* p. 4. Olgin takes a somewhat exaggerated view of the significance of the pseudonym and draws the conclusion that "Materialist" and the forces he represents were, even at this early date, afraid of the power of the cyberneticians.

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The article revealed a good general comprehension of the principles of cybernetics, and according to Ernst Kolman (on whom see further), "Materialist" has now "changed his view" and is one of the leading Soviet commentators on cybernetics.[4]

But in 1953, at any rate, "Materialist" was dogmatic in asserting that Wiener and his associates were ill-informed on the ideological and philosophical implications of their own science.[5] He rejected cybernetics essentially on three major grounds. First, he said, cyberneticians had gone well beyond the legitimate claims of computer theory, extending their science to tackle problems not only in telemechanization but in biology, physiology, psychology, sociology, economics, and politics. (It should be noted that he condemned only the overall theories of cybernetics and not the theory and design of electronic computers, which were in increasing demand in the Soviet Union.) Second, he objected to the assertion of some of Wiener's followers that mental operations were neither different from nor superior to potential machine operations. Finally, he claimed that cyberneticians sought to divide humanity into two classes: the rulers or controllers of the supermachine, and the laboring classes who would be, at best, servants of the machine.

"Materialist" also contended that cyberneticians were offending against a fundamental position of Marxism—that thought, a property of the highest form of the motion of matter, cannot be ascribed to lower forms of motion of matter, particularly biological or mechanical matter. Allegedly this resulted from Wiener's adherence to the teachings of modern behaviorism which, according to "Materialist," rejected valid concepts of Pavlovian psychology, especially the theory of the second signalling system introduced by Pavlov specifically to study the activity of conscious mind.[6]

Right after "Materialist" attacked cybernetics as a "pseudo-science" in Russia, similar articles appeared in the satellite and sycophant press. In France an article by André Lentin was published in the "progressive" journal *La Pensée,* echoing the attacks and charges outlined above.[7] Almost simultaneously a similar article appeared in East Germany written by M. Jaroschewsky, entitled "Cybernetics, a New Science of the Obscurantists"; it was even more vehement than its predecessors. The author referred to the "modish pseudo-theory" devised by a group of American scholars and sarcastically noted that the theory was supposed to solve all the problems of the world. The cybernetic epidemic, as he called it, had infected sciences from physiology to linguistics.

Jaroschewsky insisted that the cybernetic thesis of a thinking machine was totally unscientific in every respect and that the basic idea of such a machine as a substitute for man was "unbelievably stupid." In his view cybernetics had no significance for the progress of science and technology because even school children knew that an adding machine was simpler than any biological organism. The proponents of cybernetics, he argued, were pretentious in claiming to have a method of analysis for any possible system. In essence, he concluded, cybernetics was merely another tool of the American imperialists, who planned to place bombing and biological warfare under the control of robots.[8]

Western analysis of these attacks ranged from dismissing them as meaningless tirades to the estimate that they presaged a long-term struggle between traditional dialectical and historical materialism and proponents of a new world view. This latter interpretation seems to be the most justified. According to Constantine Olgin (see footnote 2), it was feared in the Soviet Union that Wiener's thesis and his idea of universal applicability could result in

. . . the rise of a rival philosophy and, at the very least, encourage the devotees of cybernetics to query, first the laws of dialectical, then those of historical materialism, and finally the omniscience of the Central Committee, not in the natural sciences, which Khrushchev's administration has already virtually liberated

[4] Private interview with Ernst Kolman, Washington, D. C., Sept. 9, 1962. He would not, however, reveal the name of "Materialist."

[5] "Materialist" noted that at least Norbert Wiener, the father of cybernetics, had a critical attitude toward capitalism in general and in this, of course, he was right.

[6] See Olgin, *op. cit.,* pp. 5-6.

[7] André Lentin, "La Cybernetique: Problèmes Réels et Mystification," *La Pensée,* No. 47, 1953, pp. 49-61.

[8] M. Jaroschewsky, "Die Kybernetik—eine neue Wissenschaft der Obskuranten," *Neue Welt,* May 1952, pp. 1193-95.

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from party tutelage, but in economics, sociology, and possibly even politics where this tutelage must be preserved at all costs. The spread had to be stopped.[9]

Because plans of the Central Committee, even at this early point, demanded more and more complicated computers, Olgin believes that "Materialist" found it quite difficult to reject cybernetics totally and that his article reflects an attempt to divorce the theory of construction of complicated computer machinery from the implications of the thesis itself. Although it is undoubtedly true that the motivation of "Materialist's" article was to prevent inroads by cybernetics into dialectical and historical materialism, Olgin has somewhat overstated the point in writing about the events of 1953 with the hindsight of developments in the 1960's.

Despite "Materialist's" attack and other pressure against cybernetics, ideological restrictions had only a mild effect on extensive research in computers and computer technology. While Soviet scientists and theorists have recently claimed that the period of the "cult of personality" seriously affected progress and development in this field, it may be that such contentions have been made, as David D. Comey claims, merely to "hide deficiencies in the Soviet program and shift the blame to unnamed, undefined reactionary philosophers."[10]

In any case, Soviet research in cybernetics and associated fields went steadily forward, and it was not long before pragmatic considerations forced a reassessment of the role of cybernetics and concomitant theoretical adjustments.

Rehabilitation

Some two years after "Materialist's" article appeared in *Voprosy filosofii,* Ernst Kolman, a theorist who had made his reputation in mathematics and the philosophy of science, was assigned the task of rehabilitating cybernetics. Now a senior party theoretician but the same man who in the 1930's led the Bolshevik attack against the Debornites and the Mechanists, Kolman performed his task with considerable astuteness and ability.

He began by defending the earlier attacks on cybernetics, asserting that they justifiably criticized the uproar surrounding the science in the United States and the attempt to sell it as a universal science capable of replacing psychology and the social sciences. He joined "Materialist" in scoring the contention that automation and electronic computers could wholly replace the mental work of man. "Reactionaries" (meaning Americans) had used cybernetics to "refresh bourgeois sociology and idealist philosophy" in order to give them "some semblance of science."

Nevertheless, Kolman continued, "Materialist" and others had approached cybernetics onesidedly and had obscured the positive side of the picture:

Of course, nothing is easier than to declare cybernetics to be a mystification, pseudo-science, etc. But it seems erroneous to suppose that our opponents occupy themselves with nonsense, spend enormous amounts of money, create entire institutes, call national conferences, publish special journals—all in order to discredit Pavlov's teachings and to drag idealism and metaphysics into psychology and sociology.[11]

Cybernetics, Kolman concluded, had been tested in practice and had exceptional significance for the future of society; hence it was a "huge self-deception to consider it a 'huge mystification.'" The attitude originally taken toward cybernetics was "nihilistic" and had caused great setbacks to Soviet progress.

Formal logic, one of the fundamental disciplines contributing to cybernetics, had also become the object of considerable attack.[12] Kol-

[9] Olgin, *op. cit.,* p. 4. Of course, Olgin makes an error here in that at the time "Materialist" was writing, "Khrushchev's administration" did not exist nor had relaxation in other fields commenced. I would also question his implied divorce between administration and the party.

[10] Comey, personal letter to the author, Oct. 25, 1962.

[11] Ernst Kolman, "What is Cybernetics," *Voprosy filosofii,* No. 9, 1955. Translated by Anatol Rapoport in *Behavioral Science,* April, 1959, p. 134. Further page references are to translation.

[12] For one version of the logic controversy see Alexander Philipov (sometimes Filipov), *Logic and Dialectic in the Soviet Union,* New York, Research Program on the USSR, 1952. See also two booklets now in preparation by Dr. David D. Comey, consisting of selected and edited Soviet writings on formal logic and dialectical logic. The booklets will be published by the Ost-Europa Institut, University of Freiburg, Switzerland, in its series, *Studies on Soviet Thought.*

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man argued that formal logic was not a system which would replace complex laws of thought with elementary mathematical rules, as some Soviet philosophers contended. It had its limitations, but within its framework it was a powerful tool of cognition. Kolman noted that both cybernetics and formal logic had been successfully developed in the Soviet Union by mathematicians of first-class achievements, despite the negative attitude of many philosophers and ideologists. Then he asked:

Is it not true that the nihilistic attitude of some of our philosophers toward relativity theory and quantum physics has been harmful, when along with a justifiable criticism of idealistic deductions which some bourgeois physicist-philosophers had made, the theories themselves were branded as pseudoscientific and reactionary? Is it not true that such an attitude toward modern formal logic is harmful? . . . the same applies to cybernetics.[13]

Kolman defended the use of the analogy between the human brain and the electronic computer provided one continued to "protest vigorously against the assertion that the processes within the human brain are entirely identical to those in machines." He referred to Marx for justification:

When he [Marx] speaks of devices such as the telegraph, [he] emphasizes that they are not simply an extension of our hands but organs of the human brain. Evidently, Marx wishes to say that within certain limits the human brain can be extended just as our hands can be.[14]

To defend the use of analogy in science, Kolman harked back to the "famous" passage in Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism* where the analogy is drawn "between the displacement of the center of revolutionary movement to Germany in the 1840's and the displacement of the center of revolutionary movement to Russia at the beginning of the 20th century." On this basis, concluded the professor, "analogy has a great significance both for the natural and for the social sciences." (His article was published a year prior to Khrushchev's secret speech, at a time when it was still proper to use Stalin as a source of correct thinking.)

The remainder of his article consisted of a very careful and conservative presentation of some of the basic concepts of cybernetics. Well known as a loyal party theorist, Kolman was the ideal choice to write such an article. His views did not approach the more advanced outlook of Soviet cyberneticians today, but they were a marked improvement over the article by "Materialist" and signified a great change in the Soviet attitude toward cybernetics. He was confident enough of high party backing to make this early defense of cybernetics, stemming obviously from the Soviet Union's increased need for technicians and workers in the fields of mathematical logic and computer engineering.

From the General to the Particular

More broadly, the reversal of the Soviet attitude toward cybernetics seemed to be part of a general official reevaluation of the natural and physical sciences that marked the end of the Stalin era.

Some hints of a change of attitude even predated Stalin's death; in 1951, for example, *Voprosy filosofii* started a discussion on relativity theory that lasted until 1955, with victory going to the more objective side. In the more controversial field of biology, Lysenkoism was sufficiently discredited by 1956 to cause Lysenko's resignation as President of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences.[15]

In 1958, the Soviet Union called an All-Union Conference on Philosophic Problems of Modern Natural Sciences, an impressively planned and highly organized conference of leading philosophers and scientists of the Soviet Union conducted under the cosponsorship of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Ministry of Higher Education. The purpose of the conference was to strengthen the growing alliance between philosophers and natural scientists on the

[13] Kolman, "What is Cybernetics?," p. 140.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[15] See Gustav Wetter, S. J., "Ideology and Science in the Soviet Union," *Daedalus*, Summer 1960, p. 588. For studies on the controversy surrounding physics and Marxism-Leninism see Siegfried Muller-Markus, *Einstein und die Sowjetphilosophie*, Dordrecht, Holland, D. Reidel, 1960; Constantine Olgin, "Physics and Dialectical Materialism," *Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR*, May 1960, pp. 3-20.

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basis of Marxist-Leninist theories. Statements made at and about the gathering indicate both the advances and limitations in Soviet attitudes by this date.[16]

At the conference cybernetics was represented by Academicians Sobolev and Liapunov, both outstanding mathematicians. Their presentation was a conservative and rather restricted view of the possibilities of the discipline. They concerned themselves almost entirely with explaining cybernetics and its technical features, and, despite the avowed purpose of the conference, avoided any controversial implications of the new discipline.[17] An official summary of the meeting, published in *Vestnik istorii mirovoi kultury* in January 1959, stated as Sobolev's main point merely that cybernetics "provides a stimulus to the construction of regulating machines, and greatly influences mathematical logic, as well as the mathematics of computation."[18]

On the other hand, Sobolev was the only conference speaker to make reference to previous treatment at the hands of party ideologists. Commentators on physics, relativity theory, biology, and genetics apparently felt it unwise to reopen old wounds. But Sobolev declared:

The views expressed by some writers to the effect that cybernetics is a pseudo-science, idealistic, mechanistic, etc., are the result of a misconception, and originate only from a total ignorance of the actual content of cybernetics.[19]

Liapunov touched on a slightly more controversial area, noting that cybernetics also had great importance for the study of the problem of heredity, since the latter is "a sort of transmission of information by parents; a stream of information from the parent organisms to the organisms of their progeny." With heredity regarded as an information system, cybernetics might become an important tool in its study.

Another commentator, the physiologist P. K. Anokhin, expressed a belief that cybernetics had great significance for the further development of physiology and that cybernetic specialists must be trained both in mathematics and in physiology in order to benefit from the new application.[20]

As a whole, however, the representatives of cybernetics were subjected to extensive criticism at the conference. A woman professor, Kostrikova, criticized Sobolev and Liapunov for "their treatment of a number of successive generations as a mere stream of information" and rejected their assertion that "the mechanism of the transmission of information from the parent organism to the embryo cells is unknown." Since this same Professor Kostrikova also criticized the work of Professor Dubinin and other representatives of the genes theory of heredity, she was obviously a Lysenko supporter.[21] Another such supporter, G. Platonov, denounced a botanical journal which had published criticisms of Lysenko and announced that the main defect of the papers read at the conference was the absence of "criticism of idealistic views in science and philosophy." He was witnessing, he claimed, an increasing tendency among Soviet scientists to abandon the struggle with idealism.

Platonov also attacked Kolman for the latter's uncritical preface to the Soviet translation of Norbert Wiener's *The Human Use of Human Beings*. Clearly, in 1958 a Stalinist line still strongly affected the relationship between science and philosophy in the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, P. N. Fedoseiev, Director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, noted that the conference theme had been the victory of dialectical materialism. In view of the rapid tempo of change in the natural sciences, he called for profound and serious work on the part of Marxist philosophers and scientists in clarification of the "philosophical generalization of modern scientific discoveries, and for strengthening of collaboration between philosophers and scientists, stressing the impropriety of importing the methods used in combatting hostile ideologies into scientific discussion." Concrete analysis of scientific questions,

[16] See Wetter, *op. cit.*, p. 582. For a stimulating summary and review of the entire conference, see also Constantine Olgin, "Science and Philosophy in the USSR," *Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR,* December 1960, pp. 3-19.

[17] "Documents I: Philosophy and the Natural Sciences in the USSR," *Daedalus,* Summer, 1960. This is a translation in full of *Vestnik istorii mirovoi kultury* (Moscow), January-February 1959. Cited hereafter as "Documents I." For a discussion of the contribution made by Sobolev and Liapunov, see Olgin, "Soviet Ideology and Cybernetics," *passim.*

[18] "Documents I," p. 637.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 639.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 645.

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he argued, was crucial because the absence of such analysis could lead to grave errors such as "the nihilistic rejection of cybernetics by certain philosophers." [22]

That the chairman of the conference should single out one science for special attention was unusual. This, coupled with the obvious reluctance of Sobolev and Liapunov to discuss the philosophical implications of cybernetics, leads to the conclusion that at the time it was still open to doubt precisely because of its philosophical content.

From Limbo into Limelight

The years since 1958 have witnessed an increasing number of Soviet writings on cybernetics, with philosophical and ideological implications frequently discussed. Up to the 1960's cybernetics was still struggling for a secure place in the Soviet scientific world. But by 1960—according to Americans who attended the 1960 Moscow meeting of the International Federation of Automatic Control—Soviet theory and techniques (though not hardware) were on a par with those of the Western world.[23] By 1965 cybernetics not only had established itself but had in effect become, in the words of one observer, "the rage" of the country.[24]

The ascendancy of cybernetics was demonstrated in a controversial article by the famous Soviet Academician and physicist, P. L. Kapitsa. Writing in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* on March 25, 1962, he noted that the gap between theory and experimentation had become detrimental to theory. He was particularly critical of ideologists engaged in philosophical problems of natural science, and he gave cybernetics as an example:

Most of us know what cybernetics is . . . we also know the tremendous role it plays in the life of contemporary society. Yet this is what was written on the subject of cybernetics on page 235 of the Philosophic Dictionary, *1954 edition:*

"Cybernetics (from the Greek word meaning helmsman, manager)—a form of reactionary pseudo-science, originating in the USA after World War II and now broadly utilized in other capitalist countries; a form of modern mechanization."

True, the quotation is from a book published eight years ago. This particular mistake has been rectified. But the philosopher's job should be to foresee the development of the natural sciences, not ossify stages already past.

Had our scientists back in the year 1954 paid attention to the philosophers, had they accepted

Above: "Technology Bordering on the Fantastic"
Middle: "Well, how is it with automation at your factory?"
Below: "Take a look . . ."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), Sept. 30, 1964.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 647.
[23] See Edward A. Feigenbaum, "Soviet Cybernetics and Computer Sciences, 1960," *Communications,* the journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, December 1961, pp. 566-79.
[24] *The New York Times* (Western edition), Dec. 29, 1962. p. 7.

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that definition as a guide to further development of this particular science, we may safely say that our conquest of space, of which we are so justly proud and for which the whole world respects us, could never have been a reality, since it is wholly impossible to steer cosmic vehicles without having recourse to cybernetics.[25]

This, Kapitsa argued, was merely another example of how inadequate knowledge and superficial understanding can impede physical experimentation. He recalled that at the same time that some Soviet philosophers, "dogmatically applying the method of dialectics, were proving the unsoundness of the theory of relativity," Soviet physicists who ignored the philosophers produced the atomic bomb.

While cybernetics has escaped oblivion at the hands of the ideological dogmatists, debate among the philosophers and scientists continues, a debate in which cybernetics is rapidly gaining ground. Apropos of this, the author was amused by the comment of Ernst Kolman at a private discussion in the fall of 1962 in Washington, D.C. Dr. Kolman remarked that his friend Todor Pavlov from the Academy of Sciences in Bulgaria was still bitterly opposed to cybernetics and was doing everything he could to stop its further expansion. But Kolman added that Pavlov is not overtly against cybernetics as such because "today one cannot be against cybernetics."

In the course of debate it has become clear that not only ideological dogmatism and the residue of the "cult of personality," but also an inherent conservatism on the part of certain scientists who felt they had disciplines to protect, has helped to retard the development of cybernetics in the Soviet Union. In the words of one Soviet commentator:

In work which has begun in recent years on the application of cybernetics to economics, as in the case of any large-scale new undertaking, there is no circumventing the conflict of the progressive and new with the backward and the outdated.[26]

The same problem has been noted with respect to other disciplines by Academician V. V. Parin. In an article in *Literaturnaia gazeta,* he criticized the continued negative attitude in certain biological circles towards cybernetics and other techniques in biology and psychology.[27] His article is testimony both to the strength of conservative elements in science and to the freedom of expression now existing among avant-garde members of the scientific community.

To this day we find among what is fortunately only a small section of biologists a tendency to approach with distrust all the experimental methods based on the achievements of modern physics, chemistry, and cybernetics, when these new techniques invariably invade the scientist's own sphere of research. A short while ago I came across a review of some biology articles, published in a compendium of problems of cybernetics compiled by the USSR Academy of Sciences. The reviewer felt it inexpedient to introduce wide-scale cybernetic methods of research in some areas of biology. . . . This reviewer's errors are self-evident. Nor can he turn back the clock. The need for all-round development of new methods in the exact sciences—cybernetics in particular—in relation to biological research is, in fact, one of the main points raised in the new Party Program, which received such general approval. Is it accidental that such a review could have been published as late as 1961? Not at all.[28]

Parin also pointed out that Professor P. K. Anokhin, an outstanding physiologist and cybernetic "ultra," had been bitterly criticized for not adhering to the research methods of the Pavlovian school, despite the fact that his techniques of electro-physiological research were

[25] Pyotr L. Kapitsa, "Theory, Experimentation, Practice," *The Soviet Review,* June 1962, p. 18.

[26] V. D. Belkin, "Cybernetics and Economics," *CSC,* p. 260.

[27] For a typical traditionalist view, see I. S. Yeremeev, "The Brain and the Machine," translation from *Nauka i Zhyttia,* No. 2, 1961; US Dept. of Commerce, Joint Publications Research Service: 11310, 1962. Emphasis is upon the alleged qualitative difference between the brain and the machine.

[28] V. V. Parin, "Scientific Heritage and Dogmatism," trans. in *The Soviet Review,* August 1962, p. 56. (Emphasis mine.) The article is a bitter attack upon the Stalin era practice of quoting Marx, Lenin, Stalin, or Pavlov and Lysenko as an answer to new ideas and research in science.

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providing a "rich store of new phenomena." He concluded that such blind criticism must be rejected if Soviet science is to meet the tasks provided in the new Party Program.

Cybernetics and the Future

Cybernetics received the stamp of official approval with the adoption of the new program of the CPSU at the 22nd Party Congress in Moscow, November 1961. The first section, on "The Tasks of the Party . . . in the Creation and Promotion of the Material and Technical Basis of Communism," stated that "cybernetics, electronic computer and control systems, will be widely applied in production processes in industry, building and transport, in scientific research, planning, designing, accounting, statistics, and management."

In short the Communist leaders have now become convinced that cybernetics is essential for the future development of Soviet society. This new science is the means by which they hope to provide the material and the technological base necessary to achieve communism. It is to "play a role in the development of the productive powers of society not lesser than that of the steam engine in its time." [29] In fact some Soviet spokesmen are so enthusiastic about the possibilities of cybernetics that its impact in the USSR has been likened to Lenin's dictum, "Communism is Soviet power plus electrification of the entire country." This comparison was made by A. I. Berg and A. I. Kitov, Academicians, writing in *Cybernetics at the Service of Communism,* an anthology of 1961.[30]

The Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences has also heartily endorsed the use of cybernetics. In an address to the Academy, he demanded that there must be greater attention given to the development and organization of research in cybernetics. He cited the Party Program to support his position, noting that the 22nd Congress deplored the lag in computer technology. And he warned that his criticism must be heeded by designers and scientists concerned with calculating machines and cybernetic appliances.[31]

The magnitude of the Soviet interest in cybernetics is apparent in the fact that more than 20 institutes for research in this new science have been developed. The first and most important of these institutes was established April 10, 1959, the date on which a scientific council for coordinating work in the new science was set up under the USSR Academy of Sciences.[32]

The research at these institutes stresses the application of cybernetics to linguistics, planning, economic control processes, industry and transportation, as well as biology and medicine. In addition, the Soviets have established a special Institute of Semiotics, a new laboratory for the study of cybernetic techniques in medicine, and a cybernetic section at the Kharkov House of Scientists, "where the doors are open to all interested persons regardless of their specialty or training." [33]

An article in *Pravda* of November 10, 1961, by Academician A. I. Berg, stresses how widespread the work in cybernetics has become. This work is being carried on, he writes, "in all the most important scientific and industrial centers in the country." Berg declines to make any attempt to estimate the effect of this application of cybernetics to all human activity. But he concludes (with Wiener) that it "will certainly mean more of a revolution than the industrial one and the consequences will be far more profound." [34]

Professional journals, books, articles, conferences and institutes on cybernetics continue to multiply at an unprecedented rate, and cyber-

[29] M. N. Andriushchenko, "Some Philosophical Problems of Cybernetics," translated from *Nauchnyie doklady vysshei shkoly filosofskiie nauki, III,* (Moscow), July-September 1959; US Dept. of Commerce, JPRS:2211-N, 1960, p. 1.

[30] A. I. Berg, ed., *Cybernetics at the Service of Communism,* translation of *Kibernetika na sluzhbu kommunizmu,* Vol. I, (Moscow, 1961); US Dept. of Commerce, JPRS:14592, 1962.

[31] A. V. Topchiyev, "On the Status and Training of Scientific Personnel in the Light of the New Tasks Placed upon the USSR Academy of Sciences," translated from *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR,* December 1961; US Dept. of Commerce, JPRS:12786, 1962, p. 95.

[32] See A. A. Liapunov, ed., *Problemy kibernetiki* (Moscow, quarterly since 1959). Available in a cover to cover translation as *Problems of Cybernetics,* New York, Pergamon Press.

[33] Yu. I. Sokolovski, *Cybernetics of the Present and Future;* translation of *Kibernetika nastoiashchevo i budushchevo,* Kharkov, 1959; US Dept. of Commerce, JPRS:3750, 1960.

[34] A. I. Berg, "Cybernetics and Technical Process," translated from *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 10, 1961, p. 3; US Dept. of Commerce, JPRS:11926, 1962.

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netics has become one of the most frequent subjects in the Soviet popular press. Honors and privileges are being bestowed upon Soviet researchers in cybernetics. Two of them, V. M. Glushkov and M. A. Aizerman, were recipients of the Lenin Prize in April 1964. At a round-table conference sponsored by three Russian magazines in September 1964, Russia's top mathematicians and economists debated the many uses of cybernetics. In October 1964 this writer attended the Fourth International Conference on Cybernetics in Belgium. The Soviet Union sent a 21-man delegation.

Despite this continuing intense interest and expanded activity in cybernetics, concrete Soviet accomplishments have been severely limited. Western observers have, in general, concluded that Soviet computer hardware is a generation or more behind that of the United States. The pace of automation has been considerably slower than in, say, the United States, and is in many ways less sophisticated.

The vast bulk of Soviet literature on cybernetics is concerned with what future accomplishments can be expected, and how they will affect the society. The great hopes pinned on cybernetics are still mainly just that—hopes. For example, although there is a wealth of literature on programmed learning and cybernetics in education, actual implementation appears to be no further along than the laboratory stage.

The experimental nature of Soviet activity is obvious even in economics and governmental planning, where cybernetics is supposed to revolutionize the society. In the Estonian SSR a regional computer center has been joined with a *Sovnarkhoz* (regional economic council), but this is still considered to be a radical experiment.

Cybernetics is indeed the "rage" in the Soviet Union but it is still largely a paper storm. Many Western observers have felt that a large number of articles being published do not involve cybernetics as such; often they seem to deal with automatic data processing or automation in their simplest forms. What, then, accounts for the flood of articles? Two theories are advanced. One, cybernetics provides an approved umbrella under which scientists can conduct research with relative immunity from the party ideologists. Second, cybernetics is so "in" that it is a convenient way to get funds for institutes and programs (a motive not unknown in the Western world).

The significance of cybernetics lies not in its concrete applications but in its freeing of Soviet scientists from the strictures of the dialectical materialists. It permits them the use of a wide variety of analytical and control techniques previously barred by ideological considerations. Yet, despite all the activity and the obvious party support for cybernetics, the philosophical controversy continues.

The orthodox position is untenable in the face of the increasing expansion of cybernetics. The moderate position faces one insurmountable problem—that the constant adjustment of dialectical materialism to new discoveries in science and cybernetics may well mean the slow, almost unnoticed erosion of the philosophy. The "ultras" are secure. So long as they do not deny the basic concepts of dialectical and historical materialism too quickly, they are assured of ultimate victory. Dialectical and historical materialism will either adjust or perish, and even in adjusting may, in effect, expire.[35]

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[35] The reader who is interested in pursuing this topic further is referred to bibliographies prepared by the author and by David D. Comey, appearing in *Studies in Soviet Thought,* June 1964, pp. 142-77. The author also wishes to thank Georgetown University and, in particular, Dr. U. S. Allers for the support and encouragement he has received in pursuing this research.

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The Vicissitudes of Soviet Music

By Boris Schwarz

The history of Soviet music can be fully understood only in terms of its relationship to the Soviet state and the Communist Party. This relationship involves mutual benefits but also bruising conflicts. Worldwide indignation was aroused when composers like Prokofiev or Shostakovich were publicly reprimanded—and the indignation was justified. Underlying all such conflicts, however, is the fact that the state is responsible for creating and maintaining the conditions enabling artists to function; these conditions are based on certain ideological concepts which the state considers inviolable. These concepts are none too clearly defined and are subject to periodic reinterpretation, which explains the recurrent shifts in cultural policies.

Professor of Music at Queens College, City University of New York, Mr. Schwarz visited the Soviet Union in the year 1960 as a Guggenheim Fellow and again in 1962-63 as an exchange scholar under the US-Soviet cultural exchange program. He has written extensively on Soviet music for American and British publications.

One must recognize that in the field of music the accomplishments of the Soviet state are impressive. Musical life has been decentralized and activated in order to reach into remote regions. All musical enterprises, such as opera, ballet, folk ensembles, and orchestras, are state-subsidized and housed in excellent theaters, many of them newly built. Music education is thoroughly organized on all levels: there is a nationwide network of children's music schools, secondary music schools, and conservatories, with separate provisions for especially gifted children. In this way young musicians—composers, performers, teachers, and musicologists—are schooled at government expense in order that they may contribute to the cultural enrichment of the population. The State Publishing House is responsible for scholarly editions of the great Russian composers, from Glinka to Scriabin; and equal attention is given to the contemporary generation. Books on music are published in prodigious numbers, with topics ranging from scholarly research to popular appreciation.

Unavoidably, government patronage on so large a scale entails government planning and

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controls, and in a country where ideology is all-important such controls easily become repressive. Hence the Soviet authorities evolved policies to direct musical creativity, to differentiate between desirable and undesirable music, to supervise musical research and criticism—in short, to subject all musical activities to the scrutiny of ideological censors. A point was reached where such academic subjects as melody and harmony, style and tonality, were regulated by party decree. Cultural commissars—like Lenin's Lunacharski, Stalin's Zhdanov, and Khrushchev's Ilichev—were charged with explaining and enforcing the party decrees. In retrospect, it becomes obvious that these decrees, collectively arrived at, were often the reflection of the personal taste of the top ruler. Thus, Lenin's predilection for classical music prevented a hurried "proletarization" of musical taste. Stalin's reactionary concept of music was largely responsible for the nefarious policies of 1936 and 1948. Khrushchev's provincial taste in the arts was amply demonstrated in his speech of March 8, 1963; and though the "thaw" materialized under his regime, so did the cultural "cold wave" of 1962-63. The present collective leadership rejects the concept of the single leader as supreme arbiter in the arts. For the moment, at least, this promises a more broad-minded approach and has already brought some significant relaxation.

The evolution of Soviet music can be divided into three major phases, each characterized by a party-directed policy. Although there were trends and countertrends within each period, they can be broadly designated as the phases of experimentation (1917-1932), of regimentation (1932-1953), and of liberalization (1963-present).

The Experimental Phase

In the years 1917 to 1932, all of the arts were comparatively free from government interference though full of partisan activity. In the aftermath of the revolution there was a burst of creative experimentation and endless discussion on how best to achieve the cultural and educational goals of the new regime. Lenin urged a cautious approach:

The cultural task cannot be achieved as quickly as political and military aims. In politics one can win . . . in a few weeks. A war can be won in a few months. But to win a cultural victory in such a short time is impossible.[1]

The cultural affairs of the young state were led with a firm yet flexible hand by Anatol Lunacharski, a professional writer who was Soviet commissioner of education from 1917 to 1929. He had a particular affinity for music and wrote extensively on musical subjects.

Within a brief time, opera houses, conservatories, and all other musical institutions were nationalized. Composers were urged to write music for the masses. Musicians were organized into "brigades" to perform in towns and villages, in factories and army camps. They were accompanied by lecturers who explained the meaning of music to the untutored listeners. A ceaseless educational campaign on behalf of music was carried out, and eventually a new mass audience was created to replace the liquidated middle class.

In the mid-1920's, two contrasting trends dominated the Soviet musical scene. One favored modernism, the other proletarian culture. Modernism was represented by the Association for Contemporary Music (ACM) which sponsored concerts, published books and journals, and worked on behalf of modern music, both Western and Russian. On the opposite side were such groups as the Russian Association of Proletarian Musicians (RAPM) and the Productive Collective of Composers (PROKOLL). Their aim was "the hegemony of the proletariat in various fields of the arts."[2] RAPM led the attack against Western modernism and American jazz, as well as against domestic "bourgeois" trends in music.

Russian musical life was weakened by the emigration of many prominent composers, among them Rachmaninov, Prokofiev, Medtner, Gretchaninov, and Glazunov. But a new generation of composers grew up, led by Dmitri Shostakovich (born 1906). His *First Symphony,* written as a graduation piece at the Leningrad Conservatory, received its premiere in 1926 and brought him international acclaim. Topics dealing with revolution and labor became fashionable, exemplified by such works as

[1] Quoted in *Istoria russkoi sovetskoi muzyki,* Moscow, 1956, Vol. I, p. 32.

[2] See Nicolas Slonimsky, *Music Since 1900,* 1st ed., New York, W. W. Norton, 1937, p. 554.

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the ballet *Red Poppy* (1927) by Reinhold Glière, the symphonies *October* and *May Day* (1927, 1929) by Shostakovich, the *Iron Foundry* (1926) by Alexander Mossolov, the *Sixth Symphony* (on revolutionary themes, 1924) by Nikolai Miaskovski, the *Lenin Symphony* (1931) by Vissarion Shebalin. A new departure was a planned effort to use the folk material of the various Soviet peoples as the basis for operas, ballets, and symphonic poems. This was the beginning of the multinational approach that became an important factor in Soviet music. Isolated from the mainstream of these developments was Nikolai Roslavets, a composer who advocated the adoption of Arnold Schoenberg's 12-tone technique.

Soviet musical scholarship was greatly strengthened by the establishment of musicological research institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, the latter under the guidance of Boris Asafiev (also known under the pen-name Igor Glebov). Asafiev became the outstanding musical scholar of his time, was elected to the Academy of Sciences, and died—highly honored—in 1949. The musicological institutes published valuable yearbooks and sponsored research in historical and theoretical musicology. Today, the Leningrad Institute functions under the name Institut Teatra, Muzyki i Kinematografii, while the Moscow institute was reorganized under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences as Institut Istorii Iskusstv.

The path of Soviet music during the first fifteen years was creative despite its many contradictions. In place of the monolithic uniformity imposed in later years, there was freedom of experimentation and an intelligent quest for a new style without destroying tradition.

The Impact of Stalin

The second period of Soviet music, from 1932 to 1953, was dominated by growing regimentation and tightened ideological controls in all spheres of musical life.

In the early 1930's, the modernistic ACM was in a state of disintegration while the proletarian RAPM gained almost dictatorial influence. Cosmopolitan modernism was displaced by growing nationalism coupled with a reawakening pride in the heritage of classical Russian music. Yet the RAPM also aroused the government's suspicion because it "did not understand . . . the guiding role of the Communist Party in the development of Soviet musical culture."[3]

On April 23, 1932, the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued a decree entitled, "On the reconstruction of literary and artistic organizations." All proletarian arts groups (including RAPM) were liquidated; in every field of artistic endeavor, there was to be a single organization "with a Communist faction therein." This clause ensured effective party control over the creative arts.

In accordance with the decree, the Union of Soviet Composers was established in 1932. Set up first in Moscow and Leningrad, it expanded rapidly into a nationwide organization. Composers and musicologists—the latter including scholars, theorists, critics, editors, and authors in the field of music—were all eligible for membership. Though the Composers' Union never achieved numerical strength (in 1958 it had a total of 1277 members in 32 chapters), it was influential because it represented the creative elite of Soviet music. The Union's official journal, *Sovetskaia muzyka,* began publication in 1933 as a bimonthly, with a printing of 3,000. Within a year it became a monthly, and today it has a circulation of 16,000, with each issue consisting of 160 pages.

Outwardly the decree of 1932 was greeted with satisfaction by all musicians, including those who had been most active in the affairs of the discredited ACM and RAPM. (By this time the *volte-face* had become a technique indispensable for survival.) The new aim was, in Asafiev's words, "the growth of political consciousness of the Soviet composer searching persistently for creative solutions."[4]

The "creative solution" was found in "Socialist Realism," a concept formulated at the 1934 All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers. Its original definition, elaborated by Andrei Zhdanov and Maxim Gorki, was aimed primarily at literature. The Composer's Union attempted to translate the new concept into musical terms:

The main attention of the Soviet composer must be directed toward the conquering of progressive principles of reality, toward all that is heroic, bright, and beautiful. This distinguishes the

[3] *Istoria russkoi sovetskoi muzyki,* Vol. I, p. 65.
[4] Quoted in *Sovetskaia muzyka,* No. 3, 1933, pp. 107-108.

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spiritual world of Soviet man and must be embodied in musical images full of beauty and strength. Socialist Realism demands an implacable struggle against folk-negating modernistic directions typical of the decay of contemporary bourgeois art, against subservience and servility toward modern bourgeois culture.[5]

Negative "modernistic directions" soon gained the label of "Formalism." The term was used so loosely that Prokofiev once quipped: "Formalism is music that people don't understand at first hearing."[6] Though ill-defined, Socialist Realism and Formalism became the two opposing principles dominating Soviet music to the present.

The problem of how to evaluate Socialist Realism in music soon aroused bitter dissension. In genres connected with words or action (like opera or ballet) it was feasible—but in *absolute* music, impossible. Stalin took a personal interest in Soviet opera and conceived an outline of its basic attributes. They were (1) a libretto dealing with a socialist topic; (2) a realistic musical language stressing the national idiom; and (3) a new, positive hero typifying the socialist era. Stalin submitted these criteria to a meeting of opera specialists on January 17, 1936. That evening he attended a performance of the opera *Quiet Don* (based on M. Sholokhov's novel) by the young composer Ivan Dzerzhinski, and expressed his satisfaction. A few days later, Stalin saw the opera *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk* by Shostakovich and found it repugnant. Indeed, nothing could be further from Stalin's idyllic concept of opera than Shostakovich's explosive psychological drama, based on a story by the 19th-century writer Nikolai Leskov. In all probability, it was Stalin's negative reaction that prompted *Pravda* to publish a slashing attack on Shostakovich and his opera, under the title *"Muddle instead of Music."*[7] The tirade was all the more unexpected since Lady Macbeth was not a new production: It had first been performed in 1934 and had received critical acclaim not only at home but in Western Europe and America. This only increased *Pravda's* venom:

Lady Macbeth *enjoys fine success with the bourgeois audiences abroad. No doubt the fact that this opera is messy and absolutely devoid of political connotations contributes to its success among the bourgeoisie . . . it tickles the perverted tastes of the bourgeois audiences with its fidgeting, screaming, neurasthenic music.*[8]

A week later, a second article was published, this time directed against Shostakovich's ballet, *The Limpid Brook:* it was branded as "falsehood," and the entire production was criticized for the artificial, unrealistic picturization of a holiday at a collective farm.[9]

Shostakovich, deeply shocked, decided to withdraw his *Fourth Symphony* on the eve of a scheduled premiere in Leningrad; in fact, the symphony was not played until 1961. It speaks for the resilience of the composer that he was able to immerse himself in the writing of his *Fifth Symphony,* his "creative answer," as he called it. The immense success of the new work (first played in November 21, 1937) reestablished Shostakovich in his preeminent position as a leading young composer. However, many Western critics believe that the psychological shock of the 1936 castigation—which was repeated in 1948—warped the entire creative career of this shy and sensitive artist. He seems to have been affected by the constant pressure of having to use an "accessible" musical idiom. Thus, in the opinion of many non-Russian experts, the extraordinary promise of his earlier works remained unfulfilled.

The New Idiom

The *Pravda* attack of 1936 had repercussions far beyond the fate of an individual artist: it warned all Soviet composers of modern orientation that the new cultural policy would be strictly enforced. This was of particular concern to Sergei Prokofiev who, after fifteen years abroad (1918-33), had reestablished himself in

[5] Quoted in "Sotsialisticheskii realizm," *Entsiklopedicheskii musykalni slovar,* ed. V. G. Keldysh, Moscow, 1959, p. 255.

[6] Quoted in Israel V. Nestiev, *Prokofiev,* transl. Florence Jonas, Stanford University Press, 1960, p. 278. Shostakovich said approximately the same in *Pravda,* June 17, 1956.

[7] *Pravda,* Jan. 28, 1936; translated in Slonimsky, *op. cit.* pp. 402-03.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 403.

[9] *Pravda,* Feb. 6, 1936. See Victor Seroff, *Dmitri Shostakovich,* New York, A. Knopf, 1943, pp. 207-208.

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Moscow. During his younger years Prokofiev had belonged to the avant-garde, and many of his works composed abroad were unacceptable in his homeland. After his return, he found the musical adjustment neither quick nor easy. Some of his new works met with complete indifference, others remained unperformed and unpublished. But outweighing the failures were a number of masterpieces which added new luster to Prokofiev's fame. Suffice it to mention the film and orchestral suite, *Lieutenant Kije* (1934); the ballet, *Romeo and Juliet* (1935-36); the children's tale, *Peter and the Wolf* (1936); the film and cantata, *Alexander Nevsky* (1939); the opera, *Semion Kotko* (1939). There is greater warmth and expressiveness in Prokofiev's musical idiom of the 1930's—undoubtedly the effect of his confrontation with a new audience. He realized that "in the Soviet Union music is addressed to millions of people who formerly had little or no contact with music." [10] At first he seriously believed that these new millions needed a special approach—a type of " 'light-serious' music, primarily melodious, written in clear, yet original terms." [11] But within a few years he changed his position and became convinced that the new audience needed no condescension: "The masses want great music . . . they understand far more than some composers think. . . . I consider it a mistake to strive for simplification. . . ." [12]

While Prokofiev and his generation encountered problems in adjusting to Soviet reality, younger composers spoke with ease in the "new" idiom, a mixture of Russian traditionalism, Soviet topicality, and a strong infusion of folk material. Among the composers who made their mark during the 1930's were Aram Khachaturian, Dmitri Kabalevski, and Tikhon Khrennikov who—together with Shostakovich—today represent the established older generation of composers.

Shortly before the outbreak of war, a foreboding of the coming struggle inspired several patriotic works extolling, in historical perspectives, the defense of the Russian motherland. The film *Alexander Nevsky* (1939) directed by Sergei Eisenstein, depicting the defeat of the Teutonic knights in 1242, had a stirring score by Prokofiev which the composer arranged as a cantata. In 1939, Yuri Shaporin presented his symphony-cantata, *On the field of Kulikovo*, commemorating the battle with the Mongols in 1380.

Throughout World War II (1941-45) musical life in the Soviet Union continued with remarkable vigor. Much of the music composed during the war years served patriotic aims. But there were also some large-scale compositions that reflected the titanic struggle: Shostakovich's famed *Seventh Symphony*, the so-called "Leningrad" (1941-42); Prokofiev's *Fifth Symphony* (1944-45); and Shaporin's oratorio, *Saga of the Battle for the Russian Earth* (1943-44). Also written during the war was Prokofiev's epic opera, *War and Peace*, based on Tolstoi's masterpiece.

The victory in 1945 was commemorated by music of various types, none of which captured the exultant mood of the Soviet people. Glière wrote a shallow *Victory* overture, Shostakovich presented his light-hearted *Ninth Symphony*, which many found disappointing. Prokofiev puzzled his public with an *Ode to the End of the War* in an abstruse orchestration for band, double basses, four pianos, and eight harps.

Zhdanovism Triumphant

The end of the war also brought a revival of ideological disputes. There was official displeasure with the state of the arts. The party dogmatists, once again led by Andrei Zhdanov, decided to reaffirm their control over cultural matters. In the fall of 1964, literature, theater, and films were subjected to public criticism by party resolutions; in the summer of 1947, Zhdanov attacked the state of philosophy. In 1948, Soviet music received a stunning blow.

It began with a three-day conference in January at which leading musicians met with the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The first item on the agenda was a discussion of the opera *Great Friendship* by the Georgian, Vano Muradeli, which had aroused official displeasure at a closed performance in December 1947. Zhdanov dominated the conference and wasted no time in pointing out in his opening remarks that the failure of Muradeli was comparable to that of Shostakovich in 1936. In the

[10] "The Path of Soviet Music", *Izvestia*, Nov. 16, 1934. Reprinted in S. Prokofiev, *Autobiography, Articles, Reminiscences*, Moscow, Foreign Language Publishing House, n. d., pp. 99.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 106. (From "Notebooks," 1937).

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The Composer as a Constable

The historic task of Soviet composers, as Comrade Zhdanov has said, consists not only in carefully guarding Soviet music from baneful Western influences, but also in taking the offensive against decadent bourgeois art, raising high the banner of Soviet music—the art of profoundly progressive ideas and genuine humanism. The Central Committee of the party, by conducting a three-day conference on questions of music and by the resolution of February 10 [1948], has given extraordinary attention and aid to the cause of the development of Soviet musical art and to us—Soviet composers. It is our duty to conserve the vital force of these historic documents for years to come, making them our militant creative program.

—T. N. Khrennikov, General Secretary of the USSR Composers' Union, Sovetskaia muzyka, Moscow, No. 1, 1948.

At the meeting between party and government leaders and representatives of the Soviet artistic intelligentsia, as well as in N. S. Khrushchev's speech, a number of critical remarks were addressed to Soviet musicians, and specifically to our young composers.

In my speech at the meeting I admitted the justice of the critical remarks addressed to us. One of the reasons for the shortcomings in our work is, I think, that a kind of liberalist spirit has unfortunately appeared in our composers' organization in recent years. We have not always evaluated events in our musical life or new compositions correctly, as they deserved to be evaluated. We did not always speak the truth directly to the composers of these works. Some people were afraid to speak the bitter truth. . . . This liberalist spirit kept us from waging a real struggle against the negative phenomena that were the target of criticism from party and government leaders.

—T. N. Khrennikov, First Secretary of the Board of the USSR Composers' Union, Pravda, March 27, 1963.

course of the discussion, however, the entire state of Soviet music was subjected to critical scrutiny, geared to Zhdanov's ominous declarations:

The people do not need music they cannot understand. The composers have themselves and not the people to blame.[13]

On February 10, 1948, the Central Committee published a resolution, "On the opera *Great Friendship,* by V. Muradeli." After criticizing the opera for being "confused and disharmonious," it stated that Muradeli's failure "is not an isolated case . . . but closely linked with the unsatisfactory state of contemporary Soviet music." Among those accused of "formalistic perversions and anti-democratic tendencies" were Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Khachaturian, Shebalin, Miaskovsky, and Popov. (It should be noted that Kabalevsky escaped censure, though his name was mentioned at the January conference). The guilt of the composers named consisted in "the cult of atonality, dissonance, and disharmony" and in "infatuation with confused, neurotic sonorities, transforming music into cacophony. . . ." The decree also censured the conservatories, "where the formalistic trend is dominant"; musical criticism, which was "utterly intolerable"; and the Composers' Union, which had failed to develop the "realistic tendency in Soviet music." [14]

This sweeping indictment stunned the musical world, both in the Soviet Union and abroad. The Composers' Union issued an immediate call for a national conference to convene in April 1948. In the meantime, hurried meetings were held by all chapters to discuss and endorse the party resolution. The transcripts of some of these meetings were later published, and they are saddening.[15] The discussions revealed either complete submission or open vindictiveness. Barely a voice was raised to defend the great composers who had "erred," and mediocre musicians had a fine time venting their petty grievances.

[13] Andrei Zhdanov, *Essays on Literature, Philosophy, and Music,* New York, International Publishers Co., 1950, p. 92. (Zhdanov's complete speech at the January 1948 conference is reprinted on pp. 76-96.)

[14] *Sovetskaia muzyka,* No. 1, 1948, pp. 3-8.

[15] Alexander Werth, *Musical Uproar in Moscow,* London, Turnstile Press, 1949, pp. 48-86.

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The April Congress produced more of the same. Particularly disappointing was the address delivered in the name of the veteran scholar, Asafiev, who was too ill to attend in person. (It has since been learned that Asafiev's speech, so much in contradiction with his previously held opinions, was "prepared collectively, with the assistance of other Soviet musicians."[16] Emerging as the new strong man of the Composers' Union was Tikhon Khrennikov, 35, who was elected first secretary—a post he still holds today. Knowing that he was under consideration for the job, he did Zhdanov's bidding at the Congress by denouncing every modern composer, Western and Russian.

For several years following the "purge" of 1948, Soviet music was virtually paralyzed, and its international prestige sank to an unprecedented low. The bolder spirits among composers and critics were silenced; other switched closer to the party line. Prokofiev tried to explain his position in writing,[17] but none of his concessions could forestall the rude rejection of his last opera, *The Story of a Real Man.* Nor did he live to see the complete staging of *War and Peace* or his ballet *The Stone Flower,* both deliberately delayed. Shostakovich spoke and acted like a man "crushed and beaten," and his final statement has been called a "pathetic human document."[18] Shebalin lost his position as director of the Moscow Conservatory, Muradeli recanted, Popov slipped into oblivion. Scholars avoided any discussion of contemporary music and chose "safe" classical topics instead. Critics engaged in the popular pastime of blasting modern Western composers and the American musical scene.[19]

As one mitigating factor in this bleak picture, there was no overt policy to ostracize the accused composers, though they were forced to make certain concessions to regain official favor. In April 1952, Prokofiev was granted a special pension because of his precarious health, and one of his last joys was the brilliant premiere of his *Seventh Symphony* in October of that year.

The Post-Stalin Era

By an historic coincidence, Stalin and Prokofiev died on the same day—March 5, 1953. Moscow was so stunned by the death of the dictator that the death of the composer remained unreported to the outside world for several days. Stalin's demise brought some relief from immediate pressures, and an almost imperceptible relaxation set in. During the summer of 1953, Shostakovich composed the *Tenth Symphony*—his first symphony in eight years and a work of major significance. It produced heated discussions and even cries that he was reverting to "formalism." In the same year, Khachaturian published an article, "Originality and Inspiration in Music," pleading against bureaucratic tutelage over the composer. It aroused much attention at home and abroad, and the *New York Times* went so far as to call it an "indictment against Soviet policy affecting music, as it was laid down . . . in 1948."[20] In 1955 Shostakovich released two major compositions—the *Violin Concerto* and the song cycle, *From Jewish Folk Poetry*—that he had withheld since 1948. But not until the 20th Party Congress in 1956 was official sanction given to the liberation of Soviet cultural life from the "cult of personality."

Taking a clue from the party congress, the Composers' Union called a national meeting, the Second All-Union Congress of Composers, which convened in Moscow from March 28 to April 3, 1957—a lapse of nine years since the portentous First Congress of 1948. Khrennikov, who was reelected as first secretary, spoke with greater moderation than ever in the past. More important was a major address by Dmitri Shepilov, the new foreign minister (replacing Molotov) and former editor-in-chief of *Pravda.* Shepilov's speech to the composers, while firm in ideology, contained allusions to Lenin's flexible approach to the arts and foreshadowed an improvement in the relationship between the party and the musical intelligentsia.[21]

This portent became a reality when the Com-

[16] Elena Orlova, *B. V. Asafiev,* Moscow, 1964, p. 392. See also Werth, *op. cit.,* pp. 96-98. Asafiev's complete speech in *Sovetskaia muzyka,* 1948, No. 2, pp. 12-22.

[17] See Werth, *op. cit.,* pp. 94-96. Also Slonimsky, *op. cit.,* 3rd ed. 1949, pp. 625 and 706.

[18] Werth, *op. cit.* p. 40.

[19] *E.g.,* I. Nestiev, "Dollar Cacophony," *Izvestia,* Jan. 7, 1951.

[20] *New York Times,* Dec. 17, 1953 (see also Dec. 20). Khachaturian's article appeared in *Sovetskaia muzyka,* No. 11, 1953; his answer to foreign critics (particularly Mr. Taubman) in *ibid.,* No. 4, 1954.

[21] *Pravda,* April 4, 1957. English translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York), May 8, 1957, p. 15.

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munist Party made one of its rare gestures of reconciliation. On May 28, 1958, the Central Committee admitted "blatant errors" in the aforementioned decree of 1948 and published a resolution entitled, "On rectifying errors in the evaluation of the operas *Great Friendship, Bogdan Khmelnitsky,* and *With All One's Heart*" (respectively by Vano Muradeli, Konstantin Dankevich, and Herman Zhukovski). The resolution stated that the criticisms of the operas in 1948 and 1951 for shortcomings in music and libretti had been "incorrect and one-sided." It then went on to admit other injustices.

Gifted composers, Comrades Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Khachaturian, Shebalin, G. Popov, Miaskovski and others, whose works at times revealed the wrong tendencies, were indiscriminately denounced as the representatives of a formalist, anti-people trend. . . .

There followed a curious explanation of the errors:

Some incorrect evaluations in the decree reflected J. V. Stalin's subjective attitude to certain works of art. . . . As we know, a very adverse influence was exercised on Stalin in these matters by Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria. . . .

The omission of Zhdanov from this list of scapegoats is inexplicable, for he was the true villain of the 1948 purge.

While the 1958 resolution acknowledged the excesses of the past, it stopped far short of nullifying the decree of 1948. On the contrary, care was taken to point out that the 1948 decisions "had played, on the whole, a positive role in the subsequent development of Soviet music." There was renewed emphasis on the "inviolability of the fundamental principles expressed in party decrees on ideological questions."

Despite these reservations, the decree of 1958 was received with immense satisfaction by Soviet musicians. It sealed the end of "Zhdanovism" and the "cult of personality"; it rehabilitated the leading composers (two of whom, Prokofiev and Miaskovski had died in the meantime); it improved the international prestige of Soviet music, which had been impaired by the events of 1948; and it opened an era of new cordiality between party officials and composers. In the latter respect, a rapprochement had already been evident at a reception "in honor of the Soviet intelligentsia" held at the Kremlin on February 8, 1958. Here, Khrushchev urged the creative artists in all fields to display "greater daring in their quests, more attention to life and people. . . ." In reply, Shostakovich praised "all the material care extended by party and government to the Soviet composer" and "the constant, paternal, attentive, and thoughtful guidance of our music."[22] Everyone was so sweet and reasonable that the year 1956 seemed at the time like the dawn of a new millenium in the arts.

Reaction: Pianissimo

It soon became apparent, however, that Khrushchev's concept of "greater daring" did not necessarily match that of the artists he addressed. Nor were the artists unanimous as to how to express such daring. Bold leadership was lacking in the Composers' Union, whose course was charted by the same middle-aged, recognized composers of conservative orientation who had long held sway. Their works seemed to prove that Socialist Realism was viable and successful, so why change? Suffice it to mention the operas *The Mother* (1957), by Khrennikov; *The Decembrists* (1953), by Shaporin; *Nikita Vershinin* (1954), by Kabalevski; *The Taming of the Shrew* (1955), by Shebalin; the ballet *Spartacus* (1956), by Khachaturian; the *Oratorio Pathetique* (1959), by Sviridov. Even Shostakovich proved that he could be as realistic as anyone else; his symphonies Nos. 11 and 12 are programmatic, the 11th describing the revolutionary year 1905, the 12th dedicated to the Revolution of 1917. Shostakovich's position remained somewhat ambiguous: as one who had suffered most keenly under official repression, he was among the first to speak out for greater creative freedom;[23] yet he qualified this freedom by numerous statements against dodecaphony and avant-gardism.[24] His views were shared by Kabalevski, Khachaturian, and

[22] *Pravda,* Feb. 9, 1958. Translation in *Current Digest,* March 19, 1958. A similar meeting took place in 1957: see *Current Digest,* Oct. 9, 1957, pp. 3-10.

[23] *Pravda,* June 17, 1956.

[24] *Sovetskaia muzyka,* No. 11, 1959. Summaries in Alexander Werth, *Russia under Khrushchev,* New York, Hill & Wang, 1962 (Crest paperback), pp. 267-70; and *The Guardian* (London and Manchester), Jan. 14, 1960.

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Dmitri Shostakovitch and the Price of Creativity

As far back as 1936, in connection with the appearance of Dmitri Shostakovich's opera *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk, Pravda*, the organ of the Central Committee of the party, subjected to sharp criticism the anti-popular formalistic perversions in his music and exposed the harm and danger of this tendency for the future of Soviet music. . .

The music [of Shostakovitch and others] reeks strongly of the odor of the contemporary, modernistic, bourgeois music of Europe and America which reflects the decay of bourgeois culture, the total negation, the impasse of musical art.

—From the resolution of the CC of the CPSU, "On the Opera Velikaia druzhba *by V. Muradeli," Feb. 10, 1948.*

When in 1936 *Pravda* . . . severely condemned my opera, *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk*, and pointed to my serious errors, my formalism, I felt deeply my creative failure. . . . [Yet] again I swerved to the side of formalism and began to speak in a language incomprehensible to the people.

When today the party and our entire country . . . criticize this direction of my work, I know that the party is right and I know that the party is showing concern for Soviet art and for me, a Soviet composer.

—From Shostakovich's speech at a conference of Soviet composers, Feb. 1948.

Yesterday the Stanislavski and Nemirovich-Danchenko Music Theater gave the first performance of D. Shostakovich's opera "Katerina Izmailova." Created more than 30 years ago and based on N. Leskov's "Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk District," it was first given in January 1934. The opera was unjustifiably vilified in the years of the cult of the individual and was forgotten.

—Pravda, January 9, 1963.

. . . The ideological sense of [Shostakovich's] 13th Symphony contains substantial defects. The social command has remained unfulfilled. The sense of timeliness always characteristic of D. Shostakovich, the sense of high responsibility in the face of the tasks that are now being met in our country, betrayed the composer. . . . It is hard to write this, but D. Shostakovich has not understood *what society needs*, what objectively will serve Soviet people, inspiring them in the struggle for communism, and what would become a kind of hindrance, an ideological obstacle, a means of exciting undesirable passions.

—From "Listening to the 13th Symphony," by Ariadna Ladygina, Sovetskaia Belorussia, April 2, 1963.

It was my good fortune to be a participant in the Kremlin meeting, and it gave me great joy. I think that even those who were criticized were aware of the fatherly concern of the party. The criticism was exceptionally benevolent. It is helping all of us to find the necessary direction in creativity. . .

—D. Shostakovich as quoted in Pravda, March 23, 1963.

MOSCOW, Sept. 20—A great ovation . . . greeted the first [since 1963] public performance of Dmitri Shostakovich's Thirteenth Symphony. . . .

Only a few posters—and the grapevine—carried the word that Khrushchev's successors had authorized it again in the "corrected" version. . .

—The Washington Post, Sept. 21, 1965.

Perhaps [Shostakovich] really is quite content that the party retrieved him from the evils of formalism, as a stern master that is able to reward and forgive. All the same, however honestly he now believes in the principles of the party—and there is no reason why he should lay bare his soul to a foreign journalist—there must have been years of fear, depression, and dissimulation, before he adapted himself to the party line. . . . One thing appears to be quite certain: in the paradise that is administered by Tikhon Khrennikov, Shostakovich has gained no happiness that would have been denied him elsewhere. He enjoys no material advantages which would have been denied him in another society, but instead he has made changes in his life as an artist which have involved a renunciation of his artistic integrity and all of which must have left a scar.

—From "Composers' Dilemma," by Gerd Ruge, Survey (London), No. 37, 1961, p. 48.

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Khrennikov, who were influential not only as composers but as teachers of the younger generation. They made it perfectly clear that Western-style experiments would not be tolerated. Until recently, young musicians accepted this tutelage without obvious rebellion. "With us musicians, there is absolutely no reason for the generations to oppose each other," declared Rodion Shchedrin, a leader among younger composers, in 1963.[25] Only a very few dared defy the established taboos by producing some works in the 12-tone idiom and they were duly ostracized.

Viewed in large, the Soviet musical scene during the years of the so-called "thaw" offered a strange paradox. The composers seemed unwilling or unable to take full advantage of the official liberalization; the rest of the musical community—performers, critics, theorists, and, above all, audiences—were eager to reach out for wider horizons. Cultural exchanges played an important role. Foreign visitors—orchestras, choruses, chamber groups, individual virtuosos—brought an unfamiliar repertoire to the attention of Soviet audiences, including entirely new works or music not heard since pre-Stalin days. Famous names reappeared—Hindemith, Bartok, Stravinsky, Honegger, Orff and others; new names were added, among them Benjamin Britten, Aaron Copland, and Samuel Barber. Even Alban Berg's *Wozzeck* was studied at the Leningrad Conservatory. As a rule, however, Schoenberg and his 12-tone school remained excluded from public performances, as were extreme modernists like Boulez and Stockhausen. Nevertheless their works were known to the members of the Composers' Union through regular recorded sessions, and their scores were available for study purposes.

An interesting side effect of this exploratory trend was the rehabilitation of works by Russian composers previously judged unacceptable. Prokofiev emerged as a "modern classic": not only were works of his foreign period (1918-32) revived with success (for example, the *Second Symphony*), but later compositions were rehabilitated, among them his last opera, *The Story of a Real Man,* staged at the Bolshoi in 1960. Shostakovich saw the resurrection of *Lady Macbeth,* his opera which had caused such fury in 1936; revised and renamed (*Katerina Ismailova*), it was given in Moscow in December 1962. The ovation at the premiere, which the present writer attended, not only honored a great composer but vindicated an historic injustice.

No less dramatic was the visit to Russia of 80-year-old Igor Stravinsky in the fall of 1962, after an absence of 50 years. It was a reconciliation on a grand scale. "No artist's name has been more abused in the Soviet Union than mine," he said, "but one cannot achieve the future [that] we must achieve with the Russians by nursing a grudge."[26] Despite outward cordiality, some grudges remained on both sides: the Soviets remained opposed to Stravinsky's late dodecaphonic works, none of which was played on his programs, and Stravinsky remained skeptical toward recent Soviet compositions. "That was the real Iron Curtain," he remarked to his associate, Robert Craft, after having listened to a representative program of Soviet music.[27]

The Moscow season of 1962, which had opened in September with Stravinsky's concerts, developed on a cosmopolitan scale: Yehudi Menuhin, the New York City Ballet, and the Robert Shaw Chorale arrived as American representatives. Delegations of composers from France, England, and Yugoslavia presented their works. A ten-day festival of music by young Soviet composers offered several programs of premieres each day. Three opera theaters gave alternating performances of opera and ballet. Orchestral concerts were given several times a week by the three permanent Moscow orchestras. Chamber music and recitals filled two halls almost nightly. In addition, there were scholarly conferences, each covering several days, on such topics as "Jazz and Light Music," "Modern Harmony," "Tradition and Innovation in the Arts." The latter was particularly interesting since the "liberal" forces appeared to dominate the proceedings. The month of November also brought the retrospective exhibition of painting and sculpture at the Manezh Gallery, "Thirty Years of Moscow Art," and the

[25] *Sovetskaia muzyka,* No. 6, 1963, p. 10.

[26] *Newsweek,* May 21, 1962. See also Boris Schwarz, "Stravinsky in Soviet Russian Criticism," *The Musical Quarterly,* July 1962, pp. 340-61. Reprinted in *Stravinsky: A New Appraisal of His Work,* ed. P. H. Lang, New York, Norton, 1963.

[27] Robert Craft, "Stravinsky's Return: A Russian diary," *Encounter* (London), June 1963, p. 44. Reprinted in I. Stravinsky and R. Craft, *Dialogues and a Diary,* Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1963.

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first publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's famed novella, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.*

The Party: Fortissimo

No one foresaw a change in the cultural climate, and yet a change came—and rather suddenly. Early in December Khrushchev saw the Manezh exhibit, including a special section of abstract art not open to the general public. His crude remark about the abstractions having been "smeared by a donkey's tale" became a matter of record.[28] Leading personalities in the arts were summoned to attend two meetings, the first (on December 17) with government officials, including Khrushchev, the second (on December 26) with the party's ideological commission. The chairman of the commission, Leonid Ilichev, delivered two major speeches harshly attacking cultural trends. He also declared: "There never was, and never will be, any peaceful coexistence between socialist ideology and bourgeois ideology."[29] So deep was the concern of intellectuals over the renewed portents of repression that several collective letters were written to Khrushchev, but after some behind-the-scenes persuasion the letters were withdrawn.

The brunt of the attack was directed against writers and artists. Ilichev made only two brief references to music, expressing objections to the "wild howls" of jazz and the "senseless deformity" of dodecaphony. To bolster his criticism, Ilichev quoted Stravinsky, who allegedly had ridiculed the Leningrad *avant-garde* composers as "pitiful untalented imitators." (No such statement can be found in Robert Craft's diary of Stravinsky's Russian trip.)

Trapped in the cultural muddle was Shostakovich, once again the victim of bureaucratic myopia. His *Thirteenth Symphony* had to be withdrawn under official pressure after a triumphal first performance on December 18, 1962. Having heard the concert, the writer can attest to the fact that the score, one of Shostakovich's best, is not "formalistic." Apparently, the controversy arose over the texts used in the symphony, which is actually a symphonic cantata. Shostakovich selected five poems by Yevtushenko, which he set for baritone solo, male chorus, and orchestra. The poems do not form a "cycle" but are somewhat related to each other by their oblique criticism of the Stalinist past. The first movement, based on Yevtushenko's famous *Babii Yar* (an outcry against antisemitism), in particular aroused official dissatisfaction. Yevtushenko was forced to make changes, and Shostakovich adjusted the score. Nevertheless, after a few additional performances in February and March 1963, the *Thirteenth Symphony* was shelved indefinitely. No foreign performance has as yet been authorized, and no printed score is available.[30] (As this issue went to press, however, a dispatch from Moscow reported that the symphony had been played again in public, with Shostakovich and Yevtushenko present—Ed.)

The cultural malaise simmered on until Khrushchev spoke the final word. On March 8, 1963, he delivered a major speech before the party Presidium and Soviet intellectuals: it seemed to signify the end of all "liberalization" in the arts. What little he said about music was homespun and blunt: "We are for melodious music with content . . . we are against cacophony." Khrushchev disclaimed any intention to make his personal taste "some kind of standard for everybody." "But we can't humor those who palm off cacophonous sounds as genuine music. . . ." He described dodecaphony as "the music of noises," adding: "Apparently it means the same as the word 'cacophony'. . . . Our people can't use this rubbish as a tool of their ideology." Jazz, too, gave him a "feeling of nausea."[31]

If Khrushchev expected massive obedience in response to his homily, he must have been disappointed. Soviet intellectuals proved recalcitrant, and foreign Communist leaders (notably Togliatti) rallied to their support. After a four-day plenum in June 1963, it became apparent that the campaign of intimidation had failed; no new measures of cultural constraint were enacted.

However, after a summer of comparative calm, Khrennikov—still the "boss" of music—

[28] *New York Times,* Dec. 4, 1962.
[29] *Pravda,* Dec. 22 and 26, 1962.

[30] See Boris Schwarz, "Soviet Music since Stalin," *Saturday Review* (New York), March 30, 1963, pp. 55-56. Also Leroy Wolins, "Shostakovich and Babii Yar," *Jewish Currents,* September 1964, pp. 20-24.
[31] Khrushchev's 15,000 word speech is reprinted in English, with comments, by *Encounter* (London), Pamphlet No. 9, 1963. Given quotations are on pp. 29-30.

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decided to revive the controversy at the Composers' plenary meeting on October 17 and 18, 1963. The vehemence of his attack led at least one observer to conclude that in the musical field, "Communist ideological strictures against Western-oriented intellectuals were [being] renewed on a broad scale." [32] Once again Khrennikov uttered dire warnings to potential adherents of *avant-gardism* among Soviet composers, especially those who showed "heightened interest in the 12-tone gimmicks." [33]

The concern of the leaders of the Composers' Union was, from their viewpoint, justified. Khrennikov had to admit that "influences of *avant-garde* music had wormed their way into some socialist countries, even becoming widespread there." [34] Obviously he referred to Poland, where composers have been given complete freedom and have proved that communism and modernism are not incompatible. The Warsaw Autumn Festival has become a stronghold of the *avant-garde,* where attending Soviet composers have felt utterly out of place—except for a young rebel like Andrei Volkonski, who was feted in Warsaw while banned at home. This has merely served to emphasize the growing international isolation of Soviet music. True, Shostakovich, Kabalevski, and Khachaturian have enjoyed a certain fame in the West, but their late works have met with increased criticism; even the survey of Shostakovich's life work at the 1962 Edinburgh Festival was at best a divided success. Furthermore, these composers are in their sixties while the younger generation of Soviet composers is virtually unknown abroad. Through cultural exchanges new Soviet compositions have been presented in the West, but the critical reaction has proved that Soviet music in the Socialist Realist idiom is not easily exportable. After a visit to Russia in 1963, the British critic Colin Mason felt confirmed in his opinion that "in all the Soviet Union not a single interesting composer has emerged since 1930." [35] He advised Soviet composers "to turn from Socialist Realism to artistic realities. . . . Music is made not with ideas but with notes." [36] Equally negative was Robert Craft—and, apparently, Stravinsky.[37]

Such Western criticisms have been received in Moscow with the utmost irritability, for they contradict the exaggerated reports of success spread by Soviet composers returning from abroad. Foreign critics doubting Moscow's cultural wisdom have been accused of political opportunism and musical ignorance. Typical of such attacks was an article by I. Nestiev, "From the position of the Cold War," in which the author denounced leading music critics in England, France, Germany, and the United States as "iron curtain" politicians because they had expressed honest critical opinions about the state of Soviet music.[38]

Khrennikov's efforts to impose a new crackdown were largely fruitless. By 1964, it became apparent that the Soviet party leaders, under the pressure of political considerations, were willing to make concessions to the intelligentsia in order to win internal and external support. At meetings on May 15 and 16, 1964, Ilichev promised—as the *New York Times* put it—"to be more liberal towards the arts and literature in return for support . . . in the ideological struggle with the Chinese." [39] In music, there were demands by youth groups for more light music and jazz, and Shostakovich spoke up in support. Khrennikov's stand on this question was opposed by many, and in fact was roundly denounced by the Communist youth paper, *Komosomolskaia pravda.*[40]

The forced retirement of Khrushchev in October 1964 brought no immediate change in cultural policy. Reports reaching the outside world indicated that—as in other areas—there was serious disagreement in the top echelons of the party as to the course to be pursued with regard to Russia's artists and intellectuals. On

[32] *New York Times,* Nov. 14, 1963.
[33] "USSR Union of Composers," *Information Bulletin* (Moscow), No. 2, 1963. p. 11. Russian text of Khrennikov's speech in *Sovetskaia muzyka,* No. 1, 1964.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] Colin Mason, "Russia's Young Conservatives," *The Guardian,* March 21, 1963.
[36] C. Mason, "Anti-music in Russia," *The Guardian,* March 30, 1963.
[37] Craft, *op. cit.,* p. 44.
[38] Nestiev, *Sovetskaia muzyka,* No. 10, 1963, pp. 125-30.
[39] *New York Times,* May 24, 1964.
[40] *Komsomolskaia pravda,* June 4, 1964, as quoted in *New York Times,* June 5.

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February 21, 1965, the long awaited authoritative statement on the cultural policies of the new political leaders was released. Its title was "The Party and the Intelligentsia"; its author, the newly-appointed editor-in-chief of *Pravda*, Alexei Rumiantsev (since then replaced by Mikhail Zimianin). He assailed the "anti-intellectualism of the Khrushchev era" and offered a new criterion for evaluating the arts: The "all-around free development of the personality of every member of society." Progress required "the existence of different schools and trends, different styles and genres competing with one another. While he qualified his endorsement of freedom of choice by reaffirming the principle of Socialist Realism, he offered assurances that the application of this principle was not to be governed by the personal esthetic judgments of party officials, nor by a "single leader, confident in his own outlook." (The latter could apply to either Stalin or Khrushchev.) On the whole, Rumiantsev's statement revealed a considerable change of attitude.[41]

From then on, events moved fast. On March 23, Ilichev, the ideological expert, was transferred to the Foreign Ministry. Shortly thereafter, the ideological commission of the Communist Party's Central Committee, which had been formed during Khrushchev's reign, was dissolved.

On May 24, the Moscow correspondent of the *New York Times* cabled a report that opened with the startling paragraph, "The musical world here has been stirred by the official approval given to two musical forms denounced by N. S. Khrushchev—12-tone music and jazz." The correspondent—obviously not a music expert—based his report on articles in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. His interpretation, however, seems overly optimistic; having examined these articles and other evidence, the writer detects, at best, a greater tolerance toward new musical techniques, not a drastic reversal of position.

Current Trends

Nevertheless, the temperate stance of the new leadership and the abolition of the odious ideological commission have released creative energies in Soviet music that had been dammed up for years. The speed of breakthroughs has indeed been surprising. What are these developments and what do they portend?

In the field of jazz, the Russians are now trying to develop a "new Soviet jazz style." Contrary to popular belief, jazz was never "banned" in the Soviet Union (there were famous Russian jazz bands in 1930); the objections were directed against American-style jazz. In an article in May 1965 entitled "Jazz at the Crossroads," a Soviet jazz expert, A. Medvedev by name, conceded that jazz had come to Russia "from the West," though he omitted mention of its Negro-American origin. Reviewing a three-day jazz competition that had just taken place in Leningrad, he noted that the majority of the performers were non-professional musicians, which stamps Soviet jazz as an avocational pastime. It is no wonder that he found "dilettantism and poor taste, weak imitations of the jazz 'fashions.'" Yet his final judgment is positive: Soviet jazz is on the rise.[42] It is noteworthy that "serious" Soviet composers like A. Eshpai, A. Babajanian, O. Gordeli, and many others are engaged in writing for jazz. In fact, Shostakovich composed two suites for jazz as far back as the 1930's.

More significant for the future evolution of Soviet music are the intensified experiments with 12-tone technique (also called dodecaphony or serialism). This technique is not "new": its beginnings reach back to 1910. As developed by the Viennese school of Arnold Schoenberg and his disciple, Anton von Webern, serialism has become an established musical practice in modern Western music, an almost "classical" device. This development has bypassed Russia, isolated from the mainstream of Western music since the early 1930's. As early as 1934, Prokofiev predicted that "the danger of becoming provincial is a very real one for Soviet composers."[43] The danger became a reality after the Stalinist attacks of 1936 and 1948. These barbarous interferences in the creative processes caused incalculable damage to Soviet music "in terms of warped individualities, wasted talent, and frustrated genius."[44] There is a "lost generation" of Soviet composers, performers, and listeners—whose formative years fell approxi-

[41] *Pravda*, Feb. 21, 1965.

[42] "Dzhaz na povorote," *Nedeliia* (*Izvestia*), May 16-22, 1965.

[43] Prokofiev, *Autobiography* . . ., p. 99.

[44] R. Craft, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

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Half a Loaf . . .

EDITORS' NOTE: It is a significant fact that the Soviet party authorities, while admitting that injustices and excesses were committed against Soviet writers, artists and composers under the notorious Zhdanov cultural decrees of 1946-48, still refuse even today to repudiate those decrees unequivocally, maintaining that "as a whole" they served a beneficial purpose. This ambivalence is again manifest in the following excerpts from a recently published history of the Georgian Communist Party:

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party adopted a number of important decrees on ideological questions in 1946 the decrees "On the Journals *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*," "On the Repertory of Drama Theaters and Measures to Improve It," and "On the Film 'The Great Life'," and in 1948 the decree "On the Opera 'Great Friendship' by V. Muradeli."

The shortcomings noted in these decrees were to a certain degree also characteristic of the literature and art of Georgia. . . . Some Georgian composers, following falsely understood "innovation," created works which separated art from the people and turned it into something for a narrow circle of esthetic gourmands. . . .

The Central Committee's decrees . . . as a whole facilitated raising the demandingness toward artistic workers and implacability toward ideological shortcomings. However, Stalin's subjective approach to certain works of writers, composers, and other artistic figures led to one-sided and tendentious evaluations. . . .

Similar shortcomings characterized the decrees of the Georgian Central Committee on the work of creative organizations. Thus, for example, the 13 March 1948 decree . . . "On the Work of the Union of Soviet Composers of Georgia," while correctly pointing out that some works of Georgian composers had a formalistic character and did not meet the spiritual needs of the people, also subjected a number of good musical works of leading composers of Georgia to undeserved criticism.

mately between the years 1936 and 1956, and who find it difficult to acclimatize their musical taste to the modern idiom.

Today's young Soviet composers, on the other hand, are attempting to bridge the gap in a hurry, but it cannot be done overnight. Thus their present experiments with serialism, based on outdated books and models, are illustrative of the difficulties involved in assimilating an idiom that was imported from abroad, an idiom lacking in indigenous roots. At the time of Stravinsky's visit (September-October 1962), there was already a small nucleus of young Soviet composers experimenting with serialism in defiance of official strictures. These groups centered in Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, and Tallinn, working virtually "underground." Some of their scores were sent abroad with the request that, in case of performance, the composer remain anonymous. One such composition, a 12-tone *Suite for Piano* was played in New York on March 13, 1964, at a concert of the International Society for Contemporary Music—and the composer remained unnamed.[45]

Best known among the young Russian "rebels" is Andrei Volkonski. Born in 1933 in Geneva, son of Russian émigrés, he attended the Paris Conservatoire in 1944-47. A few years later he enrolled at the Moscow Conservatory as a composition student of Shaporin who, despite his own conservative leanings, had high regard for Volkonski's talent. Expelled from the Moscow Conservatory for "infraction of rules" (more probably because he was a rebellious student), Volkonski published a *Piano Quintet* dedicated to his old teacher, Shaporin. The work aroused a heated controversy in *Sovetskaia muzyka* (1956) because of its alleged modernism. In his later compositions Volkonski showed increasing tendencies toward serialism, and he was singled out as a "misguided" talent by Ilichev, Shchedrin and others. His works remained unperformed in the Soviet Union for some five years, but a recent premiere in Leningrad marks his re-emergence as an important young composer. The work performed was *The Laments*

[45] See review by Eric Salzman, "Smuggled Avant-Garde-Music the Soviet Bars," *New York Herald Tribune*, March 14, 1964.

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of Shchaza, for soprano, violin, viola, English horn, xylophone, vibraphone and harpsichord. A Western critic writes:

Volkonski wrote this sensitive, expressive work in 1962. One recognizes Webern as dominating Volkonski's musical development, but one can also perceive his assimilation of other post-Webern influences into a rich and moving style of his own.[46]

Significantly, the performance was conducted by a young assistant conductor of the Leningrad Philharmonic, Igor Blazhkov, who only recently (1963) was subjected to heavy criticism for his interest in dodecaphonic music.

All this is symptomatic of the easing of ideological restrictions, and Volkonski is joined by other young composers—Boris Tishchenko, Sergei Slonimski, Arvo Pyart, Arno Babadjanian, to name a few—in experimenting more boldly with new techniques. Most significant, however, is the fact that serialism has won "converts" among composers heretofore considered traditional.

Kara Karaiev (born 1918 in Azerbaijan) and Rodion Shchedrin (born 1932 in Moscow) are among the most gifted of younger Soviet composers, but until now their musical style has been one of colorful nationalism. (In 1964 Karaiev and Shchedrin visited the United States under the cultural exchange program.) Their latest orchestral works, first performed in Moscow in the spring of 1965, are written in a musical idiom reportedly close to Western modernism. Without examining the scores (which are not yet available), it is impossible to determine to what extent their approach to musical composition has changed. Karaiev's *Symphony for Chamber Orchestra* reportedly employs folk material of Azerbaijan that is elaborated with the help of dodecaphonic techniques. Shchedrin's *Second Symphony* (completed in 1965) uses a novel form—25 orchestral preludes organized into five large-scale sections. The quick changes of musical "frames" suggested to one critic the techniques of cinema. Shchedrin had a great theme in mind—peace and war, life and death. To achieve his expressive purposes, he needed unusual sonorites and he obtained them by the use of dodecaphony and aleatory (*i.e.*, improvisations by the performing instrumentalist). Both techniques belong to the Western *avant-garde,* hence were proscribed in the USSR.

From the reviews of Soviet critics, it becomes clear that Karaiev and Shchedrin attempted an expansion rather than a reversal of the Soviet-accepted musical idiom, but this expansion is symptomatic of the rapid evolution of Soviet musical esthetics. A prominent Moscow critic makes the following observations on the current state of Soviet music:

With regard to the general direction of the explorations of our young composers, I can say that there is indeed at present a greater tolerance for dodecaphonic experiments, though on the whole this school remains unacceptable. Free devices of 12-tone writing, i.e., the "tone row," are used (though without strict method) in some compositions which aim at expressing a certain nervous tension, an expressionistic atmosphere. . . . There are quite a few disputes about it, but in a "peaceful" manner. . . . You can see that there is absolutely no switch in our viewpoint concerning dodecaphony. . . .[47]

Zukunftmusik?

There is so much talk about "dodecaphony" that one is tempted to ask—how "dangerous," or on the other hand how vital, is dodecaphony for the future of Soviet music? Actually, the issue has been exaggerated out of all proportion. The opponents should realize that the true danger for Soviet music lies in the colossal inbreeding, the stale conformity which has inhibited the spirit of creative adventure. It is not dodecaphony *per se* which is vitally important to the future of Soviet music, but the freedom to explore, to experiment, to learn by trial and error —a freedom that is essential to all artists. This is precisely the meaning of Rumiantsev's statement of February 21, 1965 (already quoted in part): "Real creative work is possible only by searching, by experiment, through free expression and a conflict of views." And again, "Truly creative work . . . cannot be stimulated by orders and does not tolerate an officially bureau-

[46] Paul Moor, "Russia, Music for May Day," *High Fidelity/Musical America* (New York, July 1965. See also his "The Russian Winter," *ibid.,* March 1965.

[47] Private letter from Moscow, June 20, 1965.

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cratic approach." In essence, this statement is close to the Leninist policies of the 1920's.

Rumiantsev went on to quote a decision of the Politburo of July 1, 1924, as follows: "Communist criticism must rid itself of the tone of literary command. The party must in every way eradicate attempts at homebred and incompetent administrative interference in literary affairs." He added: "This was and this will henceforth remain the most important party principle in matters of artistic creation." Paradoxically, the 1925 decision was not a "liberalizing" but rather a regulatory step—to prevent splinter groups (especially the ultra-left) from speaking with assumed party authority. Yet, in quoting it, Rumiantsev clearly meant to reassure today's creative intelligentsia, and he has since seemed determined to defend this position against critics within his own party. Replying to recent criticism in *Izvestia* which deplored the "nihilism" of young writers, he reiterated the leadership's intention to "defend the artist's freedom to choose theme and subject, style and manner of execution." He even went so far as to state that there was a "feeling among some people, honest and devoted to the ideas of communism, that no party guidance of literature and art was needed." [48]

This may possibly indicate an official cooling toward Socialist Realism, with its decidedly *petit-bourgeois* criteria, fashioned and enforced by Stalin. It may, in a sense, indicate a return to Lenin's exhortation that the party "must begin to move forward far more slowly than we had hoped, and move in such a way that the masses move with us." In due time, Lenin predicted, "the forward movement will accelerate in a manner undreamed of today."

The discontent that gripped the creative intelligentsia after Stalin's death and infected an important segment of the art-loving population stemmed partly from the fact that the officially approved level of the arts had fallen below the taste and receptivity of the people. Soviet society, more affluent and more sophisticated, had outgrown the limits of "art for the masses" and began to demand new cultural goals. Khrushchev and his cultural advisors sensed the agitation; they called for "bold quests" but were unsure how far the boldness should go. When the liberal trend gained momentum, Khrushchev's cultural experts were delegated to stem the tide; they were aided and abetted by the entrenched official hierarchy in the creative unions who favored the *status quo*. Finally, Khrushchev himself, as *arbiter artium*, delivered the ultimate judgement that earned him the contempt of every Western Communist intellectual.

The present Soviet leaders—more prudent and more impersonal—are faced with the choice of either discarding or reinterpreting Socialist Realism. As a dogma, it is outdated, vapid, and discredited; its application to music in particular was, from the outset, absurd and unworkable. The more culturally advanced Communist countries—Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary—have already abandoned Socialist Realism or are in the process of discarding it. East Germany's "restrictive policies in the arts" recently came under attack at a literary colloquium in East Berlin (Soviet writers were among the critics), and an East German Marxist, Robert Havemann, has had the courage to call for "ideological coexistence," advising the party to refrain from interference in esthetic matters. Thus the time may be near when Socialist Realism will become symbolic of an art "provincial, narrow, and lacking in modernity."

Should the Soviet leaders decide to retain Socialist Realism, the term will require a thorough redefinition; it will have to be made more elastic to embrace a greater variety of styles and creative methods. In fact, this process is already in the making. Once the stigma of "bourgeois decadence" is removed from the much-maligned avant-gardism, an important liberating step will have been made. But this step will be meaningful only if accompanied by actual performances of music by the pioneering 20th-century masters — Schoenberg, Alband Berg, Webern—whose works are still virtually banned in the USSR. An educational campaign among Soviet performers and listeners will be needed to create a receptivity toward the dodecaphonic language of music. The young avant-garde composers of the Soviet Union have an important role in this process of adjustment: it will be their task to prove that they can absorb the advanced musical idiom without loss of personal and national identity. But once the spirit of creative revolution is permitted, once the young composers are liberated from outworn slogans and the excessive tutelage of the old guard, the glory of Russian music may well experience a new era of efflorescence.

[48] Pravda, Sept. 9, 1965.

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Modern Art and the Shackles of Dogma

By Paul Sjeklocha

Over the past two decades a truly vast amount of literature has been published on the USSR. Yet one significant aspect of the new Soviet society remains virtually unexplored: the plight of its "unofficial" artist—the artist who does not subscribe to the official dogma of Socialist Realism and who is not a member of the Artists' Union.

Any full analysis of developments in the modern art movement in the Soviet Union today would be extremely difficult. Even the most informed people in the USSR know only what occurs in their immediate vicinity. At best, they might be aware of what is taking place in the two big metropolitan centers of Moscow and Leningrad. It is also too early to analyze the works of many young but promising artists, or even to list their names, because until very recently there has been much political animosity toward creative activity outside the narrow realm of Socialist Realism. It can be positively asserted, however, that all major trends in contemporary art have their counterparts in unofficial creative circles in the USSR, consciously or unconsciously following in the footsteps of their Western exemplars. Admittedly, their strength is not in organization (most artists move in small circles of friends), but in numbers. A conservative estimate made by an important Soviet modern art collector placed the unofficial artists' community at 500 in Moscow, 300 in Leningrad, and from 50 to 100 in Kiev, for a total of about 1,000 artists throughout the Soviet Union.

Ironically, it is in the two metropolitan centers, where official cultural policy is shaped, that the unofficial artist enjoys the most freedom. While one might expect unofficial groups to flourish in the provinces, away from the watchful eye of cultural officialdom, this is not the case; local political control is so tight that the artist can do little more than echo the approved official sentiments from Moscow. In cities such

During an extended visit to the Soviet Union in 1963, Mr. Sjeklocha had a first-hand opportunity to delve into the subject of Soviet "unofficial art," meeting many of the artists personally and acquiring samples of their work. Some of these are reproduced here, the signatures of the artists being deleted for their protection.

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as Alma-Ata, Yerevan and Tbilisi—from what this writer personally observed—the provincial artist seems to be trying to outdo the Academician Gerasimov (whose official portraits of Stalin adorned public halls for a quarter of a century).[1] It is in the provinces, the wastes of Russia—where the propagandistic value of art is deemed most necessary and the esthetic value is least questioned, where the artist is directed to glorify the agricultural drive in the virgin lands, or the bridging of the Yenisei River, or the introduction of a chemical fertilizer—that the official creative theory and control of art are most successful. And most noticeably it is in the provinces that Socialist Realism—through the enforcement of the standard of "intelligibility" to the masses—has lowered artistic criteria to the political-poster level, transforming art into a serviceable social tool.

[1] Two exceptions among the provincial centers are the Baltic cities of Riga and Tallin, where smaller groups of unofficial artists exist.

Untitled (11½" x 16½"). Moscow, 1962. White and black India ink with the rubber cement pickup technique.

The "political-poster standard" had its origin in the early revolutionary days, when the magic of art was needed for social mobilization. In the aftermath of the Revolution, the Soviet artist became a mouthpiece of the party, illustrating the ideological dogma of the new state in a most unsophisticated and direct manner, lowering the artistic standard of his work in an effort to make it accepted and understood by all, so as to evoke in every beholder the same feeling toward the rising state.

It was Lenin, with his few obscure but now sacred pronouncements on revolutionary art, who set the stage for the Stalinist control of all creative activity. Lenin, who (according to Klara Zetkin) boasted of not understanding the art of "expressionism, futurism, cubism and other such 'isms'," [2] nevertheless did keenly recognize the emotional impact of art and its educational potential for transmitting the ideology of the new Soviet state. With the following statement, he provided the cornerstone of the theory of Socialist Realism as applied to art:

Art belongs to the people. It must penetrate with its deepest roots into the very midst of the working masses. It must be intelligible to these masses and be loved by them. It must unite the feeling, thought and will of these masses and elevate them. It must awaken in them artists and develop them.[3]

In the Stalinist period, this dictum was invoked as the doctrinal justification for conscripting art into the exclusive service of the state as an instrument of social mobilization and control. Esthetic merit and creative experimentation were choked out by the overwhelming stress on "intelligibility and "socialist content." Indeed, an examination of the official art of Soviet Russia over the past three decades leads inexorably

[2] For this enlightening statement as well as Zetkin's remininiscences of Lenin, see Mikhail Lifshits (ed.), *Lenin o kulture i iskusstve,* Moscow, Izogiz, 1938, p. 299.

[3] *Ibid.* Visiting the Second All-Union Poster Exhibit held in the Manezh Gallery in Moscow in the winter of 1963-64, the present writer found this very quotation written in gigantic red letters over the entrance like a message from the heavens.

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to the conclusion that Socialist Realism, for all its theoretical pretensions, in the end left room for nothing but the propagandistic political poster—whether rendered on canvas or in the graphic arts media.[4] Few artists survived the pressures of the official dogma. The postrevolutionary work of the Soviet-Armenian master Martiros Sarian, for example, bears virtually no relationship to that of his impressionist period at the turn of the century.[5] His later work is as oblivious to the tradition of the so-called "Great Experiment" in Russian art[6] (toward which he was gravitating in 1911), as is the sterile output of the recent Lenin Prize winner B. Prorokov to the new trends illustrated on these pages.

Today the political poster remains the hallmark of official taste in the visual arts, and Socialist Realism reigns on, at least in the Soviet provinces. In Moscow and Leningrad, however, where numbers and proximity create a sort of contagious atmosphere, the tradition of the Great Experiment has managed to survive. Even in the void of the Stalin era, it was tenuously preserved through such masters of the "formalistic brush" as Pavel Filonov, who painted throughout the 1930's and early 1940's before his death in the famine accompanying the wartime siege of Leningrad; Robert Falk, member of the famous "Knave of Diamonds" group and an influential university professor, who continued to pursue his art until his death in 1958; Alexander Tyshler, who has worked since the Revolution in a rather precise style verging on surrealism; Leningrad artist Nathan Altman, who has persisted in his experimental searches through the years; and the "official" Leningrad artist and noted lithographer, Anatoly Kaplan, in whose magnificent illustrations of the Jewish folk theme the Chagallian touch vividly survives. Masters such as these—who have maintained their ties with the past, thereby supplying a link with the pre-Stalinist artistic tradition—have a strong attraction for today's young Soviet artists.

Title: *Faith* (8 ¾ " x 12"). Moscow, 1962. Color crayon —an individual blend of constructivist elements with surrealistic overtones.

A number of voices have been raised against the deliberate isolation of these and other masters from public view. Many important members of the creative intelligentsia, arguing that the treasures of the past are not something alien to be feared, but a free creative influence to be welcomed, have made their views public. In his memoirs, Ilya Ehrenburg complained:

Our museums possess superb collections of the "left art" of the early postrevolutionary years. It is a pity that these collections are not open to the public. You can't throw out a link from the chain. I know young Soviet artists who were "discovering America" in 1960. They were doing (or to be more precise, trying to do) what Malevich, Tatlin, Popova, and Rozanova had already done in their time.[7]

[4] It was disclosed at the First All-Union Artists' Congress in 1957 that, in the six years preceding the event, over 665 million posters with 32,000 titles were published. See *Materialy Pervovo Vsesoiuznovo Sezda Sovetskikh khudozhnikov,* Moscow, *Sovetskyi khudozhnik,* 1958, p. 161.

[5] Some of Sarian's friends have remarked to Westerners that Martiros would have given Picasso a run for his money—had the Revolution never occurred.

[6] See the authoritative work of Camilla Gray, *The Great Experiment: Russian Art, 1863-1922,* New York, Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1962.

[7] Ehrenburg, *Liudi, gody, zhizn,* Moscow, 1961, p. 429.

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Untitled (11″ x 15″). Moscow, 1965. Felt pen.

The challenge to orthodoxy in the visual arts took form in the course of the general cultural thaw that followed Khrushchev's "secret speech" of 1956. The denunciation of Stalin's cultural policies (one of the lesser charges against him) was mistakenly, though perhaps purposely, interpreted by the creative intelligentsia as a new promise of freedom. Stirrings among Soviet youth were manifested—among other ways—in a sudden upsurge of student interest in art and literature. Literary and artistic circles formed in institutes and universities; youth cafes began to open; handwritten and typewritten manuscripts appeared, as did even a few unofficial serialized journals.[8] Young art students began visiting the homes of unofficial artists who, prior to the thaw, had moved only among friends. Their kitchens and bedrooms were turned into studios, and quietly the teaching of modern art was resumed. The sporadic cultural witchhunts of the regime in the years after 1956 have had only temporary effect on these activities.

With the opening of the East-West cultural exchange in 1959 and the influx of tourists that followed, communication was established with the modern art movement in the West: art books, magazines, reproductions and postcards of abstract expressionists became more and more available. Progressively, the creative spirit of the Great Experiment was revitalized, and a genuine following of modern art became a reality.

It was not until the Manezh affair, however, that the new enthusiasm for abstract art became public knowledge and the strength of the "unofficial" artists was revealed. Nikita Khrushchev's visit to the exhibit, his outburst of barnyard Russian ("Are you pederasts or normal people? . . . What is hung here is simply anti-Soviet. It's amoral. Art should vitalize the individual and arouse him to action . . . Who painted this picture? I want to talk to him. What's the good of a picture like this—to cover urinals with?" *etc.*), and the events that followed have already been described elsewhere.[9] Seen in retrospect, the episode testifies to the foothold that abstract art has gained among the Soviet public, especially among the young intelligentsia and the "new class"—*i.e.*, the bureaucrats and professional and managerial personnel. The controversial young poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko, for example, boasts a personal collection of abstract paintings in his home. Even Khrushchev's son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, reportedly owned some twenty abstract paintings and sculptures at the time of the Manezh incident.

Generally speaking, the most outspoken support for the unofficial artist and his art comes from the younger generation of the intelligent-

[8] This practice has now become a thriving enterprise, though it occasionally costs the unfortunate entrepreneurs a few years of exile in Siberia.

[9] For a condensed version and translation of a hitherto unpublished stenographic account of Khrushchev's remarks at the Manezh Exhibition, see *Encounter* (London), April 1963, pp. 102-03. See also Priscilla Johnson, "The Regime and the Intellectuals: A Window on Party Politics," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1963.

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sia and professional classes: students, teachers, engineers, scientists, lawyers, managers, and others. For them the old formulas of culture and esthetics have become empty and meaningless; they prefer types of art more attuned to their intellectual cognizance. Scientists in particular, who as a group enjoy a relatively high degree of personal and economic freedom, have taken to modern art. Several of the artists whose works are illustrated on these pages claim to have the support of high-ranking patrons in the scientific institutes and research centers in and around Moscow and Leningrad. "You really can't expect an astrophysicist—with his thoughts in outer space—to be satisfied with a Gerasimov in his living room," I was told by one artist. Then he added: "On second thought, maybe in his living room, but certainly not in his study or his 'dacha'."

Current trends in Soviet architecture have also favored the introduction of modern art. Soviet architects have had to adapt themselves to many new techniques of mass construction, such as the use of prefabricated sections and other standardized materials. The design of modern housing developments—the "Moskovsky raion" (Moscow Region) of Leningrad is a good example—calls for the introduction of modern decorative art to fit in with the sleek, functional lines of the new buildings and the space-age nomenclature of the streets. Visiting the new apartments on Moskovsky raion's Prospekt Gagarina (named after the first Soviet cosmonaut), one finds modernistic touches in interior decor, ranging from lampshades to semi-abstract prints, some of which, the tenants claim, came with the apartments.

In defying the dogmas of Socialist Realism, the unofficial artist isolates himself from external reality and confines himself to an inner world of his own, his art deriving its inspiration almost entirely from the imagination. The real value of this art lies perhaps in its portrayal of the narrow but deeply felt inner reality perceived by the artist, and it is on this basis that the esthetic value of such works should be judged and evaluated.

The works shown on these pages are not the best examples of contemporary Soviet abstract art. Rather, they are representative of the various trends that are present in the unofficial graphic arts medium: expressionism, cubism, surrealism, *skazka* (fairy tale), and so on. The creators of these works are young artists between twenty and thirty-five years of age, all holding respectable jobs in state enterprises, in commercial art, or in some other approved field of activity. These jobs are important to them because of the frequently enforced antiparasite law, which requires that every Soviet citizen earn a minimum wage of 30 rubles per month ($33). Also, the successful artist—the one who can sell his works—needs regular employment

Title: *Kavkaz-1963* (12" x 16½"). Leningrad, 1963. Pencil.

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Title: *Family* (17" x 23"). Moscow, 1964. Pencil—an original and charming stylization of the Russian "*skazka*," or fairy tale genre. (This artist's work has been rejected by publishing houses on the ground that it is too "formalistic.")

in order to conceal his unofficial income and activity, while the less successful artist must have the income for subsistence.

There is, however, another category of unofficial artists who are completely ostracized from society, classified as "mentally and socially unfit" by the authorities, and provided with a minimum subsistence pension of 30 rubles per month as "neurotics." These are artists who openly challenge the authority of the state, not merely by their unorthodox creative endeavors, but also by their adamant refusal to participate actively in "socialist labor construction" and other aspects of collective life. Their rebellion violates two shibboleths of the Soviet state: by producing abstract, non-objective works of art, they defy the sacred rules of Socialist Realism, which require that the artist find his inspiration in the real life of socialist society; and by their inactivity, they violate the laws against "parasites." [10] In the Stalinist period, such open defiance of "socialist morality" would have been punished by years of forced labor in Siberia, if not worse. With the post-Stalin trend toward a limited permissiveness, however, the regime appears to have adopted a novel method of dealing with recalcitrant artists and intellectuals. Labeled mental cases, they are sometimes confined to mental institutions for limited periods, but also receive a lifetime subsistence pension. Little did the Soviet authorities realize that this device might be used by some dissident intellectuals willing to spend a couple of months in a mental institution for the sake of a life-long pension, however minimal.

Many angry young men defy the system by deliberately choosing such personal withdrawal from society. This author knows one talented young poet from Moscow who, feigning mental illness, inveigled his way out of the Soviet navy after a year's service and retired to a friend's "dacha" in order that he might "think and write in peace without party slogans." Another young man, a journalist, who had been fired from the staff of a Moscow newspaper for harmful editorial criticism of Soviet reality, retired to the south of Russia on his lifetime pension as a "mental case." Yet another young intellectual retired to the north, not to write or paint, but simply to "watch the reindeer."

This self-imposed alienation has some merit, to be sure. It provides the artist with the freedom he needs in order to create. By pensioning these so-called "misfits," however, the Soviet government places itself in the anomalous position of actually subsidizing some of the practitioners of abstract art—the anathema of Socialist Realism.

[10] See "Hosts and Pests: The Fight Against Parasites," by Leon Lipson, *Problems of Communism,* March-April 1965.

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Obtaining art supplies and equipment is a serious problem for all unofficial artists. Since they cannot requisition materials from the government as the official artists do, they have much difficulty in obtaining even the most common supplies, such as ink and paper. They are obliged to acquire whatever materials they can from the local stores, which carry some art supplies for general public consumption, usually as low in quality as in quantity. Hence, the frequent use of pencil, felt-pen, crayon, rubber cement, and other more readily available media.

The unofficial artists also have no printing presses. To own a private press in the USSR is against the law, as it also is to own a mimeograph or duplicating machine. (Presses in the studios of official artists are properly registered and owned by the state.) Moreover, etching and carving tools, zinc plates, and wood blocks are very difficult to obtain since these items are at a premium even for the official artist. (Linoleum, however, is more available.) In spite of these difficulties, the unofficial artist somehow manages to work with common substitutes. He may use shoe polish for ink or the back of a political poster for printing paper. Dedicated to creative truth as he sees it, he persists, spurred on by the ever-growing appreciation and demand for "his kind of art."

Several dealers in unofficial art have become quite prominent, and even affluent, in Moscow and Leningrad. The going price for an average oil by a recognized unofficial artist is about 150 rubles, or $165 at the official exchange rate (1 ruble=$1.10). Good prints and sketches sell for about 25 rubles, and sculptures can go as high as 2,000 rubles. In terms of the 75-ruble monthly income of the average Soviet worker, these are stiff prices. Obviously, however, it is not the average worker who pays them. Only the moneyed Soviet ruling and professional classes can afford to collect unofficial art—including those for whom the collection of modern, non-objective, and individualistic art has become something of a status symbol.

Ironically, this means that the very persons most closely associated with controls over creative freedom have also become the patrons of many unofficial artists. The Manezh exhibit provided evidence of this paradoxical state of affairs: an open exhibit in a public gallery surely points to the existence of influential patrons high up in the cultural policy-making hierarchy. Thus, an unofficial world of non-conformist artists enjoying a significant—if surreptitious—following has sprung up alongside the official world of "Socialist Realists," a situation known and tacitly tolerated by the power elite.

The overriding factor favoring the growing avant-garde is time itself and the direction of change in Soviet society. Already the formulas of rigid control and artistic content have become hoary and meaningless, while the forces of unofficial art have gained in strength and popularity. The creative genius of the people of Russia, having eloquently asserted itself in modern science and technology, may well be launching the first stage of another renaissance in the cultural history of the country. Thus, even in the Soviet Union, both doctrine and authority may be fading before the forces of modernity.

E. Soloviev. Title: *Toward Communism—In United Construction, Toward a Single Goal!* (22½" x 45"). 1963. This political poster, epitomizing what Stalin called "art national in form and socialist in content," depicts the multinational Soviet society marching united toward the Communist future.

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Perspectives on the Soviet Economy

DAVID INGRAM: *The Communist Economic Challenge,*
New York, F. A. Praeger, 1965.
S. SWIANIEWICZ: *Forced Labor and Economic Development,*
London, New York, Toronto; Oxford University Press, 1965.

Reviewed by Marshall I. Goldman

AFTER A LONG DEARTH of books on the Soviet economy, the last few years have seen a welcome renaissance of studies concerning this vital area of Soviet life. Unfortunately, however, there is always a little skim underneath the cream. For different reasons, neither of the books under review measures up to the standards of the recent past. Despite the timeliness of his topic, David Ingram's *The Communist Economic Challenge* is altogether too casual, if not out of date. Professor S. Swianiewicz's study, *Forced Labor and Economic Development,* is much more scholarly and careful, but his theoretical framework creates a sense of incredulity which detracts from the rest of his analysis.

Providing only a few footnote references to primary Soviet sources and little other documentation of any sort, Mr. Ingram paints the Soviet economic scene with a broad brush, producing a picture that is a little too abstract for the non-specialist and embarrassingly blurry for the specialist. His general purpose is to show that the Soviet Union will not overtake or surpass the United States economically by 1970, as Khrushchev once predicted. To perform this no longer difficult exercise, he presents production statistics and discusses some of the problems facing the Soviet economy. Portions of his data are intriguing, but it is quite frustrating for the reader to attempt to trace the sources. Apparently, Mr. Ingram owes most of his information to the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, which has indeed prepared some excellent materials. Nonetheless, even the author's references to these materials are too infrequent to satisfy an exacting reader.

Mr. Ingram promises to face head-on some of the underlying statistical problems that plague anyone attempting to compare economic growth in the USA and the USSR. The confrontation, we are told, will take place in the Appendices. But when the reader gets to the Statistical Appendix, he finds only vague generalizations.

There are other shortcomings. At one point, the author says that the Soviet Union failed to "render much material aid to China," yet four pages later he contradicts himself by showing that the Russians, during the first five years of Chinese Com-

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munist rule (1950-55), provided $3 billion in exports to China, of which $1.17 million was not offset by Chinese exports to Russia. One also wonders about Mr. Ingram's willingness to accept at face value reports that collectivization in Communist China was imposed without bloodshed and without the mistakes made in the USSR.

More serious is the fact that the author makes no mention whatever of Libermanism or any of the current Soviet economic reforms. It might perhaps be unfair to criticize a book with a 1965 dateline for failing to mention the deposition of Khrushchev in the fall of 1964, but Libermanism after all has been the center of a good deal of attention since late 1962, and the far-reaching implications of such experiments are certainly worthy of some comment. By the same token, Mr. Ingram's assertion that "consumer sovereignty and the free play of supply and demand . . . have been discarded" is no longer entirely valid—and had already become partially incorrect by the early 1960's, if not before. Even more surprisingly, it is not until p. 111, or about three-quarters of the way through the book, that one finds even an inkling of the Sino-Soviet split, while Russia's troubles with Albania and Rumania are completely ignored. In a survey devoted to the economic competition between East and West, such vital omissions are baffling, to say the least.

For all its faults, Mr. Ingram's book does have some redeeming features. In his final chapters dealing with the Communist challenge in the underdeveloped areas, the author quite properly warns of what might happen if the lagging countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa are not provided with sufficient foreign economic aid. These last few chapters and the section on Soviet foreign aid are considerably better than the earlier part of the book. It is interesting to learn from Mr. Ingram's discussion of Soviet aid that the USSR supplies oil to Cuba at half the price it charges for oil sold to its East European allies. The best section of the book is the second appendix, on military affairs, which is more original and contains some interesting information (even though here, too, documentation is lacking).

PROFESSOR S. Swianiewicz's study of the role of forced labor in Soviet economic development is, by and large, a much more solid work. Considering that the author himself actually spent two years in Soviet concentration camps, his book is remarkable for its unemotional tone and scholarly research. In fact, the coolly dispassionate manner in which he weighs the economic costs of forced labor against the economic gains derived from its use strikes one as almost too unfeeling. It is somewhat like watching a scientist weigh the probable effectiveness of biological warfare against the costs of the necessary research. While it is comforting that Professor Swianiewicz concludes that the NKVD forced-labor projects did not make economic sense despite the cheapness of the labor input, it is necessary to recognize that there is more to the problem than a mere calculation of economic costs and productive efficiency. Normally irrational projects, such as the Volga-Don Canal and the Northern Route, were authorized in the Soviet Union precisely because the system of forced labor ignored the value of human life and rendered normal profit and loss calculations useless as a restraint. This is something that Professor Swianiewicz neglects in his otherwise careful calculation of the costs of the forced labor projects. It would also have been useful had the author inquired into whether the same labor utilized elsewhere under less onerous conditions (the annual death rate in forced-labor projects was 30-50 percent) might not have made a more worthwhile contribution to the economic well-being of the USSR.

Professor Swianiewicz focuses on the wage-good gap that seems to be an inevitable feature of the belated economic development of the poorer countries of the world. In an attempt to develop all sectors of their respective economies simultaneously, these countries find it necessary to mobilize the predominantly agricultural and unskilled working force and transfer it into industrial activities. This process is usually disruptive enough by itself, but, in addition, it often leads to an increase in consumer purchasing power without a commensurate increase in the stock of consumable goods, thus setting the stage for inflation. Professor Swianiewicz is incorrect, however, in asserting that the only way inflation can be avoided in such a situation is to cut back on consumption. Among other things, it is possible to reduce the scope of investment so that those projects which are undertaken are performed more effectively. Thus, one of Khrushchev's frequent complaints was that too many projects were being undertaken at one time, with the result that there was never enough equipment to permit any one project to be completed on schedule.

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Having explained the pressures created by the wage-good gap, Professor Swianiewicz considers the purge of the Soviet peasantry in the late 1920's and early 1930's and the wave of arrests carried out by the NKVD in the urban and party centers during the late 1930's. Although he sometimes appears to disavow it, the author's recurring thesis is that the first wave of arrests was necessary because there was a shortage of labor in the urban centers. He argues that as conditions deteriorated in the urban areas, the workers returned to the countryside, and that in order to reverse the tide the kulaks and middle peasants were arrested with the expectation that chaos in the rural areas would induce large numbers of peasants to flee to the cities. He believes that the regime also viewed the imprisonment of large numbers of consumers as a means of reducing inflationary pressures. This same rationale is applied to the Yezhov purges of a few years later. Then, however, it was no longer a problem of moving peasants to the city; rather, it was a matter of a general labor shortage, especially in the prison camps of the NKVD. As the surplus of peasants in agriculture was drained off, the NKVD solved the problem "by the enormous wave of arrests known by the name of Yezhovshchina." In effect, Professor Swianiewicz feels that the arrests were needed to fill the ranks of labor. Later, as even the urban sources of forced labor dried up, the Soviet authorities were forced to look elsewhere, and Professor Swianiewicz sees in this a partial explanation for the Soviet invasion of Poland and the Baltic states.

ALTHOUGH there are coincidences, it seems difficult to believe that such factors were the main causes of the mass arrests and the wholesale use of forced labor. Even though it is true that there was a migration to the rural areas in the USSR, experience in other developing countries of the world tends to show that once there is stability, the peasants generally move on their own to the urban areas—notwithstanding the existence of greater poverty for most in a city such as Calcutta than in the countryside. With respect to the arrests of the late 1930's, moreover, it is hard to conceive that the Stalin regime could have expected to solve a nationwide labor shortage by taking the most productive members of society, such as scientists, engineers, and managers, and putting them to work cutting trees and mining gold. It is true that the tasks of the NKVD took on a momentum of their own and that something had to be done to compensate for the high mortality rate among the prisoners, but this alone is not enough to prove that there was an economic motivation or justification for the mass arrests. Had there indeed been such a motivation, it would have been much more rational to put people to work in more productive circumstances. Instead of concentrating on reducing consumer demand by means of mass arrests, certainly it would have been more sensible to focus on possible ways to increase output.

It is probably more accurate to seek the real explanation for the arrests in Stalin's political tyranny rather than in any economic considerations. Overconcentration on the possible economic motives leads Professor Swianiewicz to suggest that the reason why there were no arrests of a similar magnitude in the late 1940's and early 1950's was that economic conditions had improved enough so that there was no longer a shortage of labor. However, he neglects to mention the Jewish Doctor's Plot and the fresh wave of arrests that was halted only by Stalin's death. Furthermore, many economists argue that the Soviet standard of living in 1955 was not much higher than it had been in 1937. If the prison camps could be emptied in 1953-56, there is no reason why the economy would have suffered any more if they had been emptied in the late 1930's.

Professor Swianiewicz's warnings to the developing countries to heed the lessons of the Soviet experience with forced labor are particularly timely and worthy of attention. Already, Guinea and Ghana have set up workers' brigades which could be the forerunners of forced labor camps after the Soviet model—an ominous sign that the institution of forced labor is not yet a thing of the past. Perhaps Professor Swianiewicz's warnings would have had greater force if he had spent less time seeking for an economic rationalization of the Soviet use of forced labor and placed greater emphasis on its inhumanity and economic costs.

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Toward Integration?

MICHAEL KASER: *Integration Problems of the Planned Economies.*
Published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
London, Oxford University Press, 1965.

Reviewed by George Kemeny

THE SOVIET ATTEMPT to transform the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) into a supranational organization vested with centralized economic planning authority for the countries of the Soviet bloc is already past history. Three years after the move was launched at a Comecon summit meeting at Moscow in June 1962, it is now quite evident that what was originally intended to be a fundamental change in the economic and political structure of the bloc has ended up instead as little more than a reform of Comecon's internal administrative machinery.

An expert on the East European economies, Mr. Kemeny is presently preparing a study on the economic and political aspects of Soviet bloc integration for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

The Executive Committee which was set up in 1962, ostensibly to take the lead in working towards closer integration of the bloc economies, has remained without a legal definition of its functions and powers owing to the inability of the member governments to reach a consensus on revision of the 1960 Comecon statute, which thus continues formally in effect. While practically obsolescent in some respects, the old statute retains full validity so far as the requirement for unanimous decision is concerned. Consequently, although the Committee—through meetings held at short intervals—has brought a greater degree of efficiency and continuity to proceedings within the Comecon organization, it has made little, if any, headway towards the goal of economic integration. Attached to the Executive Committee is an economic planning board, but its function remains strictly advisory.

All this lends interest to Mr. Michael Kaser's recently published study of the development of Comecon over its fifteen-year existence and of the problems and difficulties involved in the effort to integrate the Communist planned economies. As Mr. Kaser points out, what has emerged from this development is merely "a mechanism for central consultation" rather than an instrumentality of genuine central planning.

IN ASSESSING the results of Comecon, one question that arises is the extent to which it has attained the objective of increasing interdependence of the bloc economies. While Mr. Kaser does not offer a detailed statistical analysis, it becomes clear from his references to United

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Nations sources that the development of bloc foreign trade has not kept pace with industrial expansion in the Comecon countries: Comecon's share in world trade has indeed risen, but not at anywhere near the same rate as its share in world industrial production. Measuring the results by comparison with regional groupings of market economies, the author concludes that cooperation within Comecon has not resulted in as extensive an international division of labor as has developed in these other groupings.

Mr. Kaser sees the lack of coherent price structures as the chief obstacle to the integration of centrally planned economies. "The absence of criteria whereby the Soviet economy can measure its own goals and its own performance," he states, "has for fifteen years been the crucial issue on which Comecon integration has foundered."

The price structures of the Soviet Union and the other Comecon countries have undergone considerable changes as a result of repeated reforms, and the problem of the relationship of costs to prices, in particular, has been extensively discussed all through the post-Stalin period. The present bloc regimes no longer oppose recognition of the "law of value" with Stalinist obstinacy, but they still hesitate to relinquish central control in favor of decision-making at the enterprise level. A few hundred Soviet enterprises are currently experimenting with Liberman's method of cost calculation, which includes capital charges. Except in Hungary and Bulgaria, however, costs generally continue to represent aggregate wage bills (*i.e.*, the cumulative total of the wage costs of the consecutive phases of production). While prices are now appreciably closer to costs than in Stalin's day, they are still far from reflecting relative costs in the individual bloc countries, the more so since the exchange rates in force are highly arbitrary.

Techniques employing combined calculations in physical terms and in value have been evolved for the purpose of drawing inter-country cost comparisons and measuring the efficacy of foreign trade. Yet, in this reviewer's opinion, Mr. Kaser's statement that "the gain from trade can thus be measured by a simple comparison of domestic and foreign prices" (p. 148) goes too far—and it is also in contradiction with the author's prior statements.

As price comparability within the Soviet bloc still appears to be a distant aim, the use of Western world-market prices in intra-bloc trade continues. This dependence on Western prices, however, is not accepted willingly, and it has repeatedly been argued—not without reason—that world market prices do not correspond with costs inside the Soviet bloc. The establishment of Comecon's own price basis has been advocated in the Soviet Union since 1959 and was again urged (as Mr. Kaser notes) in the Soviet proposals of 1962.

THE DIFFICULTIES of devising an appropriate price system for the bloc are not exclusively responsible for the failure of the Soviet proposal. Rumania, relying increasingly on deliveries of Western capital goods, refused to break away from world-market prices, and even the more compliant bloc members such as Poland and Czechoslovakia showed reluctance to support the change. Both these latter countries, keen on preserving and extending their relations with Western markets, appeared to take the view that adherence to the prices of those markets would help them in promoting a so-called half-open-door policy.

Since the collapse of the Soviet initiative of 1962, there have been various indications that further moves toward economic integration within the bloc would circumvent Comecon.[1] A highly important step in this direction (briefly referred to in Mr. Kaser's study) was the establishment early this year of Intermetall, an organization embracing six (not seven, as erroneously stated by Mr. Kaser) Communist countries—*i.e.*, all the European members of Comecon with the significant exception of Rumania—and charged with coordinating the steel production of its members. It was obviously Rumania's veto of integration moves within Comecon that caused this new organization to be set up outside the Comecon framework.

Intermetall, with headquarters in Budapest, functions as a coordinating center with authority to adopt resolutions and see to their execution by the respective member countries. According to authoritative Communist press reports, the organization as originally conceived was to have included only Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, but it was later decided that the USSR, East Germany and Bulgaria would also join.[2]

Owing to the participation of the Soviet Union, Intermetall

[1] See the reviewer's article, "Economic Integration in the Soviet Bloc," in the Sept.-Oct. 1964 issue of *Problems of Communism*.

[2] *Nepszava* (Budapest), Jan. 4, 1965.

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constitutes a powerful unit. Combined steel ingot output of the six countries amounted to 105 million tons in 1963, as compared with 100 million tons for the United States and 73 million tons for the countries of the European Coal and Steel Community. Common planning of steel production in the member countries will necessarily entail coordination of investments in this important branch of the economy. It still remains to be seen, however, to what extent a concerted steel investment policy will eradicate the harmful effects of the economic follies of the Stalinist era.

Moscow's motives for joining the steel organization are not hard to guess. As a member of Intermetall, the USSR is able to exert a decisive influence on the planning of a key industry throughout almost the whole of Communist Eastern Europe. This very fact tightens the Soviet grip on the economies of the participating countries—a grip which is already strong because of the dependence of these economies on Soviet supplies of raw materials and power—the latter through the Friendship oil pipeline and the interconnected electric power grid. The open rift with Rumania makes closer Soviet economic ties with the rest of Comecon even more desirable. In addition, Moscow may well consider Intermetall a useful expedient to counteract undercurrents which tend, if not to endanger, at least to damage the economic cohesiveness of the bloc. Specifically, while close relations continue to exist between the USSR and East Germany because of the Ulbricht regime's utter dependence on Soviet political and economic backing, Poland and Czechoslovakia, both highly industrialized countries, have recently displayed eagerness to develop closer economic ties with the West.

ANY STUDY OF Comecon is bound to come to grips with the so-called "Fundamental Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labor," endorsed by the Comecon summit conference of June 1962. In an attempt to set the line of future development, the Principles proclaimed the attainment of maximum productive efficiency by the bloc economies as the paramount objective of Comecon's policy; yet, at the same time, the building of national economic complexes with an all-round development of productive forces was advocated. The two purposes—the second clearly implying an equalization of levels of economic development in the member countries—defeat each other. This underlying ambivalence of Comecon policies was brought into the open by the conflict between Bucharest and Moscow. In the ensuing bitter debate between the industrially advanced Comecon countries and Rumania, one East German economist went so far as to argue for an intra-bloc division of labor based, in part, on the priority development of agricultural resources in Rumania at the expense of the country's forceful drive for industrialization, maintaining that this would serve not only the interests of Comecon as a whole but also those of the individual countries concerned. This argument, however, has not convinced Bucharest.

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NOTES & VIEWS

New Vistas for Soviet Readers

By Colette Shulman

Amid the ambiguous trends and countertrends in Soviet literature today, the exploratory ventures of the literary journal *Novyi mir* (New World) quietly continue to earn respect and prestige. One of the first portents of literary trends after the change of leadership in 1964 was a declaration of intent by Editor Alexander Tvardovski in which, among other things, he talked of the need for getting away from stereotyped clichés in reporting the travels of Soviet writers abroad.[1] What this was to mean in practice is now becoming clear, and it points up one of the interesting aspects of the widening perspectives of Soviet literature today—that which is expressed in the travel literature, and is particularly well illustrated in a recent travelogue from the pen of the novelist and essayist, Victor Nekrasov.

In December 1962, when *Novyi mir* was publishing his now famous piece on Italy and the United States,[2] Nekrasov went to France for a month in the company of Konstantin Paustovski and Andrei Voznesenski. Soon afterward this earlier travel report was to draw major fire from Khrushchev, and in the host of accusations that filled the air of early 1963, even Nekrasov's French trip came under passing attack. Toward the end of his March 8 speech to the artists and writers, Khrushchev voiced the opinion that "an unpleasant impression was left by the visit paid to France by the writers V. Nekrasov, K. Paustovski, and A. Voznesenski," but perhaps because he had already been speaking for several hours and was beginning to tire, he did not elaborate on this "unpleasant impression."[3]

We now have Nekrasov's account of that French trip, published in *Novyi mir* of April 1965, two years after Khrushchev's speech and six months after his fall, and at a time when his successors have been at special pains to cultivate their re-

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[1] "On the Anniversary," by Alexander Tvardovski, *Novyi mir* (Moscow), No. 1, 1965. English translation in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York), Vol. XVII, No. 13, 1965.

[2] Translated and published under the same title, *On Both Sides of the Ocean,* New York, Holt, 1964. The quotations appearing in this article were taken from the translation by Robert Potts and Leo Gruliow which was first published in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York), and later reprinted in *Half Way to the Moon,* edited by Patricia Blake and Max Hayward (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).

[3] See Priscilla Johnson, *Khrushchev and the Arts,* Boston, MIT Press, 1965.

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lations with General de Gaulle (a factor that may have made the publication of this piece more acceptable). "A Month in France" is the first foreign travelogue by Nekrasov to appear since his extraordinary "On Both Sides of the Ocean," and while its focus differs from that of the earlier one, it is in outlook and spirit distinctly what we have come to expect and to respect in Nekrasov.

Readers will remember that "On Both Sides of the Ocean" was almost more of a commentary on Soviet life than a report on Italy and America, and the striking thing about it was how bluntly it touched on some of the most sensitive areas of Soviet society. For instance:

On the limited extent of destalinization in literature:

If our literature has not yet really taken up the complex, bitter and contradictory aspects of what we now call the period of the cult of the individual, this is only a matter of time.

On security police surveillance of Soviet citizens traveling abroad:

Poor, poor Ivan Ivanovich. . . . After all, he had to keep track of all twenty of us. . . . Still and all, our kind Ivan Ivanovich forgot one thing. . . . Excessive caution—let us call it that—does not bring people together, it drives them apart.

On the Soviet standard of living, with Nekrasov reporting what an Italian Communist had told him:

. . . the average Italian . . . unfailingly asks: "Why is it that these people who have sent a satellite around the moon still can't get rid of queues?"

The other striking feature of "On Both Sides of the Ocean" was the considerable degree of independence which Nekrasov showed in his observations of Italy and the United States. With some exceptions, he adhered fairly closely to his self-adopted standard of "telling only those things I saw with my own eyes," and in spite of the brevity of his trip, what he wrote was the least stereotyped Soviet look at the United States since Ilf and Petrov's *One Storied America,* published more than a quarter century ago.

Either one of these two features by itself—the fresh look at America or the thoughtful look at Soviet life—would have made "On Both Sides of the Ocean" a notable piece of post-Stalin writing, but in this instance the two features were inseparably linked, and in a way, the first was a vehicle for the second. Here was an intelligent Soviet writer who was stimulated to think about his own society by what he saw and heard in the West; comparisons and contrasts were inevitable, particularly the contrasts, and Nekrasov was courageous enough to articulate them. It was clearly the case of a man with deep roots at home, concerned about the future of Soviet society and hoping that his critical remarks would strengthen the cause of reform in the Soviet Union.

In his second travelogue, Nekrasov is still very much the reflective traveler, perceiving at every step similarities and differences between the two societies. This time, however, he shares his comparative thoughts with us in a more subtle way. In discussing the arts in France, he occasionally pauses to comment directly and outspokenly on the Soviet cultural scene, but for the most part his views on the home situation are suggested by the language of implication and indirection—so often the technique by which Soviet literary communication deals with sensitive matters.

"A Month in France," by contrast to the earlier piece, has an outward focus; it is almost wholly devoted to French culture and history and to the fabric of daily life in Provence and in Paris, where Nekrasov spent several years as a very young child. An architect by training, he is uncommonly sensitive to the visual, esthetic side of life and to its intangibles of mood and atmosphere. In this essay he conveys the look of French people and places and how it feels to be among them with such warmth and directness, with such a tactile sense, that you imagine yourself to be there alongside him. Here is a passage in which Nekrasov includes the reader in one of his morning walks in Paris.

Let's you and I go out of the hotel ("Bonjour Monsieur," the obliging porter says to us, "there's nothing here for you yet"), buy the latest newspapers at the kiosk, make a right turn and go get a bite to eat in the little bar near the entrance of the hotel. Rustling the papers, we have a cup of coffee or two and a crunchy roll (here they are called "croissants"), and after picking up a pack of Gauloises—the cheapest and strongest cigarettes that don't make you cough—we set out. . . .

Where shall we go? I think we would do best to trace my favorite morning constitutional walk on the map of Paris. So let's turn left and duck under the arches of the Louvre.

There follows a vivid guided tour with frequent excursions into history, including the place by the Louvre where the young D'Artagnan was challenged to a duel by each of the Three Musketeers. Nekrasov recalls an exciting sequence of events in Dumas' book and then exclaims:

What people! What emotions! . . . It's true that under Cardinal Richelieu duels were forbidden, and the Musketeers violated the ban. We do not violate bans, but at times, oh how one would like to. To throw down the gauntlet: "Tommorow at six a.m. at Novodevichi. The choice of weapons is yours."

He walks his readers to Notre Dame ("The first time I ap-

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proached this cathedral . . . I felt a tremor of emotion"), and after analyzing the impact it makes, he describes a Christmas Eve High Mass that he attended in the cathedral, in which the music of organ and choir made him feel the solemnity of the moment and of the place where Napoleon crowned himself emperor one hundred and sixty years before. He takes his readers into a small cafe on the corner of the Boulevard des Capucines, and from its second-story window he points out the many sights of the Paris he loves, from such piquant sidelights as the place where in 1835 it first became fashionable to smoke in public to the places that evoke in him memories of France's revolutionary tradition. He then describes the cafe in all its colorful detail:

Every table is taken. It's unbelievably crowded. Coats are lying everywhere—on the backs of chairs, on windowsills, on people's knees or simply under the table. Pretty waitresses, balancing trays, are maneuvering skillfully in the narrow spaces between the tables. And above it all there is a continuous hum of voices—nobody eats in silence, everyone is talking, laughing, joking, praising and criticizing one another, people get acquainted, pay no attention to anyone else, and at the same time, casting a swift glance over you, they immediately size you up.

Everyone is simply dressed, but —for Parisians are still Parisians— dressed in good taste and attractively. Nothing flashy, but nothing dreary either. . . . The majority of the girls are wearing slacks, the particularly fashionable ones are even in leather slacks. And in leather jackets with zippers. They say, by the way, that this fashion is already on the way out, that it is migrating to the provinces—in Avignon, for example, there are many more "leather-togged" girls than in Paris.

The cafe is full of people, but they serve you quick as lightning. You have barely ordered when the waitress is already bringing you an appetizing steak, a fresh roll, and the inevitable carafe of wine. Without wine, the French do not dine.

"On Both Sides of the Ocean" was criticized for devoting undue attention to the pleasures of the Italian "trattoria," the Soviet critics' implication being that this was frivolous reporting and that the essay should have dealt with more serious aspects of Italian life, such as industry and agriculture and the political struggles of the Italian workers. Nekrasov's response and his way of discouraging similar criticism of the French travelogue is to say:

Our reader, when he becomes acquainted with this or that foreign travelogue, often asks himself the question: why does it tell so much about the restaurants and bars? Can it be that there is no other theme, no other place for personal contract? Alas, this is the case. If you want to rub shoulders with French people, you cannot escape the restaurants and cafes.

His ear rejoices in the sound of the French language, and shows appreciation for the French sense of humor and its place in French life:

In all his trials and tribulations, the Frenchman tries not to lose his sense of humor. . . . He knows that humor saves. It brightens adversity and helps one to live. . . . The Frenchman jokes and is ironic about everything in life—his wife, his mistress, his friends, himself, even General Charles de Gaulle.

Everywhere he goes, he is responsive to the beauty of French art and architecture, not only in the masterpieces of Paris, but in the old cities of Provence, its monasteries and crumbling fortresses as well. He seeks to understand why each particular beautiful thing has moved him deeply. Thus, in Provence, he fell in love with the surrounding walls and towers of a 13th-century port town: "Walls and towers —and that is all. Solid, built to last for centuries, out of rough stone . . . Not a single unnecessary, superfluous detail . . . everything is business, for war and for defense, nothing for embellishment. It is beautiful. Somber, frightening, but beautiful in its clarity and single-mindedness."

Nekrasov's impressions show how preoccupied he is both with the style of French everyday life and with the outer manifestations of a culture whose art was true to the period in which it was created. In the first instance, it is a matter of visualizing a Parisian day and a quiet street in Provence for his readers back home, very few of whom have ever been to France even though they belong to the most travelled group in Soviet society—the intellectual, economic and party elite. Nekrasov, with his vivid, tactile, intimate descriptions, goes a long way toward compensating for this handicap of isolation. What he says may sometimes strike Western readers as elementary, but to Soviet readers his impressions are fresh and meaningful. He is a "seeing eye" for his countrymen, and when one realizes that most of them will never get to Paris within their lifetimes, there is something profoundly moving about the function he performs.

In a larger sense, Nekrasov is a man in pursuit of beauty and grace and refinement in life. In France he found these qualities in abundance, and he was impressed by the extent to which they have become part of the fabric of French society and have shaped the French style of life. It is this impression, above all, that he is trying to communicate to his readers. He would like to see more beauty and grace and refinement in Soviet life—in its art and architecture, in the way people dress, behave and communicate with one another—and his hope is that if they become sensitive to these qualities, they will

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want to cultivate them in their own society.

On a deeper level then, Nekrasov's essay has a truly civilizing mission and is written as clearly with the future of Soviet society in mind as was the more abrasive and politically oriented "On Both Sides of the Ocean". He is concerned about whether the new skyscrapers in parts of Paris will violate the city's harmony, but he is far more concerned about the skyscrapers going up on the New Arbat, which leads into the very heart of old Moscow.

He compares the late Le Corbusier—who declined his invitation to come to the Soviet Union and apply his talent to the vast Soviet building program—to Stanislavski, the founder of the Moscow Art Theater, seeing in these two men the impulse to search continuously for something new. The author of the "Stanislavski system" feared that his set of flexible propositions and guiding principles could be turned into a dogma; Nekrasov says in effect that they have:

I still remember the endless queues for "The Three Sisters," "The Cherry Orchard," and "Tsar Fedor." I remember the joy we felt when we managed to get a pass from the theater manager, allowing us to sit on the steps of the dress circle. Not long ago, when I walked past the theater on Kamergerski Street, two people offered to sell me their tickets.

However, the theater is not architecture, it has its own laws. But there is one general law which all the arts have in common—not to get paralyzed, not to mark time, to keep pace with the times, and perhaps keep even a tiny bit ahead of them.

Perhaps the most important theme in this travelogue—at least it seems so to me—is an underlying one which Nekrasov comes close to articulating only once. Even then, he does it not by speaking directly but by reporting the thoughts of a young French doctor of left-wing sympathies who spent six months working in a Moscow clinic under the cultural exchange program and stopped in Kiev to see him on his way back to Paris. Nekrasov writes that the young Frenchman was sad to be leaving his Soviet friends.

He rejoiced over each new acquaintance—like a child he rejoiced. And he grieved deeply whenever anyone treated him with caution and, recognizing him as a foreigner, began to praise our achievements excessively or to conceal clumsily our shortcomings.

"Why do they do that?" he puzzled. "After all, I see everything myself. I see both the good and the bad, and the good interests me more."

Jean-Marie did not want to leave. He rejoiced in our successes, he saw our difficulties and concerns, he did not understand many things, did not agree with certain things. But he did not want to leave: he had grown to love Russia, to love its people.

This is the nearest Nekrasov comes to raising the subject of Soviet traditional suspicion toward foreigners. Perhaps one may say that he is interested in the nature and quality of the Soviet relationship to the outside world—not on the official governmental and party level—but on the individual human level. How do Soviet people behave when in another country? What kinds of questions do they ask? What do they look for, how do they interpret what they see and hear, and in what spirit do they report their impressions when they return home?

Nekrasov never offers explicit answers, yet they emerge unmistakably from his own outlook and behavior. When a Russian and a foreigner become acquainted, Nekrasov in effect tells us, their relationship is above all a human one, regardless of what countries and ideologies they represent, and it carries with it the same obligations and high standards one expects from human relationships at home. It is a relationship to be treated thoughtfully from the possible long-term perspective rather then carelessly from the short-term outlook. At one point, he mentions a book on Marseilles by a foreign journalist who gave a distorted picture of the city and thereby deeply offended its people. "I have told this story as a kind of warning to myself and my fellow writers. When you write about foreign countries, remember, always remember, that your lines can come to the attention of readers in those countries, and it is a most offensive thing if you voluntarily or involuntarily do as that journalist did. . . . Alas, this still happens."

He further strengthens the long-term perspective by urging Soviet tourists to jot down the addresses of people whom they meet abroad, because one never knows when one might see them again. He describes several cases in which foreigners he met kept in touch with him by letter, package, and in person, appearing on his Kiev doorstep some time later. "In a word, I believe in writing down addresses—it is not just an act of politeness."

For Nekrasov, the meaningful part of foreign travel is always the human contact and the private dialogue. He points out that there are many kinds of international contacts—conferences, festivals, and sports meets, exchanges of professors, students, and artists—"but the most precious, the most valuable, the most useful contact is the simplest kind: to sit together and talk." Indeed, a large part of his travelogue is about the people he met and the things he did on his own, outside the scope of his officially organized program.

How sharply different is this open, unsuspicious attitude toward foreigners from the theme of heightened vigilance that characterizes so much of the Soviet press these days, from the concerns and attitudes which the political bureaucracy is trying to instill into its subjects!

"On Both Sides of the Ocean" pointed up with striking examples

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the isolation of Soviet intellectuals from Western cultural life. One feels that sense of isolation in this essay too, although less so, and there is also a suggestion here that the West is insufficiently in touch with Soviet cultural developments. However, Nekrasov reports that he was asked questions about Solzhenitsyn (this was just after the publication of *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*), thereby informing his readers that at least the highlights of current Soviet literature come quickly to Western attention.

While Nekrasov is in a class of foreign reporting almost by himself, there is noticeable throughout *Novyi mir* an effort to broaden and improve the magazine's coverage of the outside world. Partly this is being done through translations and reviews of contemporary Western literature. But in addition to Nekrasov's travel notes, Tvardovski has published in the past year some half dozen other Soviet travelogues on life abroad, of which a few are moderately interesting for their informative reporting and freshness of outlook. The one singled out by Tvardovski (writing before Nekrasov's piece appeared) as an example of the "broad and unconstrained form of exposition" he would like to see more of in his journal is an essay by the historian S. Utchenko, entitled "Egypt: Fifty Centuries and the Present," which was published in November 1964. It is thoughtful, and while set in a broad historical-ideological framework, is relatively free from the effort to confirm ideological clichés which has marked most of the reports of Soviet travelers. Utchenko ranges from ancient Egyptian art and architecture to village life on the Nile today and the overall problem of modernization in Egypt, from strictly personal impressions of what he sees to scholarly consideration of the underlying principles of historical change, including some discussion of the theories of Spengler, Toynbee, Karl Jaspers and other Western philosopher-historians.

In February and March of 1965, *Novyi mir* published a travelogue on Chile by Margarita Aliger, a critic and poet who spent two months touring the country during the same December and January that Nekrasov was in Paris. Her "Chilian Summer" has an informal, conversational style, and she too looks upon foreign travel in a very personal way, placing a high value on an individual's private explorations and his own reactions to life abroad. She writes:

What does it mean to spend some time in another country, to get the feeling of it? Does it mean looking at its countryside, its culture, the architecture of its cities, its museums, theaters, universities, and its public and social institutions? Of course it does. All this goes without saying. But in viewing all these aspects of a country's existence, one may nonetheless remain isolated from it, not get the feeling of it, not enter into its life. True penetration into the life of a country is for me an intangible and indescribable sensation.

To go out of the hotel alone in the early morning, on a weekday—even if it is drizzling—and to walk along the quiet, out-of-the-way, altogether undistinguished little side streets, to mingle with a crowd of people on their way to work, to try and understand the insignificant words they toss back and forth as they go, to guess what they are thinking about and what concerns them.

In his travel notes, Utchenko voices much the same personal approach. Pointing out that tourists in Istanbul are always taken to see certain particular monuments, he says that since this was his third visit to Istanbul he knows how to find these monuments, but he feels that he doesn't "really know the city itself. Only once did I manage to stroll by myself, without any guides, along the streets where they never take tourists."

This emphasis on personal discovery and impressions is one of the most fascinating aspects of these recent Soviet travelogues. It is especially noticeable in the contributions of talented fiction writers and of poets, and understandably so, since they tend to perceive life in a more consciously personal and individual way than most people do, and they are practiced in articulating their feelings. By publishing their reports, Tvardovski is setting a higher standard for subsequent note-taking travellers.

The increasingly personal perception of life abroad may be viewed as something of a parallel to the more than ten-year-old trend in post-Stalin fiction which focuses on the private side of a Soviet citizen's existence—on his personal joys and sorrows, his own problems and objectives as distinct from those of the society as a whole. In these travelogues, the main concern is not what is happening in agriculture and industry, how well off the workers in the country are, or how strong is the local Communist Party. These subjects are discussed or touched on in passing, but the central preoccupation of these travellers is the human side of life abroad, the people themselves. Nekrasov's description of Parisian cafe atmosphere and Margarita Aliger's picture of New Year's Eve in Valparaiso are interesting to Soviet readers not only because they have never visited these places, but because such descriptions are still, long after Stalin's death, a refreshing change from most of the foreign reporting in the Soviet press. The intensity of their interest is a measure of how slow Soviet foreign reporting has been to venture into the cultural and human interest fields.

In conversations with Soviet intellectuals in their twenties and thirties, one is often struck by the sophisticated level of their thinking about the West. There

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are great gaps in their knowledge of Western life, but what they do know and have reflected on, they are able to discuss in remarkably Western terms. In part, this is because they are nourished by Western channels of communication—by radio broadcasts, cultural exchange programs, Western literature in translation (of which more has become available in the last few years), and by talks with foreigners, the substance of which is then relayed to many friends and acquaintances. In spite of such contacts and because of them, these Soviet intellectuals are keenly aware of the inadequacy of the Soviet press in the foreign field. Not even the weekly *Za rubezhom* (*Beyond the Border*), which reprints material from the foreign press (much of it from Africa, Asia and Latin America) and was warmly welcomed at first, interests them much any longer. As one Muscovite put it, "Ten years ago this magazine would have filled a need with us, but now it does not differ much from the rest of the Soviet press."

For people such as these, the thoughtful travelogue of *Novyi mir* has an important role to play as a cutting edge in Soviet cultural development. Its discursive form and leisurely pace allows Soviet writers to take the broader view of things, to give a more integrated picture of the outside world and use their experience abroad to say significant things about reform in Soviet society. In short, the travelogue bears out the old truth that a trip is a way to philosophize about the whole of life.

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